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Abstract 
 
 In the post-1990 round of redistricting a number of majority-African American 
legislative districts were created, especially in the South.  The new majority-African 
American districts were created by “pulling” many of the African Americans from 
surrounding districts into a single district, leaving the adjacent districts with a higher 
percentage of whites.  These adjacent districts are often referred to as “bleached” 
districts.  As the number of African Americans elected in the new majority-African 
American districts increased, so did the number of Republicans. This is referred to as the 
“perverse effect thesis.”  This thesis has been widely acclaimed, but scholars have found 
minimal support for the thesis. There is an alternative explanation for the Republican 
growth.  This explanation attributes it to the fact that, regardless of their distance from 
majority-African American districts; more southern whites are voting for Republican 
candidates.   
 Generally, when scholars examine the perverse effect thesis, they have examined 
the twelve new southern majority-African American United States House of 
Representative districts that were created after the 1990 census. This study deviates from 
the prior studies that examine the perverse effect thesis. This study seeks to determine 
how many of the Republican gains in southern  state lower chambers are attributable to 
the new majority-African American districts in these chambers from 1988 to 2004. It 
examines both the perverse effect thesis and the alternative hypothesis. Alabama, 
Louisiana, and Mississippi were used in this study. These states were used because they 
are part of the Deep South, and they are protected by Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. 
Deep Southern states have a larger African American population compared to the Rim 
ix 
 
states.  This study found evidence supporting both the perverse effect thesis and the 
alternative hypothesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Perverse Effects Thesis, Redistricting, Civil Rights Act, Racial Gerrymandering, African 
American Politics
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION: PERVERSE EFFECTS THESIS 
In the post-1990 round of redistricting a number of majority-African American 
legislative districts were created, especially in the South.
1
  Twelve new majority-African 
American United States House of Representative districts
2
 and 51 new majority-African 
American districts for the lower chambers of state legislatures were created in that region 
(see Tables 1.1- 1.2).
3
  The immediate purpose of these districts “was to provide African 
Americans with opportunities to elect representatives of their choice” (Engstrom 2006, 
96).  This purpose was usually achieved, as the vast majority of such districts resulted in 
the election of African American Democrats, whereas districts with less than a majority 
African American rarely did.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
  The South in this study consists of the eleven states of the Confederacy: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, 
Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia.  
 
2
 Prior to the 1990 census, there were only five majority-African American southern United State House 
districts.  
 
3
Lublin (2004) states that fifty-one new majority-African American districts were created in the lower 
chambers of southern state legislatures.  He does not include Arkansas in his study because racial data for 
the court-ordered 1990 districts are unavailable (111). 
2 
 
Table 1.1: The New Majority-African American U.S. House Districts in the South  
 
State 
 
District Number 
 
African American 
% of Total 
Population 
 
African American 
% of Voting Age 
Population 
Alabama 7 67.5 63.5 
Florida 3 55.0 50.6 
 17 58.4 54.0 
 23
a
 51.6 45.7 
Georgia 2 56.6 52.3 
 11 64.1 60.4 
Louisiana 4 66.4 62.6 
North Carolina 1 57.3 53.4 
 12 56.6 53.3 
South Carolina 6 66.2 58.3 
Texas 30
a
 50.0 47.1 
Virginia 3 64.1 61.2 
 
Source: Engstrom 2005. 
 
  a According to Engstrom (2005), “The Florida twenty-third and Texas thirtieth were not majority-African 
American in voting age population (VAP) but were considered to be majority-minority districts because of 
the Hispanic VAP within them.  Three new majority-Hispanic districts were also created, two in Texas and 
one in Florida” (97). 
 
 
Table 1.2: Southern States’ New Majority-African American Lower Chamber Districts, 1990-
1994 
 
 
States
a
 
 
Number of New Majority-African 
American Lower Chamber 
Districts 
 
Total Number of Seats 
Alabama 7 105 
Florida 4 120 
Georgia 9 180 
Louisiana 7 105 
Mississippi 4 122 
North Carolina 7 120 
South Carolina 7 124 
Tennessee 1 99 
Texas 2 150 
Virginia 3 100 
Source: Lublin 2004, 110-111. 
 
 a 
Lublin (2004) does not include Arkansas in his study because the data on the racial composition of 
legislative districts in that state were not available (111). 
3 
 
Table 1.3 presents the percentages of seats held by African Americans in the 
lower chambers of eight southern state legislatures: Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia.  As revealed in 
Table 1.3, the seats held by African Americans increased from 1990 to 1994.  The largest 
gains were achieved in Mississippi and Louisiana in the 1992 elections.  In 1990, African 
Americans held 14 percent of the seats in Louisiana’s lower chamber, and by 1992 they 
held 22 percent of them.  Similarly, in 1990 African Americans held 16 percent of the 
seats in Mississippi’s lower chamber, and by 1992 they held 25 percent of them.  In 1990, 
79 percent of the African Americans in the United States House of Representative were 
elected from majority-African American districts; in 1992, 94 percent of them were 
elected in such districts (Handley, Grofman, and Arden 1998, 23).  The increase in 
African American representation in southern state legislatures and in the U.S. House far 
surpassed the increase in the rest of the country (ibid,14).   
  
4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.3:  Percentages of Seats in the Lower Chambers of Southern States Legislatures Held by African 
Americans 
 
 
States 
 
1988 
 
1990 
 
1992 
 
1994 
 
1996 
 
1998 
 
2000 
 
2002 
 
2004 
 
2006 
 
Alabama 18 17 18 17 17 26 26 28 23 26 
Arkansas 5 9 10 10 10 10 12 12 12 13 
Florida 8 8 10 12 13 13 13 13 14 15 
Georgia 12 13 15 17 17 18 18 19 21 23 
Louisiana 14 14 22 22 19 19 21 21 29 29 
Mississippi 16 16 25 25 28 28 29 29 29 29 
N. Carolina 11 12 12 15 14 14 16 15 15 18 
S. Carolina 12 13 13 15 21 21 21 21 21 27 
Tennessee 10 10 10 12 14 13 13 14 15 16 
Texas 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 7 7 
Virginia 7 7 8 8 9 10 10 10 10 12 
 
Average % of African 
Americans by year 
 
11 
 
12 
 
14 
 
15 
 
16 
 
16 
 
17 
 
17 
 
18 
 
19 
 
Note: Entries are the percentage of seats held by African Americans in the lower chambers of southern state legislatures. 
 
Source: Percentages of African Americans legislators were collected from Lublin (2004), state House web sites, Elected Black 
Offices (1988-1993) and (1997-2001), and by personally contacting each state. Texas stopped reporting the racial makeup of 
their House legislators after the 2002 election.  Racial identifications of Texas legislators as of 2002 were determined by 
examining their pictures and biographies posted on the state legislature’s website (see 
www.capitol.state.tx.us/Members/Members.aspx?Chamber=H; www.capitol.state.tx.us/Members/Members.aspx?Chamber=H; 
www.capitol.state.tx.us/Members/Members.aspx?Chamber=H). This same method was used for Tennessee and Georgia. 
Tennessee’s website listed all of the past House members (1993- 1996 and 2001-2006) (See 
www.legislature.state.tn.us/house/Archives/98GA/Members/Members.htm; 
www.legislature.state.tn.us/house/Archives/99GA/Members.htm; 
www.legislature.state.tn.us/house/Archives/103GA/Members/HMembers.htm; 
www.legislature.state.tn.us/house/Archives/102GA/Members/Members.htm; 
www.legislature.state.tn.us/house/Archives/103GA/Members/HMembers.htm). Georgia’s African American legislators were 
collected from several different websites. For 1995-1996 (www.legis.state.ga.us.legis/1995_6/house/mem.htm); 1997-1998 
(www.legis.state.ga.us.legis/1997_98/house/mem.htm); 1999-2000 (www.legis.state.ga.us.legis/1999_00/house/mem.htm); 
2003-2004 (www.legis.ga.gov.legis/2003_04/house/memers_by_name.htm); and 2005-2006 
(www.legis.state.ga.us/legis/2005_06/house/05alpha.htm).Data from South Carolina were collected from 1994-1996 and 2002 
to the present from the South Carolina Legislature Black Caucus’ website (www.sclbc.org/9.html). Black Wintry (Director of 
Research and Interpretation, Mosaic Templars Cultural Center) complied data of African Americans serving in Arkansas 
General Assembly from 1868 to 2005. The total number of African Americans serving in the Arkansas’ lower chamber in 2006 
was obtained from Arkansas’ General Assembly website (www.arkansas.gov/house/reps.php). 
 
5 
 
 The new majority-African American districts were created by “pulling” many of 
the African Americans from surrounding districts into a single district, leaving the 
adjacent districts with a higher percentage of whites.  These adjacent districts are often 
referred to as “bleached” districts.  The whiter a district, other things being equal, the 
greater the chance that a Republican candidate will be elected in it (Swain 1995, 229; 
Cameron, Epstein and O’Halloran 1996, 805; Lublin 1997, 99).  Many commentators 
have argued that these bleached districts have contributed to the growth of the 
Republican Party in the South (see the overview by Engstrom 2006, 94).  For instance, 
the number of Republicans elected to the southern delegation in the U.S. House and to 
the lower chambers of southern state legislatures has increased as well as the number of 
African Americans.  Table 1.4 presents the percentages of seats held by Republicans in 
the lower chambers of southern state legislatures.
4
Southern Republicans gained nine U.S. 
House seats in 1992 and sixteen more in 1994 (ibid, 95).  This increase has been 
considered by some as the cause of the Republicans gaining control of the U.S. House 
following the 1994 election (Swain 1995, 227, 232; McKee 2002, 123).  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4
 This table will be discussed in greater detail in section VI. 
6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Most African Americans are more likely to identify with the Democratic Party 
than with the Republican Party (see Black and Black 2002, 244; Lublin 2004, 135; Tate 
2003, 118; Frymer 1999, 5; Fauntroy 2007, 3-4, 6).  David Lublin states that African 
Americans feel “completely unwelcome” by the Republican Party (2004, 145).  The 
increase in Republican legislators is said to lead to a decline in legislative support for the 
policy preference of African Americans. Richard Engstrom  notes, “a conservative 
Republican who does not include African Americans in his or her ‘reelection 
constituency’ is not expected to be sensitive to African American concerns, so if the 
Republicans’ gains in legislative seats exceed those of African Americans, an increase in 
the descriptive representation for African Americans may well be at the expense of their 
Table 1.4: Percentage of Seats in the Lower Chambers of Southern State Legislatures Held by Republicans, 1988 to 2006 
  
1988 
 
1990 
 
1992 
 
1994 
 
1996 
 
1998 
 
2000 
 
2002 
 
2004 
 
 
2006 
Alabama 16 21 22 28 28 34 35 40 40 41 
Arkansas 11 9 10 12 14 24 30 30 28 25 
Florida 39 38 41 48 50 61 64 68 70 66 
Georgia 20 14 29 36 41 43 41 41 55 59 
Louisiana 16 16 15 15 26 26 31 34 35 39 
Mississippi 7 16 20 20 30 30 27 31 39 39 
N. Carolina 38 33 35 56 51 45 48 51 48 43 
S. Carolina 30 33 40 48 52 55 56 59 60 59 
Tennessee 40 43 36 40 38 40 41 45 54 46 
Texas 38 37 38 41 45 48 48 59 58 54 
Virginia 39 39 41 46 46 50 52 65 58 57 
 
Average % of Southern 
Republicans by year 
 
27 
 
 
27 
 
30 
 
35 
 
38 
 
41 
 
43 
 
48 
 
50 
 
48 
 
Note: Entries are the percentages of seats held by Republicans in the lower chambers of southern state legislatures. 
 
Sources: Data for 1992-2002 were gathered from Lublin, The Republican South: Democratization and Partisan Change 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), data for 2002, 2004, and 2006 were collected at the National Conference of State 
Legislature website (see http://www.ncsl.org/programs/legismgt/statevote2002.htm; 
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/legismgt/statevote2004.htm; andhttp://www.ncsl.org/programs/legismgt/statevote2006.htm. 
7 
 
substantive representation” (2006, 94).5  A number of scholars have argued that this in 
fact happened during the 1990s (see Swain 1995, 227, 232;Overby and Cosgrove 1996, 
540, 547-551; Cameron et al.1996, 794, 808, 809-810; and Lublin 1997, 99, 119). 
 The hypothesized linkage that more majority-African American districts result in 
more Republicans being elected is known as the “perverse effects thesis.”  This thesis 
typically refers to Republicans winning in the districts “adjacent to,” “surrounding,” 
“bordering,” or “neighboring” the new majority-African American districts (see, e.g., 
Bullock 1995a, 22 and 1995b, 33; Overby and Cosgrove 1996, 541; Knuckey 2001, 258; 
Black and Black 2002, 197; McKee 2002, 124, 131, 137).  The perverse effects thesis has 
been widely proclaimed, but it is also contested.  Engstrom writes, “Given the amount of 
attention that the new majority-African American districts generated, and the popularity 
of the perverse partisan effects thesis among commentators, we may be surprised at how 
few analysts have placed a number on how many times Republicans replaced Democrats 
because of them” (2006, 102).  Studies note the rise of the number of both African 
American Democrats and Republicans being elected and attribute this to a relationship 
between the majority-African American districts and the adjacent districts without 
identifying any specific instances of the two being connected (ibid, 95).  
 Engstrom examines the empirical evidence for the “perverse effects” thesis and 
maintains that the “creation of twelve new majority-African American [U.S. House] 
districts in the South following the 1990 census did benefit the Republicans, but the 
studies of these districts that examine the perverse partisan effects thesis concluded that 
                                                 
5A reelection constituency, according to Fenno (2003), “contains all voters who support or might support 
the member” (7).  Hanna Pitkin (1967) distinguishes between descriptive and substantive representation.  
Members of minority groups gain descriptive representation by electing members of their group to public 
office (209).  Minority groups gain substantive representation by exerting influence over the policy process 
(209). 
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this benefit was not nearly as great, or as consequential, as many commentators have 
assumed” (2006, 107).  Empirical research has concluded that only about six U.S. House 
seats gained by Republicans following the 1992 and 1994 elections were attributable to 
the new majority-African American districts.
6
  The extent to which Republican gains can 
be “blamed” on the new African American congressional districts is therefore limited 
(ibid, 95).  Even authors who argue for the empirical presence of the perverse effects 
thesis reveal only modest empirical impacts (Hill 1994,399-400; Lublin and Voss 2000b, 
805; Hill and Rae 2000, 18-19; McKee 2002, 131). 
 Kevin Hill states, “not all Republican gains in the South were related to racial 
redistricting” (1995, 400, emphasis in original).  Many of the Republican victories 
occurred in areas not affected by the new majority-African American districts.  The 
Republican surge in electoral support in the South at this time was far from limited 
geographically to areas around these districts.  It may be, as one author has stated,   
“difficult, if not impossible, to determine how many seats underwent partisan change 
because of race conscious redistricting” (Beachler 1995, 76; see also Bullock 1995b, 35).    
 If the large number of Republican gains is not attributable to the new majority-
African American districts themselves—what does account for them?  There is an 
alternative explanation for the Republican growth.  This explanation attributes it to the 
fact that, regardless of their distance from majority-African American districts, more 
southern whites are voting for Republican candidates.  This study will test at the state 
legislative level both the perverse effects thesis concerning adjacent districts and the 
alternative hypothesis that the increase in the number of GOP (Grand Old Party) seats in 
                                                 
6
 These districts were the Alabama Sixth and Georgia First, Third, and Fourth in 1992; and North 
Carolina’s Second and Third Districts in 1994. 
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the South was attributable more to the Republican realignment in the South than the 
consequences of racial redistricting. 
Nearly all of the literature that examines the perverse effects thesis has focused 
solely on the twelve new majority-African American U.S. House districts that were 
created in the post-1990 round of redistricting.  The exception is a study by David Lublin 
and Stephen Voss that analyzed the effects of racial redistricting on southern states’ 
lower legislative chambers.  They examined these districts because they felt that the 
congressional context “…provide[s] few actual cases to test how electoral borders shape 
Democratic fortunes” (2000b, 793).  
Like the Lublin and Voss’ (2000b) study, this analysis will also examine the 
effects of racial redistricting on the southern states’ lower legislative chambers.  This 
study will differ from their study in a major way; it will test the perverse effects thesis by 
examining the districts adjacent to the new majority-African American districts.  Lublin 
and Voss’s study does not distinguish between Republican gains due to the bleaching of 
districts adjacent to majority-African American districts and Republican gains occurring 
elsewhere in a state.  
The Republican growth at the state level, especially in southern states’ lower 
legislative chambers, has been much slower than at the federal level (Lublin 2004, 67).  
Lublin argues that scholars “need to examine partisan shifts below the congressional level 
in order to explain why partisan change has occurred more slowly as one moves down the 
ballot” in the South (ibid, 67).  This study will examine districts in the lower chambers of 
three southern state legislatures (Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana).
7
 Lublin states 
                                                 
7
 Chapter 4 will provide a detail account how and why these states were selected.  
 
10 
 
that, “the elections of many southern state senators to staggered terms, as in the U.S. 
Senate, makes it difficult to assess the impact of any one election” (id, 47).  He further 
notes that partisan change in state Senates tends to closely parallel that in lower chambers 
(id, 47). 
It is also important to analyze the lower chambers in southern state legislatures 
because two-party competition at this level has increased due to the growth of the 
Republican Party.
8
  Republicans made significant gains in these chambers during the 
1990s and 2000s.  In 1990, they held 27 percent of all southern states’ lower chamber 
seats.  The percentage of these seats held by the GOP increased to 30 in 1992 and to 35in 
1994 (table 4; see also Lublin 2004, 51-52).  Furthermore, examining these districts will 
provide a larger number of cases to gauge the perverse effects of these districts.  As 
Lublin and Voss  note, “the South’s smallest state House has more than three times as 
many districts as the region’s largest congressional delegation” (ibid, 793).9 
 Majority-Hispanic U.S. House districts were also created in the post-1990 round 
of redistricting, but they are not as abundant compared to the number of majority-African 
American districts.  There were only three majority-Hispanic U.S. House districts created 
at that time (Engstrom 2006, 97).  African Americans tend to be more geographically 
concentrated than Hispanics, making it easier to create these districts for African 
Americans (Handley, Grofman, and Arden 1998, 25; Engstrom 2006, 96; Casellas 2011, 
                                                 
8
 See Lamis1990, 9-10; Broach and Bandy 1999, 59-62, 67-68; Christensen and Fleer 1999, 90-92; 
Binford, Baxter, and Sturrock 1999, 126, 128-130;  Edds and Morris 1999, 152-154, 164;  Barth, Blair, and 
Dumas 1999, 180-181; Ashford and Locker 1999, 215-216,  Cotter and Gordon 1999, 244, 247; Shaffer, 
Sturrock, Breaux, and Minor 1999, 260, 270-271; Murray and Attlesey 1999, 328, 337-338; Carver and 
Fiedler 1999, 360, 362-364. 
 
9
 Lublin and Voss (2000b, 793) state that the Texas congressional delegation, the largest of any southern 
state, includes 30 members, while Tennessee’s lower chamber, the smallest of all southern states, consists 
of 99 members. 
 
11 
 
81).  Most of the scholarly attention has focused on the twelve new majority-African 
American districts.  It is likely that these districts received this attention because of the 
history and large presence of African Americans in the South.  The 1990 and 2000 
censuses both report that about 53 percent of the African American population resides in 
the southern region (1990 and 2000 American Fact Finder, U.S. Censuses). 
 When examining the perverse effects thesis, most studies have only examined 
data from the 1990s.  This study will examine data from the post-2000 elections as well.  
It is important to examine these elections because there have been a number of changes in 
the law that have jeopardized the longevity of majority-African American districts.
10
  The 
time frame for this study is from 1988 to 2004.  This study will seek to determine how 
many of the Republican gains in southern lower chambers are attributable to the new 
majority-African American districts in these chambers from 1988 to 2004. 
MAP OF THE STUDY 
 Chapter Two of this study will provide a closer look at the perverse effects thesis. 
It will discuss why many scholars contest this thesis.  Chapter Three will examine 
sections 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.  These two sections have played an 
essential role in the creation of new majority-African American districts.  The evolution 
of these provisions will be examined along with several United State Supreme Court 
cases concerning them.  Chapter Four examines the alternative hypothesis - the extent to 
which the increase in Republican state legislative seats is due to the GOP surge in the 
South.  Two elements will be examined in this chapter: the rise of the Republican Party 
and the entanglement of race and partisanship.  Chapter Five will present the study's 
hypotheses and the analytic approach.  Chapter Six will present the results from the two 
                                                 
10
 These challenges to these districts will be discussed in Chapter 3 in greater detail.  
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analytic approaches and Chapter Seven will conclude the study by offering a recap of the 
study, its key findings, and future recommendations. 
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CHAPTER 2: A CLOSER LOOK AT THE PERVERSE EFFECTS THESIS 
 African Americans and the southern region have a complex history, which can be 
traced back to the introduction of racism as a justification for slavery.
11
Race and its role 
in southern politics have received considerable scholarly attention, which often highlights 
the region’s uniqueness.  V. O. Key’s, Southern Politics in State and Nation  was one of 
the first studies that examined the region’s uniqueness (1949). Key’s analysis is based 
upon the contention that race is the fundamental structuring force of southern politics.  
The relationship between whites and African Americans is at the heart of this uniqueness.  
This relationship has often been described as the central artery of southern politics (Key 
1949, 5; Black and Black 2002, 4; Lamis 1999, 3).Key writes, “Of the books about the 
South there is no end.  Nor will there be so long as the South remains the region with the 
most distinctive character and tradition” (ix).   
 Since the publication of Key’s seminal book, the South has undergone some 
dramatic changes, such as the Civil Rights Movement, population growth especially in 
the number of Hispanic residents, and the increasing number of Republicans being 
elected in the region.  The Civil Rights Movement and the passage of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 changed the racial context of southern 
politics, but racial tension did not disappear (Lublin 2004, 15).  Earl Black and Merle 
Black state that race has been, and continues to be, “the central political cleavage” in the 
region (2004, 4).  
                                                 
11
 The southern political system for centuries was based on the segregation and subjugation of African 
Americans (Glaser 1996, 2). Key states, “In its grand outlines the politics of the South revolves around the 
position of the Negro” (1949, 5). 
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 Following the 1990 census of population, state and local governments across the 
United States engaged in an atypical round of gerrymandering.  It was atypical because, 
unlike previous rounds, new majority-African American and majority-Hispanic 
legislative districts were created to facilitate the election of representatives that were the 
choice of African American and Hispanic voters.
12
  This round of redistricting is often 
referred to as “racial redistricting” because this process was based on race.  Concerning 
the expression “racial gerrymandering,” Richard Engstrom states that “instead of 
referring to the past practice of designing districts to impede the elections of African 
Americans, it is now used to refer to efforts to design districts to facilitate their election” 
(2006, 92).  
 Redistricting of congressional and state legislative districts is traditionally under 
the authority of state legislatures, which meant in the South white Democrats usually 
controlled this process.  The Democratic Party was the majority party in southern state 
legislature during the early 1990s (Clayton 2000, 33).  In the post-1990 round of 
redistricting, however, southern Republicans and African American Democrats played a 
vital role in the process. Dewey Clayton states that white Democrats wanted to draw 
district lines to ensure their own long-standing dominance in the southern delegations to 
the U.S. House and in state legislatures, whereas African Americans wanted to increase 
the number of African Americans elected to these bodies (ibid, 33).Clayton states that 
“Republicans, outnumbered [in state legislatures], saw that their only opportunity to gain 
congressional seats was to ally themselves with blacks in support of the creation of 
majority districts” (id, 33).Republicans believed that these districts would remove 
                                                 
12
  James Glaser states, “several of these new African American districts are located in many places where 
race is still a big and obvious issue” (1996, 142-143).   
 
15 
 
African American voters from the existing Democratic districts, which would leave the 
remaining Democratic incumbents vulnerable because the districts would have a greater 
number of whites and be more Republican-leaning than districts not affected by racial 
redistricting (Clayton 2000, 33-34; Bullock 1995b, 22).  
LITERATURE REVIEW: THE PERVERSE EFFECTS THESIS 
STUDIES SUPPORTING THE PERVERSE EFFECTS THESIS 
 The literature on the perverse effects thesis can be divided into studies that report 
perverse effects and those that challenge the magnitude of the reported effects.  Almost 
all of the studies concern U.S. House districts, and focus on the 1992 and 1994 elections.  
The early 1990s saw the occurrence of the largest increase of majority-African American 
districts in American history.  Scholars have reported that evidence reveals that they 
resulted in the election of more African Americans and more Republicans. 
 Kevin Hill’s study of the 1992 U.S. House election, for which eight southern 
states adopted new majority-African American districts, examined the link between the 
rise of African Americans and Republicans in the South and addressed what would have 
happened if racial redistricting had not occurred (1995, 385).
13
  Using a multivariate 
analysis, Hill found evidence to support the thesis that the creation of the new African 
American districts cost Democrats seats in this election (id, 399).  While 7 of the 
107districts experienced a party change in the 1992 election, Hill argues that only four of 
                                                 
13
  The eight southern states examine were Alabama, Georgia, Florida, Louisiana, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, Texas, and Virginia. Arkansas, Mississippi, and Tennessee were excluded from Hill’s analysis 
because these three states did not create majority-African American U.S. House districts for the 1992 
elections.   
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these districts can be attributed to the new majority-African American districts. The four 
districts are the Alabama Sixth and Georgia First, Third, and Fourth (id, 391).
14
 
 Seth McKee, using the results from all southern U.S. House elections in 1992, 
argues that the creation of the new majority-African American districts constitutes a 
direct loss of four white Democratic seats (2002, 133).  These four Democratic losses are 
the same four districts identified by Hill.  McKee notes, “in 1992, the average increase in 
[white voting-age population] for the districts bordering the newly created [majority-
African American districts] is 10 percent and the average decline [in African American 
voting-age population] is 37 percent” (ibid, 133).  
1992 and 1994 Congressional Elections 
 Scholars have examined both the 1992 and 1994 congressional elections to 
determine the effects of racial redistricting.  Charles Bullock examined the 1992 and 
1994 elections, and states that Republicans gained three U.S. House seats in Georgia, 
four seats in North Carolina, and one in Mississippi (1995b, 35).
15
  Likewise, David 
Lublin, examining all southern U.S. House elections in 1992 and 1994, states that “racial 
redistricting explains at least one-half of the 1992 Republican gains, though the national 
Republican tide that gave Republicans control of the House for the first time in forty 
years accounts for most of the new seats won by Republicans in 1994” (1997, 111).  
                                                 
14
 Hill states that these four experienced a “dramatic drop-off in the percentage of African Americans 
residing in these districts, especially the Alabama Sixth,  where the proportion of African Americans went 
from 31 percent to 8 percent as a result of redistricting” (1995, 391).  The African American population in 
Georgia’s First District went from 37 to 9 percent, in Georgia’s Third District it decreased from 35 to 18 
percent, and in Georgia’s Fourth District, it went from 25 to 12 percent (Hill 1995, 391; Lublin 1997, 111). 
 
15
 Engstrom believes that Bullock might have meant Alabama’s Sixth District instead of Mississippi’s Sixth 
(2006, 103). 
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 Lublin found that “five or six” Democratic losses in 1992 were attributable to 
racial redistricting (1997, 111).  He agrees with Hill that the Alabama Sixth and Georgia 
First, Third, and Fourth were Democratic losses because of racial redistricting, but he 
also argues that Alabama Second was another district lost by Democrats because of racial 
redistricting (ibid, 112).
16
  Lublin also asserts that racial redistricting might have cost 
Democrats two additional seats in Florida’s Fourth and Twenty-Second Districts (id, 112) 
(emphasis added).
17
  Lublin, examining the 1994 congressional election, identified North 
Carolina’s Second and Third Districts as Democratic losses because of racial redistricting 
(id, 114).
18
 
Lublin and Stephen Voss (2000a) estimate that racial redistricting cost the 
Democratic Party 11 U.S. House seats in the 1992 and 1994 elections.  These Democratic 
losses were the Alabama Second and Sixth, Georgia First, Third, and Fourth, and Florida 
Fourth in 1992, and the Illinois Fifth, New Jersey Eighth, and North Carolina Second, 
Third, and Fourth in 1994.
19
  They also suggest that racial redistricting might have cost 
Democrats two seats in Florida’s Fourth and Twenty-Second Districts in 1992, as Lublin 
noted earlier. 
                                                 
16
 Redistricting reduced the African American population in Alabama’s Second District from 32 to 24 
percent (Lublin 1997, 112). 
 
17
 These districts lost a sizeable proportion of their African American population due to redistricting.  In 
1990, the African American population in Florida’s Fourth District was 28 percent but after redistricting, it 
was reduced to 6 percent.  The African American population in Florida’s Twenty-Second District was 
reduced from 26 percent to 3 percent (Lublin 1997, 112).  Republicans gained control of both of these 
districts in 1992.  
 
18
 Racial redistricting reduced the African American population in the Second District from 40 to 22 
percent and 26 to 21 percent in the Third District (Lublin 1997, 114). 
 
19
 Lublin and Voss note that the African American population in Illinois’ Fifth District decreased by 9 
percentage points while the Hispanic population was reduced from 42 percent to 13 percent (2000a, 431).   
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 Donald Beachler, in his examination of racial gerrymandering and Republican 
gains in southern U.S. House elections in 1992 and 1994,  identified only two districts 
lost by Democrats due to racial redistricting (1995, 76).  These districts were the 
Alabama Sixth and Georgia Third, both of which were identified by Hill, McKee, and 
Lublin and Voss as well (ibid, 74-77).  In a later article, which only examines Texas, 
Georgia, and North Carolina, Beachler disagrees with Lublin.  He states that Georgia’s 
Fourth District should not be included because it had “a racial balance that was not 
substantially altered by redistricting” (1998, 12).20 
 Bernard Grofman and Lisa Handley found that the creation of the new majority-
African American districts had a negative impact on the Democratic seat share in the 
1992 and 1994 elections (1988, 52).  These authors, comparing the changes in 1994 to the 
situation in 1990, concluded that “as few as 2-5 of the 24 southern congressional seats 
lost by the Democrats between 1990 and 1994” could be attributable to the new African 
American districts (ibid, 53, 56-57).
21
 
 Carol Swain makes the most extreme claim, stating that “since the race-conscious 
redistricting of the 1990s, the loss of no fewer than 17 Democratic seats can be directly 
attributable to the creation of majority-black districts in the South” (1995, 227) (emphasis 
added).  Swain offers absolutely no evidence for this assertion, however, and does not 
identify these districts. She relies on the same conclusion expressed to her by David 
Bositis in a personal conversation (ibid, 284 n.11). 
                                                 
20
 In addition, Engstrom notes that the “Democratic incumbent in the Fourth District won reelection in 1992 
with over 64 percent of the vote, but lost by less than a percentage point in 1994” (2006, 104). 
 
21
  Grofman and Handley do not identify the specific districts that Democrats lost because of racial 
redistricting.   
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1990-1994 Congressional Elections 
 In another study, Lublin, examines the 1990, 1992, and 1994 congressional 
elections, and reports that racial redistricting cost Democrats approximately ten 
Democratic seats in four states (Alabama, Florida, Georgia, and North Carolina) (2004, 
108).  Lublin’s study indicates that racial redistricting cost both Alabama and Florida 
Democrats two seats, and both Georgia and North Carolina Democrats three seats in 1994 
(ibid, 100-111).  
1988-1996 Congressional Elections 
 Hill and Nicol Rae, in a study updating Hill’s (1995) study, examined the 1988 
through 1996 congressional elections and found that racial redistricting harmed the 
Democratic Party (2000, 10, 13-18).
22
  They state that in 1988, Democrats controlled 67.2 
percent of all the southern House seats, but by 1996 they controlled 55.6 percent of these 
seats.  They report that Democrats would have maintained control of approximately 11 
U.S. House seats if racial redistricting had not occurred.  They identified the Florida 
Twenty-Second and Nineteenth, and Georgia First and Third in 1992, the Georgia Third 
and Eighth and North Carolina Second and Third in 1994, and the Alabama Fourth, 
Georgia Sixth, and Louisiana Fifth in 1996 (ibid, 16).    
CONTESTED LITERATURE 
  
The number of Democratic losses identified above are far from the magnitude 
often assumed, such as that expressed by Swain.  But the results of these studies are 
contested.  The criticisms of this literature are identified below. 
ADDRESSING THE WRONG RESEARCH QUESTION 
                                                 
22
  This study updates Hill’s 1995 study. 
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 When assessing the perverse effects of the new majority-African American 
districts, Engstrom states, “it is important to keep the question clear” (2006, 100).  
Scholars have sought to answer this question: How much better could the Democrats 
have done if the states had not felt compelled to adopt new majority-African American 
districts?  Engstrom suggests that, on the contrary, the appropriate question should be: 
How many of the Republican gains are attributable to the new majority-African 
American districts (ibid, 100)?  He notes that these two questions are sometimes 
confused, and “…districts that Republicans retained but might have been won by the 
Democrats had more African Americans been included in them are counted as losses 
along with those that the Democrats actually lost to the Republicans” (id, 101).  For 
example, Bullock (1995b, 35) and Lublin and Voss (2000a, 430-431) argue that 
Republican gains should be viewed in this manner.  
DIFFERENT METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES 
   When examining the perverse effects thesis, scholars have employed several 
different research designs.  These designs, according to Engstrom, range from: 
a common hand count, which requires scholars to examine the particular  
details of the different election contests, to more complex and sophisticated  
statistical analyses in which numerous U.S. House elections serve as the unit  
of analysis and patterns across these elections are examined (2006, 100).   
HAND COUNT 
Lublin and Voss (2000a) and Beachler (1998) have utilized a “hand count” to 
analyze the perverse effects.
23
  Lublin and Voss note that using statistical analyses 
“neglects the particulars of each contests” and “produce less-meaningful estimates” than 
                                                 
23
  Lublin’s 2004 study examined both southern U.S. House and lower legislative chamber elections based 
on a hand count.  Beachler (1995), Lublin (1997), and McKee (2002) also performed a hand count but they 
do not provide readers with how their results were generated.  
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a hand count (2000a, 428), so they opted for using a direct approach, which required 
them to “dirty their hands” by examining features of district elections.  This was achieved 
by examining “state-by-state inventory of the lost seats based on the correct Census data” 
(ibid, 429). 
Lublin and Voss state, “it is impossible to know the exact district lines that states 
would have adopted without pressure from both activists and the U.S. Department of 
Justice to create majority-minority districts” (2000a, 429). Therefore, the authors used an 
approach suggested by Grofman and Handley.  This approach maintains that district lines 
prior to the 1990 census should be used when gauging the effects of racial redistricting.  
Lublin and Voss state that Grofman and Handley’s approach has “intuitive appeal 
because states often choose status quo plans to please incumbents and minimize conflict” 
(ibid, 429) (emphasis in original).  On the other hand, Lublin and Voss suggest that this 
approach ignores the context of redistricting in particular states (id, 425). Using their 
hand count method, Lublin and Voss found that racial redistricting cost Democrats 11 
U.S. House seats in the early 1990s.   
Beachler (1998) also performed a hand count to determine if redistricting cost 
Democrats U.S. House seats in Georgia, North Carolina, and Texas in the 1992 and 1994 
elections.
24
  He examines local newspapers and secondary sources to demonstrate that the 
white Democrats who controlled the redistricting process did “perceive the mandate to 
create new black and Latino districts as a threat to white Democratic incumbents” 
(1998,3).  He argues that using this approach demonstrated that white Democrats 
redistricters were reluctant to create the maximum number of majority-African American 
                                                 
24
 These three states were used because they created at least two new majority-African American districts in 
the 1990s. 
 
22 
 
districts (ibid).
25
  Using this method, he found that racial redistricting cost Democrats 
seats in North Carolina, Texas, and Georgia. 
STATISTICAL MODELS 
Most of the studies that examine the perverse effects thesis have employed a 
variety of different statistical models (see Hill 1995, Grofman and Handley 1998, Hill 
and Rae 2000, Overby and Brown 2002).  These models are often complex and 
sophisticated, and frequently assume what would have happened if racial redistricting had 
never occurred (Overby and Brown 2002, 340). 
Hill (1995) and Hill and Rae (2000) performed multivariate analyses to examine 
effects of racial redistricting.  They used Andrew Gelman and Gary King’s (1994) model.  
This model, according to Hill, is the “…culmination of an attempt to create an omnibus 
method of evaluating electoral systems, especially the manner in which redistricting 
affects our assumption about the results of congressional elections” (1995, 388).  This 
model also allowed Hill (1995) and Hill and Rae (2000) to assume what would have 
happened if racial redistricting had never occurred.    
Hill also employed a counter factual model to test a hypothetical scenario.  This  
model determined what would have happened if the 1992 election were run with the 1990 
districts’ lines. It allowed Hill to replace the 1992 African American population in each 
district with the 1990 African American population. He found if racial redistricting had 
                                                 
25
  Beachler states:  
the impact of the 1990s redistricting on Democratic partisanship in each congressional 
district in the state is determined by calculating the change in the percentage of the vote that 
Michael Dukakis, the 1988 Democratic presidential candidate, received in each district as it 
existed from 1982 through 1990 and the percentage of the vote Dukakis received in the district 
redrawn for the 1992 elections (1998, 3). 
He states that using the Dukakis vote is a good measure to determine two-party competition in the three 
states and it is “a useful [measurement] because it is a readily available assessment of partisan change for 
congressional districts as a result of the redistricting that followed the 1990 census” (ibid, 4). 
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not occurred Democrats would have retained the Alabama Sixth and Georgia First, Third, 
and Fourth in 1992.  
Hill and Rae also conducted a similar analysis to determine what would have 
happened if racial redistricting had not occurred.  The authors “substitute percentage 
black in 1990 for percentage black in 1992, 1994, and 1996” (2000, 16).  If the 1992 
elections had been run with the 1990 districts’ lines, three districts would have stayed 
Democratic rather than switch to Republican.  These three districts were the Florida 
Twenty-Second and Georgia First and Third.  Had the 1994 election been run with the 
1990 district lines, four districts would have remained Democratic: the Georgia Third and 
Eighth and North Carolina Second and Third.  Replacing the 1996 election with the 1990 
districts’ lines, Democrats would have retained three districts: the Alabama Fourth, 
Georgia Sixth, and Louisiana Fifth.  
 Overby and Brown also conducted a multivariate analysis examining all U.S. 
House seats in the 1994 election.  They did not find evidence to support the perverse 
effects thesis.  Overby and Brown state that, “as the change in the percentage of African 
Americans in the districts increases, the vote received by white incumbent Democrats 
remains remarkably unaffected” (2002, 348). The findings are counter-intuitive because it 
has traditionally been found that African American constituents help white Democratic 
incumbents win reelections.   
DECOMPOSITION MODEL 
Scholars have also used the decomposition model when examining the effects of 
racial redistricting.  This model is relatively new to the discipline of political science; 
only a few political scientists have used it (see Grofman and Handley 1991 and 1998; 
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Krehbiel and Wright 1993).  According to Grofman and Handley, this model is a 
“…useful methodology to estimate the relative magnitude of changes in districting lines 
(composition) and changes in voting (behavior)…”(1998, 56).  This model decomposes 
shifts in the number of Democrats across elections into three categories: composition 
effect, behavioral effect, and an interaction between the two (ibid, 154-55).  The 
composition effects are losses that occurred because of redistricting.  The behavioral 
effect represents what would have happened to Democrats under the old districts (before 
racial redistricting) (id, 154-55).  The interaction effects combine the composition and 
behavioral effects together, which are losses that “would not have occurred unless the 
Democrats lost votes and the district boundaries changed” (Lublin 2004, 109).   
Grofman and Handley found: 
a 17 percent decline from 1990 to 1994 in the percentage of House seats  
held by Democrats in the (eleven state) South is apportioned into 17  
points of behavioral change (i.e., increased Republican vote share) and  
only 4 points of compositional change (i.e., redistricting-related) change,  
with -4 points of interaction effect.  If  we allocated the interaction  
equally to the compositional and behavioral components, then only 2  
percentage points, equaling a little over 2 seats (2/17 * .17 * 125) would 
be attributed to the impact of race-related districting in the South.  If, more  
plausibly, we allocate the interaction effect in proportion to the  
magnitude of the behavioral and compositional effects, we would  
still only attribute 4 Southern seats(4/21 *.17 *125) to the race related  
effects of 1990s districting.  Even if we allocate the interaction effect  
entirely to the compositional components, we would still only attribute 
5 seats (4/17 * .17 *125) to the race-related effects of 1990s districting  
(1998, 56). 
 
Grofman and Handley argue that their model is “almost certainly an understatement 
because it skips over what happened in 1992” (ibid, 58).  They suggest that Republicans 
acquired more seats in 1994 than in 1990 because the lines drawn after 1990 hurt white 
Democratic incumbents because many of them lost their seats in 1994 (id,58). 
Criticism Number One of Statistical Models: Attributing all Republican Gains to 
Majority-African American Districts 
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   Some scholars count all of the Republican gains and attribute them to the 
perverse effects of racial redistricting (see Hill 1995; Grofman and Handley 1998; 
Overby and Brown 2002).  Using all southern states in their attempts to identify how 
many Republican seats were won due to racial redistricting, they have often included 
three states—Arkansas, Mississippi, and Tennessee—that are southern but did not create 
any new majority-African American U.S. House districts during the post-1990 round of 
redistricting.  After the 1992 congressional election, Republicans acquired a seat in 
Arkansas, and in 1994, two seats in both Mississippi and Tennessee (Engstrom 2006, 
101).  Scholars tend to count these five Republican gains and attribute them to the 
perverse effects, even though these states did not create new African American districts.  
 Grofman and Handley (1998) and McKee (2002), in their analyses of the perverse 
effects thesis, examined  all of the U.S. House districts in all eleven southern states.  
Despite examining all southern U.S. House districts, scholars have found minimal 
support for the effects of racial redistricting.  For instance, Grofman and Handley 
identified “2-5” Democratic losses, while McKee identified four losses (1998, 53; 1997, 
11; 2002, 133-34).   
Criticism Number Two of Statistical Models:  Ignoring the Adjacency Requirement 
 The perverse effects thesis concerns Republican gains in districts adjacent to the 
new majority-African American districts, but scholars often ignore this constraint and 
examine all southern U.S. House districts, regardless of whether or not they satisfy this 
requirement.  This is another criticism of statistically driven models used to examine the 
effects of racial redistricting.  Engstrom notes, “The more distant a district is from an 
African American district, … the more likely it is that factors other than race play the 
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dominant role in its design” (2006, 105).  This is a reason to include the constraints.  But 
as Engstrom further states, sometimes a broader search beyond the adjacent districts 
might be informative, especially given the “domino effect,” which is so prevalent in 
redistricting (ibid,105). 
 Studies by Hill (1995), Grofman and Handley (1998), and Hill and Rae (2000)all 
disregarded the adjacency requirement.  As discussed above, these authors found support 
for the perverse effects thesis.  In abandoning the adjacency requirement, the perverse 
effects thesis is not truly being tested, and the results could be misleading.  It is possible, 
as stated by Engstrom, that factors other than race might have influenced the authors’ 
conclusions about their evidence for the perverse effects thesis. 
DIFFERENT VARIABLES USED IN THE STATISTICAL MODELS 
The statistical models used by scholars often include a variety of variables.  Hill’s 
model included incumbency, percentage of African Americans in a district, whether a 
district is a majority-African American district, and the change in the percentage of 
African Americans  in each district.  Hill states that “all of the predictors of the 1992 
Democratic vote, with the exception of the dummy for whether or not the district is 
majority-African American, are statistically significant” (1995, 395).  Hill found that 
changing a district’s African American voting-age population is a strong predictor of the 
election outcome in that district.  He states, “for each loss of one percent black, […] the 
predicted Democratic vote goes down by 0.28%” (ibid, 395).  Hill’s conclusion from his 
multivariate analysis supports the underlying notion of the perverse effects thesis. 
Hill and Rae’s study of all southern U.S. House elections from 1988 to 1996 used 
similar variables as Hill’s 1995 study, but they included some new variables in their 
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model.  They added electoral success, campaign spending for the election cycle for 
Democrats and Republicans, candidate professionalism, the American Conservative 
Union (ACU) scores for an incumbent’s roll-call voting, and the percentage of the vote 
received by the Republican presidential candidate in the district.  Whether or not the 
district has a majority-African American population and the percentage of a district that 
is African American for an election year are in the model as well.  
Hill and Rae found that when holding all variables constant, the “percentage of 
the population in a district that is black was only a significant predictor in 1992, the 
election immediately after redistricting” (2000, 14).  They also found that whether or not 
a district was majority-African American is never a significant predictor of the 
Democratic vote (ibid, 14).
26
 
Overby and Brown included a measure of change in racial composition of the 
district as an independent variable in their statistical model.  Like Hill and Rae, they also 
included variables to gauge the impact of incumbency, campaign spending, and overall 
partisan support in a district, measured by Clinton’s percentage of the two-party 
presidential vote in 1992 (2002, 341).  Constituency ideologies of a district, measured by 
Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) scores during the election cycle and region, 
were also included in the authors’ study.27 
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 They note that “Democratic and Republican challenger campaign spending against incumbents are 
usually significant predictors of the Democratic vote across districts,” but they found that the increasing 
levels of Republicans challenger spending in an election is not a predictor of the Democratic vote (2000, 
14). 
 
27
Overby and Brown state, “constituency ideological scores are derived by regressing each member’s raw 
1994 ADA score on the median household income and the percentage of college educated adults in each 
district” (2002, 342). They also included two additional variables designed to measure incumbents’ 
personal characteristics on their performance in 1994.  Seniority measured by the years served in Congress 
was the first variable.  Representatives’ previous vote percentage, measured by the percentage of their two-
party vote in 1992, was the second variable.   
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According to their results, “as the change in the percentage of African Americans 
in the districts increases, the vote received by white incumbent Democrats remains 
remarkably unaffected” (2002, 345).  Their findings are counter-intuitive because it has 
traditionally been found that African American constituents help white Democratic 
incumbents win reelection.  Overby and Brown do not find support for the perverse 
effects thesis.  
REPUBLICAN AND DEMOCRATIC GAINS DUE TO REAPPORTIONMENT 
 Following the 1990 census, five southern states gained ten new seats due to 
reapportionment—Florida gained four, Texas gained three, and Georgia, North Carolina, 
and Virginia each gained one.  This, according to Engstrom: 
 …complicates partisan effects analyses because new African  
 American districts may be viewed as the new seats (and, therefore,  
 at least theoretically, they did not cost any incumbents their seats in 
 some of these states) and because drastic changes in district lines can  
 cause problems deciding which new districts are to be matched with  
 which old ones (2006, 101).
28
 
It can be difficult to determine whether Republican gains resulted from  reapportionment, 
the new African American districts, or a combination of the two in these states (ibid, 
101).  African American districts could be a gain for the Democrats while costing 
Republicans seats in these states (id, 101).  
                                                                                                                                                 
     They also included three variables designed to measure the strength of the challengers faced by 
Democratic incumbents in 1994 (2002, 342).  Challenger quality, the first variable, was measured by a 
three point scale, “challengers were coded 0 if they had no recorded political experience, 1 if they had 
served in an appointed office, and 2 if they had previously been elected to public office” (ibid).  Challenger 
campaign spending, the second variable, was calculated as the natural log of total challenger expenditures.  
It gauges the relative ability of challengers to run visible professional campaigns (id).  The third variable 
created an interaction between challenger campaign spending and challenger quality. 
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 The number of new seats exceeded the number of African American districts in Florida, Texas, Georgia, 
Louisiana and North Carolina, while in Virginia these numbers were both one (Engstrom 2006, 101). 
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 Louisiana was the only southern state that lost a U.S. House seat following the 
1990 census.  In 1992, the state created its second majority-African American district.
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Prior to the post-1990 redistricting, Louisiana’s U.S. House delegation was evenly split—
four Democrats and four Republicans.  The new apportionment meant that one party 
would have to lose at least one seat (Engstrom, Halpin, Hill, and Caridas-Butterworth 
1994, 117-120).  It was the Republican Party that lost a seat due to the second majority-
African American district having been created. 
 Virginia was another state in which a new majority-African American district 
resulted in the Republicans losing a seat in 1992.  Virginia was allocated an additional 
seat because of reapportionment in 1990.  Virginia’s new African American district, the 
Third, was created out of two prior Republican districts.  Lublin (1997, 110, 123) and 
Lublin and Voss 2000a (429, 431, 433) state that it was not just a loss for the 
Republicans, but a gain for the Democrats.  
MINIMAL EMPIRICAL SUPPORT FOR THE PERVERSE EFFECTS THESIS 
 Seven southern states that had new majority-African American districts in place 
for the 1992 U.S. House election used the same district boundaries for the 1994 election 
(Engstrom 2006, 104).
30
  The twelve new African American members elected in the 1992 
election from the South were all reelected in 1994.  There was no additional growth in the 
African American representation from the region, but the number of Republican members 
increased by 16 (ibid, 104).  Republicans took control of the delegation in Georgia, North 
                                                 
29Louisiana’s first majority-African American district, the Second, was created in 1983 after a federal court 
ruled that a redistricting plan violated section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (see Engstrom 1986, 112).  
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3.   
 
30
Louisiana was the only state that changed its district boundaries between the 1992 and 1994 elections.  It 
adopted a newer version of the Fourth District (see Engstrom and Kirksey 1998, 253-260). 
 
30 
 
Carolina, Tennessee, and South Carolina and added seats in Florida, Virginia, and Texas 
(Bullock 1995a, 22). This election has generated a debate over how many of these 
Republican gains were attributable to possible perverse effects of the new majority-
African American districts. 
 Not all of these Republican victories can be attributed to the new African 
American districts (Hill 1995, 391). Despite scholars abandoning the adjacency 
requirement and examining U.S. House districts in all southern states, regardless of 
whether they created new majority-African districts in the 1990s, approximately six seats 
won by Republicans have been attributed to the perverse effects of the new African 
American districts.  These districts are the Alabama Sixth and Georgia First, Third, and 
Fourth in 1992, and North Carolina Second and Third in 1994.
31
 
ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATION FOR THE REPUBLICAN GROWTH IN SEATS 
 If only about six Republican gains are attributable to the perverse effects of the 
new African American districts, what explains the other 19 GOP seats gained in 1992 and 
1994?  There is an alternative explanation for the Republican growth.  Scholars have 
argued that the partisan  realignment that occurred in the South is a major reason for this 
growth (see McKee 2000, 137; Hill and Rae 2000, 18; Rae 2001, 136).
32
  This 
realignment changed the party preference of many white voters.   
   As Jonathan Knuckey argues, “Any search for an explanation of southern 
Republican congressional gains in the 1990s requires a focus on the dramatic change in 
the vote choice of white southerners” (2001, 259).  He argues that changes in southern 
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 In 1992, Democrats were elected in North Carolina’s Second and Third Districts but they lost these 
districts to Republicans in 1994.   
 
32
  This realignment is discussed in Chapter IV.  
 
31 
 
partisanship, racial attitudes, and racial resentment have contributed to the Republican 
growth (2001, 267; 2005, 14, 17).  Similarly, Beachler writes, “Clearly the major source 
of the Democrats’ problems in southern House elections is the growing percentage of 
southern whites who vote Republican” (1995, 78).   
 Beachler presented exit poll results showing that white southerners’ support for 
Democratic candidates in U.S. House districts decreased in the 1990s (2000, 56).  In 
1990, 50 percent of southern whites voted for the Democratic candidate; in 1992, this 
figure dropped by 3 percentages points, and in 1994, it dropped another 15 percentage 
points (ibid, 59). He argues that the change in white voter behavior has contributed to the 
Republican surge in the southern U.S. House delegation.  
 Hill and Rae found that a secular realignment was the major reason for the 
Republican growth (2000, 18).  They note that the Republican takeover in the U.S. House 
delegation would have occurred regardless of racial redistricting.
33
  Similarly, McKee 
argues that a secular realignment contributed to the Republican growth (2002, 137).  
McKee believes that racial redistricting hastened the Republican Party ascendancy.  He 
states, “given the scant number of white Democrats, it is no wonder that the voting 
behavior of Deep South whites reveals a strong preference for Republican candidates” 
(ibid, 137).
34
 
 It has been noted that the post-1990 round of redistricting was followed by an 
increase in open seats.  These open seats were often a result of forced retirement and a 
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 Rae and Hill state, “as our models consistently show, even if the Republicans had not defeated a single 
Democratic incumbent [from 1988 to 1996], the open seats they took from the Democrats would have alone 
been enough to produce a GOP majority in the South’s 125 House seats” (2000, 18). 
 
34
 In the Deep South, as noted by McKee, there are more African American voters who identify with the  
Democratic Party than white voters who identify with the Democratic Party (2002, 137). 
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loss of a representative’s core constituency from his or her district.35The Republicans 
won 34 open seats (55 percent) in the elections between 1992 and 1998 (Knuckey 2001, 
259).  Knuckey found that it was the increase in the Republican vote in open seats that 
produced the GOP gains (2000, 187).  Beachler also notes that open seats contributed to 
the Republican growth (1995, 360).  And Rae, in his examination of the 1994 election in 
the South, notes that many of the open seats in the South were won by Republican 
candidates (2001, 137).   
Southern States’ Lower Legislative Chambers and the Perverse Effects Thesis 
   The extent to which the perverse effects thesis applies to seats in the southern 
states’ lower legislative chambers has received far less attention than that received by the 
U.S. House delegations from southern states.  Lublin and Voss (2000b) and Lublin 
(2004) have examined elections to lower chambers of southern states and found evidence 
for the perverse effects thesis.  Examining all southern states’ lower legislative chambers 
from 1990 through 1998,  they state that “reducing the share of blacks [in a] …district 
from 30 percent to 10 percent…drops the likelihood of a Democrat holding the seat by 
52.2 percentage points…to only 39 percent” (2000b, 803).  
 Lublin and Voss (2000b) used a decomposition model like Grofman and Handley 
(1998).  This model allowed them to decompose shifts in the number of Democrats 
across elections into three categories: a redistricting effect, realignment effect, and 
interaction effect.
36
  They found that redistricting cost Democrats at least one seat in each 
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 Hill and Rae state, “since 1988, the Republicans have defeated 14 Democratic incumbents, while losing 
only 7 seats themselves.  Further, they have wrested 22 of 57 Democratically held open seats into their 
camp, while losing only 4 of their own to the other party” (2000, 18).   
 
36
  Redistricting effect is the same as Grofman and Handley’s (1998) “composition effect” and the 
realignment effect is the same as Grofman and Handley’s “behavioral effect” (Lublin and Voss 2000b, 796-
797).   
33 
 
state (2000b, 802).  They also report that the independent effect of redistricting cost 
Democrats in South Carolina and Virginia control of their lower legislative chamber 
(ibid,802).  South Carolina’s Democrats lost six seats in 1994 and 1996 (id, 802).  
Democrats lost eight seats in South Carolina and five in Virginia that were attributed to 
the interaction effect (id, 802).  South Carolina Democrats won 59 percent (73 of 124) of 
the lower chamber seats in 1992, but by 1994, the percentage decreased to 52 (id, 802).  
By 1996, Democrats only held 48 percent of South Carolina’s lower legislative seats (id, 
802).  North Carolina’s Democrats  lost 25 seats due to the realignment effect in 1994, 
but according to them, they “made up over one-half of those losses over the next two 
elections” (id, 802).   
 Using the decomposition model, Lublin, in his 2004 study, states that  
redistricting accounts for a substantial number of lower chamber seats lost by Democrats 
in the South between 1990 and 1994 (2004, 109).  The independent effect of redistricting 
accounted for 34 of 105 Democratic losses, or 32 percent (ibid, 109, 112).The 
Democratic losses due to the interaction effect decreased the total number of Democratic 
lower chamber seats further to 45 or 43 percent (id, 112).
37
  Losses in Florida, Georgia, 
and South Carolina cost Democrats about 7.6, 5.5, and 6.7 percentage points, 
respectively, in seats (id, 112).
38
 
CONCLUSION 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
37
 Lublin states, “forty-five seats is equivalent to 3.7 percent of the seats in the ten southern states included 
in the analysis—not a bad gain for the Republicans at the state [lower legislative chamber] level from racial 
redistricting” (2004, 112). 
 
38
 Lublin states, “South Carolina Democrats might have controlled the state House throughout the 1990s if 
racial redistricting had not forced them to cede control of the chamber to the GOP in 1992” (2004, 112).He 
also notes that North Carolina’s Democrats would have probably regained control of the state House in 
1996, instead of 1998, if racial redistricting had not happen (ibid).   
34 
 
 This chapter has examined the perverse effects thesis and the literature that 
addresses the thesis.  A number of new majority-African American districts were created, 
after which the number of African Americans and Republicans serving in both Congress 
and in southern state legislatures increased.  Chapter 3 examines why and how majority-
African American districts were created.  The Voting Rights Act was instrumental in the 
creation of these districts, in particular sections 2 and 5 of the Act.  The next chapter 
examines the evolution of these two provisions.  
  
35 
 
CHAPTER 3: “IF YOU CAN, YOU MUST”: SECTIONS 2 AND 5 OF THE 
VOTING RIGHTS ACT  
 The Voting Rights Act (VRA) has been described as the “most extensive federal 
voting rights legislation in American history” (Cotrell 1986, 7).  It is the result of the 
Civil Rights Movement and acts of violence and terror against civil rights advocates in 
many southern towns, such as Selma, Alabama.  These acts of terror and violence forced 
Congress and President Lyndon Johnson to adopt the VRA.
39
  It contained special 
provisions such as the nationwide suspension of the use of literacy tests and other similar 
devices that prohibited African Americans from voting.
40
  It also provided for federal 
examiners to protect registered voters
41
 in six southern states: Alabama, Georgia, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Virginia, and also a large portion (40 
counties) of North Carolina.
42
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 Charles Cotrell states, “the enactment of the Voting Rights Act represented an important change in the 
relationship of the federal government to the states with regard to the establishment of voter qualifications and 
the conduct of federal, state, and local elections” (1986, 5). 
 
40
 The literacy tests and other similar devices used to disfranchise African Americans initially were suspended for 
five years.  In 1970, the Act was amended and these tests and devices were suspended for another five years.  In 
1975, it was amended again, making this nation-wide prohibition permanent. [42 U.S.C.A. § 1973b (a) § 1973aa 
(Sup., Oct. 1975) amending 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (a) and § 1973aa (1970)].  A prohibited test or devices is: 
  
 Any requirement that a person as a prerequisite for voting or registration for voting, (1) 
 demonstrate the ability to read, write, understand, or interpret any matter, (2) demonstrate  
any educational achievement or his knowledge of any particular subject, (3) possess good  
moral character, or (4) prove his qualifications by the voucher of registered voters or  
members of any other class 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(c) and § 1973aa (b) (1970). 
 
41
42 U.S. C. § 1973d (1970). 
 
42
  These states were not the only political jurisdictions to which the special provisions were applicable, as 
reported in Engstrom (1978, 139-140):  
The initial “trigger” mechanism, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b), covered any state or  
political subdivision that maintained on November 1, 1964, a “test or device”  
as a prerequisite to registration or voting and in which less than fifty percent of   
its voting age population was registered to vote on November 1, 1964  or voted 
in the 1964 presidential elections.  In 1970 this was amended to include states 
and political subdivisions that met these conditions on November 1, 1968 and  
in the 1968 presidential election as well.  While some political subdivisions outside 
the South were covered by the trigger, the formula clearly was intended to apply  
36 
 
 The VRA quickly helped to increase the number of African Americans registered 
to vote in the covered states, but many of these states began to adopt election systems that 
would prevent African Americans from electing representatives of their choice.  Once the 
VRA was enacted, many public officials, particularly in southern states, changed their 
tactics from those that denied African Americans access to the ballot box to those that 
diluted their vote (Clayton 2001, 38).  Vote dilution, according to Engstrom, is the 
“…practice of reducing the potential effectiveness of the new black voting strength 
through such devices as gerrymanders, at-large elections, and annexations” (1978, 140).  
The VRA ultimately shifted the focus from vote denial to vote dilution.
43
  Handley states 
that minority vote dilution can occur in a variety of ways, most notably through the 
process of stacking, cracking, and packing voting districts (1991, n.p.).
44
 
                                                                                                                                                 
to the South.  In 1975 the coverage conditions were again amended, extending them  
to November 1, 1972 and the 1972 presidential election, and expanding the trigger  
to include for the first time “language minorities” as well as racial minorities by  
covering states and political subdivisions when more than five percent of the voting 
age population are members of a “single language minority” and in which elections  
are conducted in English only.”  See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) and b(f) (3) (Supp., Oct, 
1975).   
The trigger remained the same in both the 1982 and 2006 reauthorizations of the Act (http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/D?c109:5:./temp/~c109hyUSrI:). 
 
43
  Civil Rights attorney Armand Derfner states, “instead of preventing blacks from registering, the focus of 
discrimination shifted to preventing blacks from using their eligibility to gain any significant political power” 
(1973, 523).  In short, the shift went from preventing African Americans from voting to preventing them from 
winning or deciding elections.  
 
44
  Dewey Clayton states:  
 stacking occurs when heavily concentrated minority districts or concentrations of  
 minority populations, large enough for separate representation, are combined with  
 majority districts or population concentrations.  Cracking occurs when a substantial 
  minority population, large enough to constitute one or more majority-minority districts, 
  is divided among several majority districts, which effectively dilutes minority voting  
 strength.  Packing is the practice of drawing district lines so as to create districts that are  
 70, 80, 90 percent minority.  This procedure wastes minority votes that could have either  
 created another minority district or strongly influenced a majority district (2000, 38). 
 
37 
 
 Sections 2 and 5 of the VRA have been used to challenge claims of vote 
dilution.
45
  Both sections have been identified as playing a vital role in the creation of 
majority-African American districts.  These districts were crucial in providing African 
Americans with opportunities to elect candidates of their choice.  
 These two provisions have been amended and rewritten by Congress and 
redefined by the Supreme Court since they were originally adopted.  The evolution of 
these sections has affected the longevity of majority-African American districts and the 
ability of African Americans to elect representatives of their choice.  This chapter 
reviews sections 2 and 5 of the VRA and it is divided into four stages.  The first part 
reviews section 5.  The evolution of section 2 is reviewed next.  This part includes a 
discussion of how sections 2 and 5 became intertwined, and the next part discusses how 
these sections were separated.  It also includes a discussion on how judicial precedents 
have weakened sections 2 and 5 of the VRA and have impeded African Americans from 
electing representatives of their choice.  The final part reviews the Voting Rights Act 
Reauthorization, which renewed the VRA for another twenty-five years.  It also restored 
elements of section 5 which were weakened by the Supreme Court after the 2000 census.   
Section 5 of the VRA 
 Section 5 of the VRA was a vehicle to challenge vote dilution.  Pamela Karlan 
states, “[section 5] has served as a major legal engine for forming American democracy 
over the last forty-two years” (2004, 21).  It was designed to combat the perpetual 
litigation that resulted from the continuous adoption of the new discriminatory schemes 
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 Jocelyn Benson describes section 5 as the “shield” and section 2 as the “sword” to section 5’s shield, and 
together they are major weapons in the fight against vote dilution (2004, 486). 
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after existing devices were invalidated by the federal courts.
46
  It established a 
preclearance requirement under which a covered state or political subdivision of a state 
must seek approval for changes made in their election system before implementing them.  
Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Virginia, and Texas are 
covered, as are portions of Florida and North Carolina.  Covered jurisdictions must 
convince either the Attorney General of the United States or the United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia that a proposed change “does not have the purpose and 
will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or 
color.”47  The burden under section 5 is on the state or subdivision to demonstrate that the 
change does not have a racially discriminatory purpose or effect.
48
 
 In Allen v. State Board of Elections (1969), the Supreme Court defined what type 
of revision in electoral law qualifies as a “voting change” that is subject to section 5’s 
preclearance requirement.  Prior to the Allen decision, section 5 had been practically 
                                                 
46
 42 U.S.C.A. §1973c, amending 24 U.S.C. § 1973x, 1970. 
 
47
 When a change is submitted to the Attorney General, he or she has sixty days in which to enter a ruling (42 
U.S.C.A § 1973c, Supp. Oct. 1975).  Engstrom notes that the, “Attorney General is rarely the actual decision 
maker on these issues [; the] enforcement of section 5 is primarily the responsibility of the staff attorneys in the 
Voting Section of the Civil Rights Division in the Department of Justice, with the Assistant Attorney general in 
charge of that division usually making the preclearance decisions” (1978, 141-142).    
 
48
The constitutionality of section 5 was upheld in South Carolina v. Katzenbach in 1966.  Justice Black 
summarized the opposition on section 5 in a dissenting opinion:   
 
Section 5, by providing that some of the States cannot pass State laws or adopt State  
constitutional amendments without first being compelled to beg Federal authorities to  
approve their policies, so distorts our constitutional structure of government as to render 
any distinction drawn in the Constitution between State and Federal power almost  
meaningless….  Certainly if all the provisions of our Constitution which limit the power  
of the Federal Government and reserve other power to the States are to mean anything, 
they mean at least that the States have the power to pass laws and amend their constitutions  
without first sending their officials hundreds of miles away to beg Federal authorities to  
approve them…I cannot help but believe that the inevitable effect of any such law which 
forces any one of the States to entreat Federal authorities in faraway places for approval  
of local laws before they can become effective is to create the impression that the State  
or States treated in this way are little more than conquered provinces (383 U.S. 301, 1966,  
358-360).     
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dormant (Engstrom 1978, 144).
49
Allen consolidated three cases brought by private 
citizens (Fairley v. Patterson, Bunton v. Patterson, and Whitley v. Williams).  The Allen 
decision concerned altered electoral arrangements that had not been submitted for 
preclearance as stated by section 5.
50
  The Court ruled that all changes in question were 
within the scope of section 5 and provided a broad interpretation of the section’s reach, 
asserting that Congress intended it to apply to “any state enactment which altered the 
election law of a covered State even in a minor way” (Allen v. State Board of Elections 
1969, 393).  According to the Court, compliance required that “all changes, no matter 
how small, be subjected to section 5 scrutiny” (ibid, 568).51 
 The “purpose” and “effect” prongs are two essential elements of section 5.  The 
framers of the VRA hoped to eliminate every device that kept African Americans in the 
South from participating politically—whatever its stated purpose.  In this context, the 
purpose and effect prongs were close to interchangeable.  Abigail Thernstrom states, 
“…when the question was the legality of a recent alteration in voting procedure in a 
jurisdiction known to have had a long history of Fifteenth Amendment violations, the 
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  Engstrom reports “less than 200 voting changes had been submitted for preclearance though 1968, and all but 
twelve of those were from two states, South Carolina (114) and Georgia (63)” (1978, 144).  
 
50
 Engstrom notes that Fairley v. Patterson, Bunton v. Patterson, and Whitley v. William “…involved Mississippi 
statutes that allowed county boards of supervisors to alter their representational structures from single-member 
districts to at-large, specified that the superintendent of education would now have to be appointed in selected 
counties, and changed the requirements for independent candidacies in general elections” (1978, 144). 
 
51
 The list includes: 
(1) changes in electoral boundaries resulting from reapportionment or redistricting;  
(2) changes in the method of election (e.g., from single member districts to election  
 at-large); (3) changes in the composition of the electorate resulting from annexations, 
consolidations, or incorporations; (4) provisions establishing voter registration  
 requirements and candidate qualifications; (5) changes in the form of government 
(e.g., from a council-manager to a strong mayor form); and (6) provisions setting  
bilingual election procedures and assistance.  Procedures for the Administration of 
Section 5 of the Voting  Rights Act, 28 C.F.R., Section 51 (1980), p.138 (quoted in 
Cotrell 1986, 10- 11). 
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effect of the alteration was assumed to suggest its purpose” (2007, 46).  However, after 
the Allen decision the effect and purpose prongs were separated (Allen v. State Board of 
Election, 1969).  Thernstrom notes that “a districting plan that was racially neutral in 
intent could nevertheless be found discriminatory in effect” (2007, 46).  
The Allen decision also allowed private citizens to raise coverage issues in their 
local federal district courts, where they were to be decided by a three-judge panel (Allen 
v. State Board of Election 1969, 557-563).  The Court felt that section 5 “might well 
prove an empty promise unless the private citizens were allowed to seek judicial 
enforcement of the prohibition” (ibid, 551).    
In 1975, section 5 was renewed for another seven years and included special 
provisions that were extended to include “language minority groups.”52  The Allen 
decision and the 1975 renewal brought section 5 out of its dormant state and transformed 
it into what became widely regarded as the most important section of the VRA (Engstrom 
1978, 147).   
The Retrogression Standard 
 In 1976, the effect prong of section 5 was addressed again in  Beer v. United 
States.  Beer addressed the meaning of the effect requirement in the context of an 
allegation of vote dilution.  It presented a question as to whether a reapportionment plan 
that would have a discriminatory, but not retrogressive, effect on the rights of African 
American voters should be granted preclearance.  In the 1970s, the City of New Orleans  
brought suit in district court seeking a judgment that a “…reapportionment plan for city 
                                                 
52
Section 203 of the VRA requires certain states and political subdivisions in the United States to provide 
language assistance to voters, including written translation of election materials and bilingual poll workers, to 
voters belonging to specified language minority groups, including American Indians, Asian Americans, Alaskan 
Natives, and those of Spanish heritage. 
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councilmanic districts did not have the purpose or effect of denying or abridging the right 
to vote on account of race” (Beer v. United States 1976, 130).53  The district court refused 
to approve the plan because it did not alter the election of the two at-large districts (ibid, 
130).
54
 
 The city council appealed the district court’s decision to the Supreme Court, 
arguing that the new reapportionment plan was not part of any voting change and 
therefore, was not covered by section 5.  The Supreme Court found the district court’s 
decision was inconsistent with its own understanding of section 5 and reversed the 
decision.
55
  The Court interpreted Congress’ intent of enacting section 5 as ensuring that 
“no voting procedure changes would be made that would lead to a retrogression in the 
position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral 
franchise” (Beer v. United States 1976, 141, emphasis added).  If a redistricting plan is 
                                                 
53
  In 1954, the City of New Orleans’s charter established a seven-member council.  Five of the members were 
elected from the councilmanic districts, and the remaining two members were elected at large.  Engstrom states, 
“…the five single-member districts had been constructed through combinations of the city’s seventeen wards, 
which follow basically a north-south configuration” (1978, 159-160).  Most of the city’s African American 
population is largely concentrated in an east-west pattern (ibid, 160).  Under this plan, African Americans 
constituted a majority of the population in two districts, but they did not make up the majority of the registered 
voters in any districts.  Between the years 1960 and 1970, no African Americans were elected to the council.  
After the 1970 census, the council devised a new redistricting plan.  However, it was similar to the original 1954 
plan.  Engstrom notes, “the result was again a dispersion of the city’s black population, leaving two districts with 
black population majorities of 64.1 percent and 50.6 percent” (id, 160).  The other four districts contained 
African American voter proportions of 43.2, 36.8, 23.3, and 22.6 percent (id). 
 
54
  The district court held that not altering the two at-large districts had the effect, in itself, of abridging the right 
to vote on account of race or color. 
 
55
 More specifically, the court ruled that: 
(1) since the two at-large city councilmanic seats, having existed since 1954, could  
not be reviewed in a proceeding to obtain approval for the reapportionment plan under 
5 of the Voting Right Act, the plan could not be rejected solely because it did not 
eliminate the two at-large seats, and (2) the plan did not have the effect of denying 
or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color under 5, since under a prior  
plan none of the five councilmanic districts had a clear [African American] majority 
of registered voters and no [African American] had been elected to city council, but  
under the plan for which approval had been sought, [African Americans] would  
constitute a majority of the population in two of the five districts and a clear majority  
of the registered voters in one of them, making it predictable that at least one and 
perhaps two [African Americans] could be elected to city council” (Beer v. United States 
1979, 130). 
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not retrogressive, then it does not violate section 5 “unless the new apportionment itself 
so discriminates on the basis of race or color as to violate the Constitution” (ibid, 143).  
The retrogression test simply means that the covered jurisdictions cannot adopt a plan 
that is worse than the previous plan.  The Court concluded that: 
 …legislative reapportionment that enhances the position of racial minorities,  
with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise, can hardly  
have the “effect” of diluting or abridging the right to vote on account of race  
within the meaning of section 5 [… and] an ameliorative new legislative  
apportionment cannot violate section 5 unless the new apportionment itself so  
discriminates on the basis of race or color as to violate the Constitution (id, 141).   
 
In other words, the Court concluded that in the context of a vote dilution claim that the 
phrase “abridging the right to vote on account of race or color” limited the term it 
qualified, “effect,” to retrogressive effects (id, 141).56 
Section 2 
 Section 2 originally, in 1965, followed the language of the Fifteenth Amendment.  
It is a nationwide prohibition against the denial or abridgement of the right to vote.  It has 
been stated that section 2 originally was relatively insignificant and had virtually no 
impact until it was revisited in 1982 (Engstrom 1986, 114).  As adopted in 1965, it 
simply stated: 
  No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, 
  practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State  
  or political subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any citizen 
  of the United States to vote on account of race or color. 
 
Section 2 was amended in 1982 in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
the City of Mobile v. Bolden.  African American residents of Mobile, Alabama argued 
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 Unlike the effect prong, the purpose prong does not restrict protection to only retrogressive changes, “i.e., that 
the phrase ‘abridging the right to vote on account of race or color’ means retrogression when it modifies ‘effect, 
but means discrimination more generally when it modifies ‘purpose’” (Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board 
1997, 8-31).  The Court has been criticized because it did not broaden the meaning of the purpose prong (see 
Richmond v. United States 1975, 378-379).  The Court argued that redefining this standard would reduce it to a 
trivial matter, and it was even argued that it would effectively delete this prong (ibid, 378-379). 
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that the at-large election for choosing the city commission arrangement severely diluted 
their votes and violated both the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
and section 2 of the VRA.  A federal district court found that the at-large electoral system 
violated section 2 of the VRA and it was fundamentally unfair and invidiously 
discriminatory (Bolden v. City of Mobile 1976, 402).  The court also held that the system 
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The court ordered 
that the at-large system to elect the commission be disestablished and replaced by a 
Mayor and a Council elected from single-member districts (ibid).  The Court of Appeals 
affirmed the district court decision, agreeing that Mobile’s at-large elections violated 
section 2 and  the Fourteenth Amendment (423 F. Supp. 384,245).  On appeal, the 
Supreme Court ruled that the plaintiffs failed to prove that the at-large system was 
intently created to dilute their strength (City of Mobile v. Bolden).   
Section 2 was revised in 1982 in a direct response to the Court’s decision in 
Mobile (Engstrom 1986, 114).  The purpose of this amendment was “to make clear that 
proof of discriminatory purpose or intent is not required in cases brought under that 
provision” (Engstrom 2000, 25).  Engstrom argues that this “…demand for a 
demonstration of intent has been criticized as placing upon plaintiffs a burden of proof 
that is both irrelevant and unrealistic” (1978, 148).  Justice Goldberg, for example, in his 
dissent in Wright v. Rockefeller, a case involving an allegation of racial gerrymandering, 
states, “to require a showing of racial motivation in the legislature would place an 
impossible burden on complainants” (1964, 72).  
The amendment to section 2 contains a “results” test that prohibits districting 
plans that dilute a protected minority’s voting strength.  It eliminated the necessity of 
44 
 
proving intent in order to win a dilution lawsuit under section 2.  Engstrom notes the 
reasons that were given in the legislative history for this modification (2000, 25).  He 
states:  
Proof of intent was found to present plaintiffs with an “inordinately difficult”  
burden, while the inquiry itself is “unnecessarily divisive.”  But “the main  
reason” identified for rejecting a need to prove intent was that it “asks the 
wrong question” (ibid, 25).   
The appropriate question is “whether the voting strength of a minority group is being 
diluted by the system, not why the dilution is tolerated” (S. Rep. No. 97-417, 36).  
Writing in 1986, Engstrom notes the results test established by section 2 and the 
preclearance requirement contained in Section 5 are “the principal legal protections 
against vote dilution today” (1986, 111).   
Totality of Circumstance Standard and its Vagueness 
 Plaintiffs were entitled to relief under section 2 if they established that, under the 
“totality of circumstance,” a challenged election system resulted in minorities having less 
opportunity than the other voters to participate in the political process and to elect 
candidates of their choice.
57
  In Whitcomb v. Chavis (1971)and White v. Regester (1975), 
the Supreme Court declared that the totality of circumstance standard as the ultimate test 
for determining a vote dilution claim.  The amendment to section 2 prohibits voting 
practices that result “in a denial or abridgment of the right of any citizen to vote on 
account of race or color, [or language minority status]” (42 U.S.C. 1973).  The statutory 
standard follows the language from Whitcomb v. Chavis and White v. Regester: 
 A violation…is established if, based on the totality of circumstance, it is shown  
that the political processes leading to nomination or election…are not equally open to 
participation by [minorities] in that [they] have less opportunity than 
                                                 
57
 This standard was based on two Supreme Courts’ decisions concerning countywide election for state 
legislators from the early 1970s, Whitcomb v. Chavis(1971) and Whitev. Regester(1975).    
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other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to  
elect representatives of their choice (422 U.S. 935; 403 U.S. 124). 
 
The Senate Judiciary Committee’s Report in 1982 on the revision of section 2 
identified a list of factors from White and other pre-Bolden cases, which became 
popularly known as the “Senate Report Factors.”58  These factors were used by courts to 
determine if a violation of section 2 had occurred.  Judges are not limited to examining 
these factors, nor are there a particular number of factors that have to be proven to 
determine if an election system is in violation of section 2.  The “totality of 
circumstance” test is extremely vague.  Voting rights attorney Frank Parker once 
characterized it as throwing “…mud against the wall, and if enough of it sticks you win” 
(quoted in Grofman 2006, 251).   Grofman, quoting himself as A. Wuffle, further pointed 
out that, “in the totality of circumstances test, it is the trial judge who determines whether 
the wall against which the mud will be thrown will be coated with Teflon” (ibid).  This 
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 The factors include:  
(1)the extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or political subdivision  
that touched the right of members of minority groups to register, to vote, or otherwise to  
participate in the democratic process; (2) the extent to which voting in the elections of  
the state or political subdivision is racially polarized; (3) the extent to which the state  
or political subdivision has used unusually large voting districts, majority vote  
requirements, anti-single shot provisions, or other voting practices or procedures 
that may enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group;  
(4) if there is a candidate slating process, whether the members of the minorities  
group have been denied access to that process; (5) the extent to which members  
of the minority group in the state or political subdivision bear the effects of 
discrimination in such areas as education, employment, and health, which hinder  
their ability to participate effectively in the political process; (6) whether political 
campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals; and (7) the  
extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to public  
office in the jurisdiction. 
 
The Report also notes that the following evidence may have probative value in determining the substantiality of a 
section 2 claim:   
Whether there is a significant lack of responsiveness on the part of elected 
official to the particularized needs of the members of the minority group.  
 Whether the policy underlying the state or political subdivision’s use of such  
 voting qualifications, prerequisite to voting, or standard, practices or 
procedure is tenuous (S. Rep. No 417, 1982, 28-29). 
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standard gave judges great discretion when examining section 2 violations.  Justice 
Clarence Thomas has described this test correctly as:  
…a list of possible considerations that might be consulted by a court attempting 
to develop a gestalt view of the political and racial climate in a jurisdiction, but a 
list that cannot provide a rule for deciding a vote dilution claim (Holder v. Hall 
1994, 938). 
  
 Thornburg v. Gingles was the first Supreme Court decision interpreting the 
amended section 2 (478 U.S. 30, 1986).  In Gingles, African American citizens in North 
Carolina filed suit against the state, alleging that the state had diluted their voting strength 
by submerging African American voters of sufficient size to form a majority of the voters 
in  single-member districts into majority-white multimember districts (ibid, 35).  This 
case was tried before a federal three-judge district court in North Carolina.  The court 
relied heavily on the legislative history of the amendment of section 2 and the Senate 
Report factors as they applied to this case.  Applying the totality of circumstances test, 
the court held that the redistricting plan violated section 2 because it resulted in the 
dilution of African American citizens’ votes in the disputed districts (id, 35).  This 
decision was appealed to the Supreme Court, which unanimously upheld the district 
court’s decision.  In doing so, the Court identified three necessary preconditions to 
provide a violation of section 2.  They are: 
 First, the minority group must be able to demonstrate that it is sufficiently large  
and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district.  
Second, the minority group must be able to show that it is politically cohesive.   
Third, the minority must be able to demonstrate that the white majority votes  
sufficiently as a bloc to enable it—in the absence of special circumstances,  
such as the minority candidate running unopposed—to defeat the minority’s  
preferred candidate (Thornburg v. Gingles 1986, 50-51). 
 
These three preconditions provided a focus to the vote dilution inquiry.  Satisfying them 
led to decisions finding election systems in violation of section 2.   
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In 1994 the Supreme Court in Johnston v. DeGrandy removed much of the constraint 
resulting from Gingles’ three preconditions (512 U.S. 997, 1994).  Hispanic and African 
American voters alleged districts for electing state legislators in Florida were diluting 
their voting strength.  They filed suit in a federal district court, alleging that section 2 was 
violated by fragmenting cohesive minority communities among several districts and 
packing other minority voters into a few districts.  The district court held that the new 
plan did violate section 2 (Johnston v. DeGrandy 1994, 1002).  This decision was 
appealed to the Supreme Court, which relied heavily on the totality of circumstances 
factors to reverse the district court’s decision. 
 Justice Souter, joined by Justices Rehnquist, Blackmun, Stevens, O’Connor, and 
Ginsburg, reaffirmed that the presence of the Gingles’ preconditions by themselves is not 
a sufficient basis for finding a section 2 violation.  He further stated that a “lack of 
electoral success is evidence of vote dilution, but courts must also examine other 
evidence in the totality of circumstances, including the extent of the opportunities 
minority voters enjoy to participate in the political process” (Johnston v. DeGrandy 1994, 
1011-1012).  The totality of circumstance was, in short, reaffirmed as the ultimate test.  
Given the ambiguous nature of the test, judicial discretion under this standard resulted in 
settings in which the Gingles’ preconditions were satisfied nonetheless having their 
election system approved under section 2.  As noted by Engstrom, following DeGrandy 
judges would find the preconditions satisfied, yet find a system somehow free of  dilution 
under the totality of circumstances (2000, 27).  He concludes that, “the DeGrandy 
decision has had the effect of removing much of the constraint on judicial discretion that 
Gingles had imposed” (2000, 28).   
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After the DeGrandy decision, it became harder for plaintiffs to prove a section 2 
violation.  If Gingles’ three preconditions are met, plaintiffs must still show that under the 
totality of circumstances standard, they do not possess the same opportunities to 
participate in the political arena or elect representatives of their choice.   
Majority-African American Districts on the Rise 
There are a number of factors identified by scholars that helped increased the 
number of African American districts.  The amendment to section 2 had a major impact.   
Section 2 became incorporated into section 5 in Department of Justice preclearance 
decisions.  In the 1982 amendment, Congress specifically endorsed this incorporation 
(Way 1996, 1448).  The primary evidence of Congress’ intent is found in a footnote in 
the 1982 Senate Judiciary Committee report, which states: “in light of the amendment to 
section 2, it is intended that a section 5 objection also follow if a new voting procedure 
itself so discriminates as to violate section 2.”59 
The incorporation of section 2 into 5 was supported by the Justice Department 
and to some extent the Supreme Court.  After the amendment to section 2, the Justice 
Department argued when a proposed voting change “clearly” violates section 2, the 
change should be objected to under section 5 even if the change is not retrogressive.
60
  
The combination of these two sections increased the Department of Justice’s power 
because they did not have to satisfy the retrogressive standard when determining if a 
district violated the VRA.  The Supreme Court, in Morse v. Republican Party, relying on 
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 S. Rep. No. 417, 97
th
 Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1982), 12 n.31.   
 
60
 See e.g., Letter from the Department of Justice to Thomas P. Lewis, Chancery Clerk of Amite County, 
Mississippi (June 6, 1983), in 1985 Hearings, supra note 18, at 229, 230).  Letter from the Department of Justice 
to William H. Ward, Esq., Oktibbeha County, Mississippi (June 17, 1983), in 1985 Hearings, supra note 18, at 
232, 233 ("Where, as here, such unlawful conduct results in so clear a discriminatory impact on a protected 
minority group, amended Section 2 [of] the Voting Rights Act precludes preclearance under Section 5"). 
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the Senate Report footnote, concluded that “the purpose of preclearance is to prevent all 
attempts to implement discriminatory voting practices that change the status quo” and 
that “the substantive standards for section 2 and section 5 violates are the same” (Morse 
v. Republican Party 1996, 4214, n.25).  
Heather Way states, due to the incorporation of section 2 into preclearance 
determinations, “a jurisdiction could not enact a change that is clearly discriminatory, 
even if minority voters were not worse offer under the new plan” (1996, 1440).  This 
union helped to increase the number of majority-African American districts in the South.  
A violation of section 2 meant a violation to section 5. The number of section 5 
preclearance denials increased as a result, and so did the number of majority-African 
districts ultimately created.   
 In the late 1980s and the early 1990s, there was a perceived mandate that “if you 
can, you must” create majority-African American districts.  This perceived mandate was 
widely based on the incorporation of section 2 into section 5.  Laughlin McDonald states: 
  …it was generally understood that if a [section 5 covered] jurisdiction  
 could draw a majority-[African American] district, it had to do so.  And if it  
 did not, its plan would be denied preclearance under Section 5.  And even if 
 the plan were precleared, a court would likely set it aside under Section 2 
 (2006, 21). 
 
The first precondition of Gingles is widely believed to have led to an increase in 
the number of majority-African American districts itself even when section 2 stood alone.  
The first precondition of Gingles states—“the minority group must be able to 
demonstrate that it is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a 
majority in a single-member district” (Thornburg v. Gingles 1986, 50-51).  It was widely 
believed that if the African American population was large enough and sufficiently 
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compact geographically to result in a majority-African district then one had to be 
adopted.  
 John Dunne, the Assistant Attorney General during the Bush Administration 
during the 1991 redistricting process, stated that “the VRA (in particular, section 2) 
meant that whenever a state legislature could feasibly create a minority congressional 
district, it should do so” (quoted in Clayton 2000, 41).61  He further stated that he and the 
Voting Section’s primary concern with redistricting plans submitted for approval was that 
they not have the effect of diluting minority voting strength (ibid, 41).  Phil Duncan, 
writing for the Washington Times, notes that the goals of map-drawers in the past were 
making districting compact and preventing the drawing of district lines that sliced 
through community boundaries, but now that would “take a back seat to the imperative 
that minorities must be served first when new boundaries are drawn” (1990, D3).  
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 For instance, in 1991, the Ohio State Apportionment Board, consisting of five state officials; three Republicans 
and two Democrats, adopted a Republican-drafted reapportionment plan for the state legislature.  The Republican 
board members argued that the amendment to section 2 in 1982 required states to create majority-African 
American districts whenever possible (Quilter v. Voinovich 1992, 710).  The Board’s plan created eight new 
majority-African American districts; it was adopted by a 3 to 2 vote (ibid, 698, 716-17).  A federal three-judge 
District Court ruled that the plan should be revised and held that section 2 "did not require the creation of 
majority-minority districts whenever possible,” as the defendant contended (id, 698).  The District Court further 
held that the “board had failed to justify its 'wholesale' creation of majority-minority districts unless necessary to 
‘remedy’ a section 2 violation” (id, 701). The court ordered the board to draft a new plan or demonstrate that it 
was remedying a section 2 violation (id, 702).   
 The Board created and adopted a new reapportionment plan that contained five new majority-African 
American districts.  The District Court was not satisfied with the board’s new plan or the evidence demonstrating 
a section 2 violation.  In an order issued on March 10, 1992, it held that the “board failed once again to justify its 
wholesale creation of majority minority districts, thus rendering the plan, as submitted, violative of the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965” (795 F. Supp. 756, 757).    
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment by the District Court.  The Court argued:  
  
 Section 2 contains no per se prohibitions against particular types of districts:  
 It says nothing about majority-minority districts, districts dominated by certain 
political parties, or even districts based entirely on partisan political concerns.   
Instead, section 2 focuses exclusively on the consequences of apportionment.   
Only if the apportionment scheme has the effect of denying a protected class the 
equal opportunity to elect its candidate of choice does it violate section 2; where 
such an effect has not been demonstrated, section 2 simply does not speak to  
the matter (Voinovich v. Quilter 1993, 156,  emphasis in original). 
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 New computer technology has helped to increase the number of majority-African 
American districts.  This facilitated the ability to search for and include African 
Americans within districts.  State legislators armed with the perceived mandate of “if you 
can, you must” used the enhanced technology to increase the number of majority-African 
American districts at the congressional and state levels.   
Majority-African American Districts Challenged 
 Many of the new majority-African American districts created in the post-1990 
redistricting were bizarre in shape.  These odd-shaped districts caused outrage among 
some white citizens in many southern states (see figures A.1- A.5, which illustrate some 
of the oddly-shaped  majority-African American districts).  This outrage often led to 
lengthy litigation that questioned the constitutionality of these districts; one such legal 
battle occurred in North Carolina (Sellers, Canon, Schousen 1998, 269).  
Prior to the post-1990 redistricting, the Democrats constituted a majority in both 
houses in North Carolina’s legislature and therefore controlled the redistricting process 
(Engstrom 2001, 13).
62
  It was widely viewed that one, if not two, majority-African 
American U.S. House districts should be created in North Carolina to comply with the 
VRA (ibid, 12-13).
63
  On July 9, 1991, North Carolina’s General Assembly adopted a 
plan that created one majority-African American district, located in northeastern North 
Carolina, but it was rejected by the Department of Justice on December 18, 1991.  The 
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 The state’s Governor, a Republican at the time, has no veto power over redistricting legislation (Pope v. Blue 
1992, 394). 
 
63
Engstrom states, “in 1990, the Democratic candidates received 53.5 percent of the votes cast in North 
Carolina’s eleven congressional districts and won seven districts (63.6 percent)” (2001, 12).  North Carolina had 
a 22 percent African American population, but the state did not have a majority-African American congressional 
district.  The last African American elected to Congress from North Carolina was in 1898.  Engstrom states that 
“without the need to comply with the Voting Rights Act, congressional redistricting might not have been very 
controversial in North Carolina, as population growth reflected in the 1990 Census resulted in the state gaining 
another seat in the U.S. House” (ibid, 12).  
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Department found that the General Assembly could have created a second majority-
minority district “to give effect to black and Native American voting strength” using 
boundary lines “no more irregular than [those] found elsewhere in the proposed plan,” 
but had failed to do so for “pretextual reasons.”64   The General Assembly then adopted a 
second plan that included two new majority-African American districts—Districts One 
and Twelve. This plan received preclearance from the Department of Justice on February 
6, 1992.
65
 
 Republicans in North Carolina challenged the General Assembly's plan in a 
federal District Court alleging that the plan was a Democratic gerrymander.  They argued 
that the primary purpose of the plan was “to further the interests of white Democratic 
Congressmen in avoiding competitive elections” (Pope v. Blue 1992, 396).  The plaintiffs 
felt that their gerrymandering allegation was confirmed by the 1992 election (Engstrom 
2001, 14).  African American Democrats were elected in both of the new majority-
African American districts, while each of the six white Democratic incumbents seeking 
reelection also won.  The plaintiffs’ argued that the Democratic incumbents would not 
face competitive elections in their new districts, which proved to be false (ibid, 14).  Five 
of the Democratic incumbents received less than 60 percent of the votes cast within their 
new districts (id, 14). 
  In Pope v. Blue, a three- judge federal District Court dismissed the partisan 
gerrymandering complaint (Pope v. Blue 1992, 392).  The court stated in its opinion 
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App. to Brief for Federal Appellees 10a-11a. 
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 The total population of District One was 57.3 percent African American, and the voting-age population was 
53.4 percent.  District Twelve was 56.7 in total population and 53.3 percent in voting-age population. Districts 
One and Twelve were bizarre in appearance.  For instance, District One has been described as a “Rorschach ink-
blot test” and a “bug splattered on a windshield” (Pope v. Blue 1992, 476).  District Twelve has been described 
as the “I-85” district. One state legislator remarked that "'if you drove down the interstate with both car doors 
open, you'd kill most of the people in the district" (1993, A4).  
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“while members of the minority political party in any redistricted state may be apt to 
bemoan their fate, they can take solace in the fact that even the best laid plans often go 
astray” (ibid, 399).  In the 1994 congressional election, the vote for Democratic 
candidates in North Carolina dropped, resulting in a complete reversal in the partisan 
division in the seats (Engstrom 2001, 14).  One Republican incumbent won reelection 
unopposed while Republican candidates won 54.3 percent of the votes cast in the 
remaining eleven House elections (ibid, 14).  Republicans won seven of the eleven 
contested seats in these remaining districts.  Furthermore, Republicans won in four 
districts that had elected Democrats in 1992, winning less than 60 percent of the votes in 
each (id, 14).
66
 
Shaw v. Reno  
 A second lawsuit challenged the constitutionality of North Carolina’s Twelfth 
District.  This suit was filed in a federal District Court by white voters who alleged that 
the creation of this district constituted an impermissible racial gerrymander, gave African 
American voters an unfair electoral advantage, and violated their right to “a color blind 
electoral process” (Shaw v. Reno 1993, 467).67  The plaintiffs further argued that the 
district was created “without regard to any other considerations, such as compactness, 
contiguousness, geographical boundaries or political subdivisions with the purpose to 
create Congressional Districts along racial lines” (App. to Juris. Statement 102a).68 
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 This election occurred after Pope v. Blue was decided.  
 
67
 Whites constituted 76 percent of the state’s population and 79 percent of its voting-age population; they were a 
majority (83 percent) in ten of the districts. 
 
68
  Compactness, contiguousness, geographic boundaries, and political subdivisions will be examined later in this 
section.  
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 By a 2-to-1 vote, the District Court found no support for the plaintiffs’ 
contentions that race-based districting is prohibited by Article I, Section 4, or Article I, 
Section 2, of the Constitution, or by the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment (Shaw v. Barr 1992, 468-469).  The majority rejected the 
appellants’ claims that race- conscious redistricting to benefit minority voters is per se 
unconstitutional.  They also discarded the plaintiff’s claim that North Carolina’s 
reapportionment plan was impermissible.   
This case was appealed to the Supreme Court.  In a 5-4 decision, it held that if the 
“plaintiffs were correct that nonracial districting criteria had been disregarded in the 
creation of these districts, the plan could constitute a violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment” (Shaw v. Reno 1993, 641-642).  Justice O’Connor, 
writing for the majority, argued that “appearances do matter,” especially if race was the 
predominant factor in the creation of  the district was created (ibid, 647, emphasis added).  
It was not the “appearance per se” of the districts that concerned the Court, as districts 
with “extremely irregular or even bizarre” boundaries were not found problematic unless 
those features appeared to be related to race (id, 642, 644).  O’Connor argued that race-
based districting “threatens special harms,” even when it is intended to be benign (id, 
649-50).  Specifically, the Court argued: 
…reapportionment legislation that cannot be understood as anything other  
than an effort to classify and separate voters by race injures voters in other  
ways.  It reinforces racial stereotypes and threatens to undermine our system  
of representative democracy by signaling to elected officials that they represent 
a particular racial group rather than their constituency as a whole (id, 650). 
 
 Shaw v. Reno applied the “strict scrutiny” standard.  In the redistricting context, 
this standard is applied when a district is drawn solely for the purpose of separating 
voters along racial lines, and "traditional districting principles" are disregarded in the 
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process (Engstrom and Kirksey 1998, 253).  Under this standard, districts that are not 
"narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest" are unconstitutional 
(Shaw v. Reno 1993, 658).  Engstrom states, "this is the most rigorous level of scrutiny 
used to determine whether a state action or policy is consistent with the equal protection 
clause" (2001, 17).  He states that this standard is vague and is popularly described as 
"strict in theory but fatal in fact" (ibid, 17).  
Post-Shaw Redistricting Battles 
Louisiana 
 The Shaw decision stimulated additional litigation in most southern states.  It 
became a vehicle used to challenge the legality of many of the new majority-African 
American districts.  Louisiana’s and Georgia’s redistricting battles were primary 
examples of this.
69
  Following the 1990 census, Louisiana’s legislature adopted Act 42, 
which created two majority-African American U.S. House districts—the Second and the 
Fourth.
70
  District Two covered roughly the same geographic area as did the old District 
Two in the previous plan (Hays v. Louisiana 1993, 1188).  It covered virtually all of 
Orleans Parish and about one-third of Jefferson Parish (ibid, 1191). District Four was a 
new majority-African American district.  Controversy surrounded it because of its bizarre 
shape, which resembled the mark of Zorro, “a giant and somewhat shaky Z” (id, 1199) 
(see figure 2).  The adoption of this plan resulted in a lawsuit being filed to prevent it 
from being used in the 1992 congressional elections.  The plaintiffs described the state’s 
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 Louisiana redistricting ligation began in 1992, roughly a year before Shaw was decided.  Once Shaw was 
decided it became the precedent under which the Fourth District, a majority-African American district, was 
declared unconstitutional.     
 
70
 African Americans in Districts Two constituted 60.0 percent and District Four 63.2 percent of the registered 
voters in these districts (Engstrom and Kirksey 2001, 249).   
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plan as “a sophisticated voter dilution scheme” that violated both the U.S. Constitution 
and the VRA.
71
  They claimed that the Second and Fourth Districts were both safe, 
“super-majority” African-American districts into which minority voters had been 
unnecessarily “packed.”72  In addition, the plaintiffs argued that District Four was a racial 
gerrymander (Hays v. Louisiana 1993, 1190).  The District Court denied the plaintiffs’ 
request that the 1992 congressional elections be enjoined.  It also rejected the plaintiff’s 
claim that the state’s plan was unconstitutional.  However, no decision was reached 
whether the plan violated the VRA. 
 Engstrom and Kirksey noted that “the federal court in Louisiana never did rule on 
the VRA issue on which it had requested post-trail briefs in 1992” (1998, 253).  In 1993, 
the court returned to address the plaintiffs’ claim that District Four was a racial 
gerrymander that violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteen Amendment.  
Engstrom and Kirksey state, “this issue was resuscitated when the Supreme Court held in 
Shaw that race-based districting, even when designed to benefit rather than harm an 
African American minority, must be ‘strictly scrutinized’ under the Fourteenth 
Amendment” (1998, 253).   In 1992, as noted above, the state argued that the “the 
primary motive for drawing [Districts Two and Four] was to enhance the ability of 
                                                 
71
Plaintiffs’ Memorandum, at 27.  The four plaintiffs (two whites, one Asian American, and one African 
American) in this case all resided in District Five, which is adjacent to District Four (Hays v. State of Louisiana 
1993, 1119). 
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Plaintiffs’ Memorandum, at 5, 13, 16, and  testimony of Ronald Weber, August 26, 1992, at 118-119, 126-127, 
and 177.  The plaintiffs further argued that the new electoral scheme adopted was “the ‘illegitimate’ child” of an 
“illicit political love affair” between African American leaders and the Republican Party (Plaintiffs’ 
Memorandum, at 14).  Their explanation for the joint support of African Americans and Republicans for the plan 
was:  
  
the super-majority or “safe” district is treasured by black elected officials, while the reduction  
 in black influence in the remaining majority white [districts] is supported by the Republican 
 Party as an effort to eliminate the effectiveness of the black minority in the remaining districts  
 (ibid, 15). 
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African American voters to elect candidates of their choice.”73  In 1993, in the post-Shaw 
context, the state argued that the actual shape of District Four was the result of partisan 
and incumbent politics, rather than race, and therefore strict scrutiny was not necessary 
(Hays v. Louisiana 1993, 1199).  The state also argued that there were “compelling” 
reasons for the creation of District Four.  As quoted in Engstrom and Kirksey, “if African 
American voters were not provided with two viable opportunities to elect congressmen of 
their choice their plan would not be in compliance with the Voting Rights Act” (1998, 
254).
74
  The state also maintained that their districting plan would help politically 
empower the state’s African Americans.  
 The court found it unnecessary to rule on the state’s compelling interest 
arguments because, in its opinion, even if the reasons for a second majority-African 
American district were compelling, District Four had not been “narrowly tailored” to 
achieve them  (Hays v Louisiana 1993, 1196-1197).  The court argued that District Four 
contained more African Americans than necessary to provide the group with a reasonable 
opportunity to elect a candidate of their choice.  In the court’s view: 
 …a district with a black voting age population of not more than 55%--and 
probably less—would have been adequate to ensure that blacks could elect  
a candidate of their choice, assuming they chose to exercise their franchise 
 and assuming the candidate of their choice had more than a modicum of appeal 
 for non-black voters (ibid, 1208). 
 
Following Shaw, as noted above, the strict scrutiny standard must be applied 
when a district is drawn primarily for the purpose of separating voters along racial lines, 
and "traditional districting principles" are disregarded in the process.  Louisiana’s plan 
failed the strict scrutiny test because the plan, as found by the court, “cavalierly 
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 Post trial Brief of Defendants, p. 10 
 
74It was widely believed if the state’s plan did not include two majority-African American districts, it 
would be denied preclearance (Engstrom and Kirksey 1998, 254). 
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disregarded” the traditional principles when the Fourth District was created (ibid, 1200).  
Further elections under this plan were prohibited because of its failure to comply with the 
standard set by Shaw. 
Engstrom and Kirksey note, “the legislature interpreted the Hays decision to mean 
that a second majority-African American district would be permitted if it was not over 55 
percent in voting-age population”  and did not deviate from the traditional districting 
criteria as dramatically as it had in the 1992 plan (1998, 255).  Such a plan was adopted 
by the legislature during a special legislative session.  A newer version of District Four 
was developed.
75
  It was wedged-shaped and ran from Caddo Parish in the northwestern 
corner of the state to Ascension Parish in the southeast, a distance of about 250 miles.  It 
included three parishes and parts of others.  African Americans constituted 58.4 percent 
of the total population and 54.4 percent of the voting-age population (id, 256).    
The state’s plan was granted preclearance by the Justice Department, but before 
elections could be held in them, another hearing was held in the Hays case.  Once again, 
the plaintiffs were not satisfied with the plan.  They continued their Shaw challenge, 
describing the new plan as only “a slightly less egregious racial gerrymander than its 
predecessor.”76  They argued that the traditional districting principles were ignored again 
in a quest for racially determined districts.  In their opinion, “the mark of Zorro” had 
simply been replaced by a “racial dagger” (ibid, 12).  They also maintained that the state 
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Virtually all of the African Americans in the legislature voted in favor of the plan (24 African American 
members of the House and seven of the eight African Americans of the Senate voted for the plan) (id, 257).  
On the other hand, white members of the House and Senate voted against the plan.  In the House, 37 voted 
in favor and 43 against (with one absent), and in the Senate, 14 voted in favor and 15 against (with two 
absent) (id, 257). 
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 Memoranda in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Adoption of an Interim Congressional 
Districting Plan for the 1994 Congressional Elections in the State of Louisiana, at 12. 
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had no compelling interest in the creation of a second majority African American district, 
and that even if it had, District Four was still not narrowly tailored.   The plaintiffs again 
argued that District Four was “packed” with more African Americans than necessary to 
provide that group with a “realistic chance” to “elect a candidate of its choice” (ibid, 15).   
The District Court agreed with the plaintiffs that District Four was indeed a racial 
gerrymander (Hays v. State of Louisiana 1994, 119, 122).  Furthermore, it asserted that 
the district needed “major surgery,” and the redrawing of it had been “…at best a 
cosmetic makeover” (ibid, n.1).  The court rejected the plaintiffs’ assertion that African 
Americans in Louisiana had a realistic chance to elect candidates of their choice in 
districts that range from 35 to 45 percent African American, and also their 
characterization of District Four as a “pack district.”77  The court also said that the 
legislature had misinterpreted its 1993 decision “as approving a racially gerrymandered 
district if it contained no more than 55% minority registered voters” (Hays v. Louisiana 
1994, 122).  The court stated that the state had no compelling interest in basing districts 
on race. The court also rejected the state’s argument that a second majority-African 
American district was required to avoid sections 2 and 5 violations.  The state’s claim 
that a second district was needed to remedy past and present discrimination was also 
rejected by the court (ibid, 123-124). 
 Following the Hays decision, the court replaced the state’s plan with its own plan 
that contained a single majority-African American district —District Two in the New 
Orleans areas (Engstrom and Kirksey 1998, 259).  In 1994, District Two’s African 
American population was 60.7 percent, voting-age population 56.1 percent, and voter 
                                                 
77
 See transcript (July 21, 1994 afternoon session), at 18-19. 
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registration 60.3 percent.  In developing this plan, which split only six parishes and one 
town of about 3,000 residents, the court stated it had “ignore[d] all political 
considerations” (Hays v. Louisiana 1994, 125).  This plan was not utilized in the 1994 
congressional election because the Supreme Court stayed the lower court’s ruling, 
allowing the election to be held under the state’s second plan (Engstrom and Kirksey 
1998, 259).   
 The Supreme Court heard the state’s appeal of the Hays ruling in 1995.  The 
Court, without dissent, vacated the lower court’s decision because the plaintiffs did not 
reside in District Four.  Therefore, they had no standing to sue (United States v. Hays 
1995, 745).  The Court stated, “voters in [racially gerrymandered] districts may suffer the 
special representation harms racial classifications can cause in the voting context,” but a 
person residing in another district, even an adjacent district, “does not suffer these special 
harms” (ibid, 743).   Engstrom and Kirksey stated “The fact that the racial composition of 
one district had a direct effect on the racial composition of the other simply did not matter 
to the Court” (1998, 260).   However, the Court did not address the racial gerrymandering 
and strict scrutiny finding. 
 In 1995, the Hays litigation resumed in federal District Court after new plaintiffs 
that resided in District Four were added.  After a two-day hearing, the court dismissed the 
defendant’s race-neutral explanation for District Four as “frivolous” (Hays v. Louisiana 
1996, 368).  It found that “the State considered only race in determining which pockets of 
voters to pull in and which pockets of voters to push out” (ibid, 368).  The state’s 
compelling interest arguments were rejected again, for the same reasons as before, it fell 
short of the “narrow tailoring” standard (id, 371). 
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 Prior to the 1996 congressional election, the Louisiana legislature adopted the 
court’s districting plan it had created the previous year.78  This plan, as noted, reduced the 
number of majority-African American districts to one—the Second District.  The court 
claimed that the plan "empowers more [African American] voters" than the state's plan 
(Hays v. State of Louisiana 1996, 7 n.17).  It created three so-called minority influence 
districts—Districts Four, Five, and Six.79   Districts Four, Five, and Six in the court’s plan 
had voting-age population that were, respectively, 29.3, 27.8, and 29.4 percent African 
American (Engstrom and Kirksey 1998, 261).  Engstrom and Kirksey interpreted the 
decision as stating, “African Americans in these districts would presumably ‘influence’ 
election outcomes and the subsequent behavior of the people elected to represent these 
districts” (ibid, 261).  The court believed that the influence that African Americans had in 
these districts would “empower the state’s African Americans more than actually having 
a second representative in Congress chosen by and accountable to the voters in a 
majority-African American district” (id, 261).80  This plan was used in the 1996 election 
and shortly after the election; a special legislative session was held and the state formally 
adopted it.  
Georgia 
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 In essence, the plan became the state’s plan. 
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 A minority influence district, according to the court, was any district that is at least twenty-five percent African 
American in voting-age population (Hays v. State of Louisiana 1996, 7 n.17). 
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 Engstrom has identified this decision as one of the worst applications of the concept of “influence 
districts” by the American courts (Engstrom forthcoming).  
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 The 1990 census indicated that Georgia’s population growth entitled it to an 
additional congressional seat—the Eleventh District.81  During a special legislative 
session in August 1991, Georgia’s General Assembly enacted a new congressional 
redistricting plan, which created “two U.S. House majority-minority districts, the Fifth 
and Eleventh, and an additional district, the Second, in which blacks comprised just over 
thirty-five percent of the voting-age population” (Johnson v. Miller 1994, 1363).  African 
Americans constituted 58 percent of the voting-age population in Districts Five and 57 
percent in District Eleventh. 
 After being denied preclearance,
82
 members of the Georgia’s legislature met with 
the Department of Justice staff in Washington to improve their chances of receiving 
preclearance.  The legislators were informed that their “economic and political rationales 
for the proposed districts were ‘pretextual,’ and told to subordinate their economic and 
political concerns to the quest for racial percentages” (Johnson v. Miller 1994, 1365, n.8).  
Armed with these suggestions the General Assembly returned to the drawing board.  
Many of the legislators were convinced that any successful plan would have to “have the 
highest percentage of black population that we could get, irregardless [sic] of where we 
have to go” (Johnson v Miller, 1364). 
 The House and Senate could not agree on a single plan; therefore, each chamber 
passed different plans.  The House’s plan increased District Two by only two percentage 
                                                 
81Between 1980 and 1990, one of Georgia’s ten U.S. House districts, the Fifth, was a majority-African 
American district. 
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On January 21, 1992, the Department of Justice refused to grant preclearance to the Georgia legislature’s 
plan.  John Dunne, the Assistant Attorney General, writing the rejection letter, stated the Justice 
Department was “unable to conclude that the Eleventh Districts, 60.63% black, with a black voting age 
population of 56.61%, and using nearly unpopulated land bridges to rope in black concentrations in Dekalb 
and Richmond counties, satisfied the requirements of the Voting Rights Act” (Attorney General’s January 
21, 1992, objection letter 105-106). 
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points (Holmes 1998, 202).
83
  The Senate made more substantive changes in its plan, 
which “pushed the [Eleventh] District into Savannah and created a majority-Black 
Second District by including parts of Albany, Columbus, Macon, and Valdosta" (ibid, 
202).  After each plan was approved by their respective body, the senate called a special 
conference so that a single plan would be adopted.  After nearly two weeks of negotiation 
a plan was created and adopted by both chambers.  In the Second District the African 
American voting-age population was increased to 45.01 percent, and in the Fifth and 
Eleventh Districts the African American voting-age population increased to nearly 58 
percent (Johnson v. Miller 1994, 1365).  The Department of Justice denied preclearance 
to this plan as well (ibid, 1365).  In his March 20, 1992 objection letter, Dunne wrote: 
…the submitted plan minimizes the electoral potential of large concentrations  
of black population in several areas of the state.  Specifically, we note that 
alternatives, including one adopted by the Senate, included a large number of  
black voters from Screven, Effingham and Chatham Counties in the 11
th
 
Congressional district.  However, due to unyielding efforts on behalf of 
House members, this configuration was abandoned and no legitimate reason 
has been suggested to explain the exclusion of the second largest concentration 
of blacks in the state from a majority black Congressional District.
84
 
 
 After the rejection from the Department of Justice, Georgia’s General Assembly 
believed that preclearance would only be granted if their plan created three majority-
African American districts.  During a legislative session in 1992, the Assembly created 
and passed such a plan that was based on the so-called “max-black” plan.  This plan was 
created by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) (Johnson v. Miller 1994, 1360, 
1362-1363). The key to the ACLU’s plan was the “Macon/Savannah trade.” According to 
the plan, “the dense black population in the Macon region would be transferred from the 
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 One hundred and nineteen of the 165 Georgia House’s legislators supported this plan. 
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Attorney General, March 20, 1992, objection letter 120-126. 
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Eleventh District to the Second, converting the Second into a majority-black district, and 
the Eleventh District’s loss in black population would be offset by extending the Eleventh 
to include the black populations in Savannah” (ibid, 1365-1366) (see Figure 3).    
The African American voting-age population in the Second was 52.33 percent, the Fifth, 
with 57.47 percent, and the Eleventh, with 60.36 percent.  On April 2, 1992, this plan 
received preclearance by the Justice Department.
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 Georgia’s redistricting plan, especially the Eleventh District, was challenged in 
federal District Court by white voters.  This district was bizarre in shape; it “centered 
around four discrete, widely spaced urban centers, that have absolutely nothing to do with 
each other, and stretch the district hundreds of miles across rural counties and narrow 
swamp corridors” (id, 1389) (see figure 3).86 
The plaintiffs alleged that the Eleventh District was a racial gerrymander that 
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as interpreted by 
Shaw v. Reno (Johnson v. Miller 1994, 1372).  A three-judge federal District Court held 
that it was: 
…exceedingly obvious” from the shape of the Eleventh District, 
together with the relevant racial demographics, that the drawing  
of narrow land bridges to incorporate within the District outlying  
appendages containing nearly 80% of the district’s total black 
population was a deliberate attempt to bring black populations  
into the district (ibid, 1374-1376). 
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Elections were held under this plan, which resulted in African Americans being elected in each of these 
districts. 
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The Almanac of American Politics described the Eleventh District as follows:  
…geographically, it is a monstrosity, stretching from Atlanta to Savannah.  
Its core is the plantation country in the center of the state, lightly populated, 
but heavily black.  It links by narrow corridors the black neighborhoods in  
Augusta, Savannah and southern DeKalb Country” (Barone and Ujifusa 1994, 356). 
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The court also held that the state’s plan was invalid under Shaw v. Reno because the strict 
scrutiny requirement was not considered when the plan was created by Georgia’s 
legislators (id, 1372).   Race was found by the court to be the overriding factor when the 
Eleventh District was created by the state (id, 1378).  It also found that the VRA did not 
require three majority-African American districts, and that the plan was not narrowly 
tailored to the goal of complying with the VRA (id, 1392-1393). 
 On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s finding.  It held that 
the Eleventh District was unconstitutional.  Relying on Shaw, the Court found that the 
“evidence of the General Assembly’s intent to racially gerrymander the Eleventh District 
is overwhelming” (Miller v. Johnson 1995, 911).  Shaw never held that bizarre 
appearance was a necessary condition for a constitutional violation; however, the issue in 
Miller was whether the district was the result of “race-based districting,” which could be 
demonstrated through shapes, demographics, or through other evidence (ibid, 912-927).  
The Court reemphasized a standard expressed in Shaw, which Justice Ginsburg called the 
“race-as-predominant-factor” standard (id, 934).  Under this standard, the Court found 
that shapes of districts are: 
 …relevant not because bizarreness is a necessary element of the constitutional  
wrong or a threshold requirement of proof, but because it may be persuasive 
 circumstantial evidence that race for its own sake, and not other districting 
principles, was the legislature’s dominant and controlling rationale in drawing 
its district lines. The logical implication, as courts applying Shaw have recognized, is that 
parties may rely on evidence other than bizarreness to establish race-based districting (id, 
914, emphasis added).  
 
Miller also expanded the scope of the strict scrutiny standard.  It argued that strict 
scrutiny applies when “race was the predominant redistricting criterion” (id, 916).  Justice 
Stevens, dissenting in Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena, states that under the Court’s 
approach, strict scrutiny is: 
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…in order once it is determined that an apportionment is predominantly 
motivated by race.  It matters not at all, in this new regime, whether the  
apportionment dilutes or enhances minority voting strength.  As very  
recently observed, however, “there is no moral or constitutional equivalence 
between a policy that is designed to perpetuate a caste system and one that  
seeks to eradicate racial subordination” (cited in Miller v. Johnson 1995, 932). 
 
In Miller, the Court explained that a “State is free to recognize communities that have a 
particular racial makeup [without triggering the strict scrutiny standard], provided its 
action is directed toward some common thread of relevant interests” (Miller v. Johnson 
1995, 920).  The Court upheld the District Court’s finding that the use of race in drawing 
this district could not be sanctioned on this ground.
87
  
The Impact of Shaw and Miller 
 Both the Shaw and Miller decisions have elevated the importance of the four 
traditional districting principles—contiguity, compactness, respect for political 
subdivisions, and recognition of communities of interest—by placing a spotlight on them 
(Engstrom 2001, 19).  Many state constitutions, statutes, and local charters require 
representational districts to be contiguous (see Grofman 1985, 177-83; Pildes and Niemi 
1993, 528-31; Lyons and Jewell 1986, 76).  This is a dichotomous concept; a district is 
either contiguous or not.  The test used to determine this principle is not complicated.  A 
contiguous district is “one in which a person can go from any point within the district to 
any other point [within the district] without leaving the district” (Engstrom 2001, 19).  
Prior to Shaw there was limited confusion about what this principle, or its application, 
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 For more cases that challenged the constitutionality of the new majority-African American congressional 
districts that occurred after Shaw v. Reno, see Johnson et al., v. Mortham et al., (1996), concerning Florida, and 
Bush v. Vera (1996), concerning Texas.  Each ruled that the majority-African American districts created were 
unconstitutional.  Dewey Clayton stated, “Through these U.S. Supreme Court decisions, lower federal court 
decisions, and legislative action, 8 out of the 17 congressional districts in the South with a majority (African 
American) population have been overturned” (2000, 128).  New majority-African American districts in 
Louisiana (one), North Carolina (one), Georgia (two), Florida (one), Virginia (one), and Texas (two) were 
dismantled as well (ibid). 
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entailed.  As expressed by Engstrom, the “major issue concerning contiguity has been 
whether the ability to travel throughout a district is a theoretical or a literal requirement” 
(ibid, 21).  This is usually a problem when a body of water is present (id, 21).    
 Following Shaw, lower court decisions have presented alternative standards as to 
what contiguity requires.  Some judges have not been convinced that districts that meet 
the traditional definition of contiguity satisfy this principle.  For instance, a federal 
District Court in North Carolina held that contiguity had been “disregarded” in that 
state’s reconstruction of its Twelfth Congressional District in 1997, finding that the new 
district contained “narrow corridors” that left it “barely contiguous” (Cromartie v. Hunt 
1998, 8, 12, 13, 28; see also Cromartie v. Hunt 2000. sl. op.,12). 
 Compactness is not as straightforward as contiguity.  This principle has always 
suffered from ambiguity (Webster 2000, 144).  Compactness is a continuous concept that 
concerns the shape of districts, not whether they contain geographically discrete parts. 
There is no clear scholarly definition of what compactness is.  Engstrom notes that 
districts can be considered more or less compact (2001, 22).  Following Shaw,  lower 
courts have been confronted with a number of quantitative measures that supposedly 
reveal the relative compactness of districts  (see Johnson v. Miller 1994, 1388-90; Vera v. 
Richards 1994, 1329-30; Cromartie v. Hunt 1998, 5-9; Cromartie v. Hunt 2000, sl. op. at 
13-14, 16, 21-22).  But these measures emphasize different aspects of shapes and thus 
result in conflicting conclusions.  Even bizarre shaped districts can satisfy some of the 
tests (see Young 1988; Scher, Mills, and Hotaling 1997, 95). 
 There are new quantitative measures of compactness which abandon the 
geographical appearances and focuses on the physical distances between homes of the 
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people residing within a district (see Niemi et al. 1990, 1162, 1165-66).  These new 
measurements have been challenged in the courts.  The confusion that surrounds 
compactness does not simplify the districting task; instead, it makes the process more 
difficult (Engstrom 2001, 24).   
 The third criterion identified by the Court in Shaw is respect for political 
subdivisions.  Engstrom noted, “local units of government, especially counties, have 
often served as building blocks for state legislative and congressional districts” (2001, 
24).  Political subdivisions are recognized by law, and as stated by Engstrom, “…there 
should be no problem in identifying them and in determining whether or not they have 
been divided by representational district lines” (ibid, 24).  The problem lies in what 
political subdivisions to include and not include in the process.  Counties, prior to Shaw 
and Miller, were the major focus but other subdivisions can be counted as well.   
 Another concern is the use of precinct lines.  Precincts are not governmental 
jurisdictions but merely administrative units for elections (id, 25).  It is often argued that 
precinct lines should not be divided by districts.  But Engstrom states, “requiring districts 
to follow preexisting precinct boundaries can impede the achievement of other, more 
important districting goals, such as creating majority-minority districts, and courts should 
not allow this constraint to be a pretext for discriminatory districting” (id, 25).  Precincts 
are not fixed units; they can be changed relatively easily to accommodate more important 
districting criteria.  
 The last districting principle is “communities of interest.”  The Supreme Court 
added “communities defined by actual shared interests” to the list of principles in Miller; 
however, it does not reveal how this concept is to be applied.  Engstrom states, “serious 
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problems arise, however, in identifying such communities, as well as in deciding which 
deserve to be recognized, and thereby favored, in the design of districts” (id, 25).  It has 
been described as the least defined principles for drawing districts (Morrill 1990, 215; see 
also Leib 1998, 688-89; O’Rourke 1995, 764-66).  Prior to Miller judicial decisions 
contained “widely divergent concepts of communities of interest” (Malone 1997, 467).  
Trying to provide a judicial definition, as stated by Engstrom, has added to the conceptual 
confusion rather than provide clarity to this principle (2001, 26).  
 Another question raised by Miller is whether the “shared interests” must be 
among people living in geographical proximity to each other or whether this concerns the 
degree to which districts themselves combine people with similar interests (ibid, 27).  
Justice Kennedy stated “a State is free to recognize communities that have a particular 
racial makeup, provided its action is directed toward some common thread of relevant 
interest” (Miller v. Johnson 1995, 920).  There have been attempts to define and 
operationalize this criterion, but the concept of community remains just as “subjective 
and elusive” (Hastert v. State Board of Elections 1991, 600) after Miller as before.  
 The traditional districting principles will become more important in future 
districting decisions because they will serve as a “crucial frame of reference” (Engstrom 
2001, 19).  According to Engstrom, the “elevation of these principles will provide a 
necessary check on district designers because they will be less inclined to deviate from 
the criteria” (ibid, 19).  The Miller decision will force state legislators to consider the four 
principles when creating new districting arrangements.  Many redistricters in the past 
have virtually ignored them, as discussed in Hays v. Louisiana (1993). 
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 Engstrom warns that after Shaw and Miller“…the ‘political thicket’ of districting 
is now even more entangled” (2001, 19).  As noted above, these criteria often lack a clear 
and agreed upon definition.  In fact, Engstrom refers to this as a “conceptual thicket.”  
This has been apparent in the post-Shaw era in lower federal courts.  These traditional 
criteria are often in conflict with each other because of their ambiguity (id, 19).  Despite 
the Supreme Court elevating the importance of these principles they have not set an 
absolute standard for them. Nor has the Supreme Court stated that these principles are 
constitutionally required.  
 The Shaw and Miller decisions are also important because they have placed strict 
restrictions on the use of race as a criterion for drawing lines.  If districts were created 
with race as the predominant factor, their constitutionality will be challenged.  McDonald 
states that these decisions have “…created substantial confusion over the extent to which 
the consideration of race in redistricting was prohibited by the Constitution, and the 
extent to which it was required to avoid retrogression under section 5 and liability under 
section 2” (2006, 24).  A legislature may properly “be aware of racial demographics;” but 
it may not allow race to predominate in the redistricting process (Miller v. Johnson 1995, 
916).  Shaw and Miller, in a way, have placed state legislators in an uncomfortable 
position.  As stated by Katharine Butler, “legislators can be justifiably anxious that they 
will be ‘damned by the Constitution’ if they consider race and ‘damned by the Voting 
Rights Act’ if they do not” (2002, 137).   After Shaw and Miller, state legislators are 
placed in an un-winnable situation: “to create or not to create majority-African American 
districts?”   
The Straw That Broke the Camel’s Back 
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 Shaw and its progeny, the new “strict scrutiny” standard, and the four “traditional 
districting principles,” all contributed to the reduction in the number of majority-African 
American districts created in the post-1990 round of redistricting.  Many of them were 
found to be unconstitutional. Starting in the mid-to-late 1990s through 2004, the Supreme 
Court played an essential role in weakening the VRA, especially section 5. During this 
period, the Supreme Court confirmed that sections 2 and 5 are independent of each other, 
redefined the “purpose” prong of section 5, reduced the Department of Justice’s 
“preclearance power,” redefined the retrogression standard, furthered reduced the number 
of majority-African American districts, and stressed the importance of minority influence 
districts.  The next section explores these changes. 
Separating Sections 2 and 5: Reno v. Bossier I  
 After the amendment to section 2 in 1982, it was widely believed that sections 2 
and 5 of the VRA were inseparable, as noted above. These two sections working together 
resulted in more majority-African American districts created. In Reno v. Bossier Parish 
School Board I, however, the Supreme Court held that these two sections are independent 
of each other and section 2 cannot be incorporated in section 5 preclearance 
determinations ( 520 U.S. 471, 1997).   In 1992, the School Board in Bossier Parish, 
Louisiana needed to adopt a new redistricting plan in order to equalize the population 
distribution among the Board’s twelve districts.  The African American population in 
Bossier Parish, according to the 1990 census, was 20.1 percent and they constituted 15.5 
percent of the registered voters in the parish.  On October 1, 1992, the Board 
unanimously agreed to use the Police Jury’s redistricting plan, which had already 
received preclearance from the Justice Department. This plan did not contain a majority-
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African American district; therefore, it was not supported by the African American 
community.  Despite the African American community’s disapproval of the plan, the 
Board submitted it for preclearance.
88
 
Prior to the School Board’s decision to use the Jury’s  plan, George Price, 
president of the local chapter of The National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People (NAACP), wrote a letter on March 25, 1992 to the School Board 
expressing the organization’s desire to be involved in the Board’s redistricting process.  
Price did not receive a response to his letter and, on August 17, 1992, he wrote a second 
letter stating that the NAACP would dispute any plan that did not include majority-
African American districts (Bossier Parish I v. Reno 1995, 438).  During the summer of 
1992, the NAACP prepared a redistricting plan for the School Board that created two 
majority-African American districts.  On September 3, 1992, Price presented the plan to 
the Board but they refused to consider it because it required the splitting of 46 voting 
precincts.
89
 
The U.S. Attorney General issued a letter to the School Board informing them 
that their plan was denied preclearance.  It indicated that while the identical plan for the 
Police Jury received preclearance, the Board’s plan was rejected because the Attorney 
General acquired new information—specifically the NAACP’s plan, which demonstrated 
that African American residents in Bossier are “sufficiently numerous and geographically 
compact so as to constitute a majority in two single-member districts” (cited in Bossier v. 
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The Board members argued that this plan was not “retrogressive” because it maintained the status quo 
regarding the number of African American districts which was based on the Jury’s plan (App. to Juris 
Statement 93a, 141a).  
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According to Louisiana law, School Board districts must contain whole voting precincts (see Louisiana 
Revised Statutes, Title 17, section 71.3 E). 
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Reno 1995, 439).  It also asserted that the Board’s plan violated section 2 of the VRA 
because it “unnecessarily limited the opportunity for minority voters to elect their 
candidates of choice,” as compared to the plan submitted by the NAACP (ibid, 439).  As 
cited in the objection letter: 
relying on 28 CFR § 51.55 (b)(2), which provides that the Attorney General  
shall withhold preclearance where “necessary to prevent a clear violation of  
amended section 2,” the Attorney General concluded that the Board’s 
redistricting plan warranted a denial of preclearance under section 5 (id, 157a).
90
 
 
The School Board filed an action seeking preclearance under section 5 in the 
District Court for the District of Columbia.  The defendant in this matter, DOJ, argued 
that the court should consider the School Board’s violation of section 2 as evidence of its 
discriminatory purpose.  They further argued that preclearance should be denied based on 
the “direct” and indirect” evidence that the School Board acted with a discriminatory 
purpose with their plan (Bossier v Reno I 1995, 440). The District Court was unconvinced 
by the defendant’s arguments and preclearance was granted to the School Board.   
On appeal, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the District Court and 
remanded the case to consider the evidence of a dilute effect in determining whether the 
board acted with an intent to retrogress in designing its reapportionment plan. Justice 
O’Connor, writing for the majority stated, “Today we clarify the relationship between 
sections 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965” (Reno v. Bossier 1997, 474).  In doing 
so, the Court addressed two questions: 
…(i) whether preclearance must be denied under section 5 whenever a covered 
jurisdiction’s new voting “standard, practice, or procedure” violates section 2;  
and (ii) whether evidence that a new “standard, practice, or procedure” has a  
dilutive impact is always irrelevant to the inquiry whether the covered jurisdiction  
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The Attorney General also rejected the School Board’s argument that the Louisiana statue concerning splitting 
precincts was a sufficient reason not to create majority-African American districts (Bossier Parish I v. Reno 
1995, 439).   
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acted with “the purpose... of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of 
race or color” under section 5? (ibid, 474).  
A section 2 violation may not form the basis for denying section 5 preclearance, which 
according to Justice Stevens would:  
…inevitably make compliance with section 5 contingent upon compliance with  
section 2.  Doing so would, for all intents and purposes, replace the standards  
for section 5 with those for section 2.  Because this would contradict our  
longstanding interpretation of these two sections of the Act, we reject appellants’  
position (id, 477).   
 
 The Court agreed with the District Court that you cannot object to section 5 based on a 
section 2 dilutive effect, but disagreed about whether dilutive effect could be part of a 
finding of a dilutive purpose.  
 
Reno v. Bossier II: Redefining Discriminatory Intent 
The Bossier Parish School Board faced the Supreme Court again in 2000.  The 
Court in Bossier I posed a question that was left unanswered: “whether the section 5 
purpose inquiry ever extends beyond the search for retrogressive intent?” (Reno v. 
Bossier Parish II 2000, 487).  Seeking to answer this question, on remand, a federal 
District Court again granted preclearance to the School Board’s plan. The court 
concluded that “the record will not support a conclusion that extends beyond the presence 
or absence of retrogressive intent” (Bossier Parish School Board v. Reno 1998, 31). It 
further noted that one could “imagine a set of facts that would establish a ‘non-
retrogressive, but nevertheless discriminatory purpose,’ but those imagined facts are not 
present here” (ibid, 31).  Like in Bossier I, the District Court left open the question: 
“whether section 5 prohibits preclearance of a plan enacted with such a purpose” (id, 31).  
 In a 5-4 opinion, the Supreme Court held that: 
…section 5 does not prohibit preclearance of a redistricting plan that was  
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enacted with a discriminatory but nonretrogressive purpose, as, when  
considered in light of the court’s longstanding interpretation of the  
“effect” prong of section 5 as covering only retrogressive dilution, the  
language of section 5 led to the conclusion that the “purpose” prong of  
section 5 covered only retrogressive dilution (Reno v. Bossier II 2000, 329). 
 
The Court held that jurisdictions are required to show that their redistricting plan does not 
have either the purpose or effect of worsening the position of minority voters.  As stated 
on the Justice Department’s website, “…a redistricting plan adopted with a 
discriminatory but nonretrogressive purpose may not be denied section 5 preclearance for 
that reason alone, but will be subject to federal court challenges under the Constitution 
and/or section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.”91 
 The Court in Bossier II redefined and weakened section 5’s “discriminatory 
intent” standard.  After Beer, it was commonly understood that section 5 prohibited all 
changes enacted with an unconstitutional discriminatory purpose, not just those which 
made minority voters worse off” (McCrary et al., 2006a, 1). Under the new standard set 
by Bossier II, a voting change with an unconstitutional racial purpose, no matter how 
strong the evidence of discriminatory intent, would have to be precleared unless the 
evidence also showed that the change was intended to make matters worse for minority 
voters (Reno v. Bossier II 2000, 341).   
According to Beer, as noted above, an ameliorative change “cannot violate 
section 5 unless the new apportionment itself so discriminates on the basis of race or 
color as to violate the Constitution” (Beer v. United States 1976, 141).  In Beer, the 
retrogressive effect standard has been understood to apply to vote denial as well as 
abridgement.  Justice Scalia, in Bossier II, conceded that: 
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…in the context of denial claims, no less than in the context of abridgement  
claims, the antibacksliding rationale for section 5 (and its effect of avoiding 
preservation of an even worse status quo) suggests that retrogression should  
again be the criterion, arguably in that context the word “deny” (unlike the  
word “abridge”) does not import a comparison with the status quo (Reno v.  
Bossier II 2000, 338). 
 
The Supreme Court held in Bossier II that the phrasing of the “unless” clause 
clearly meant that the purpose requirement under section 5 was the same as the “intent 
standard” under Beer.  Justice Scalia, writing a dissenting opinion, viewed the phrasing of 
the unless clause as “a most implausible interpretation” on the grounds that “at the time 
Beer was decided, it had not been established that discriminatory purpose, as well as 
discriminatory effect, was necessary for a constitutional violation” (Reno v. Bossier II 
2000, 337). As stated by Peyton McCracy et al., “Justice Scalia contented that the Beer 
majority had understood the constitutional standard for evaluating vote dilution to be the 
standard set forth in White v. Regester, which characterized the case as a simple effects 
test not requiring proof of discriminatory intent” (2006, 16). Bossier II held that the 
purpose of discriminating against racial minorities was insufficient to warrant a 
preclearance denial.  McCrary et al., argued that Bossier II effectively weakened the 
purpose prong as a weapon for protecting African Americans from discrimination and 
from electing representative of their choice (2006, 21).  
 Both Bossier I and II have weakened section 5 of the VRA. Daniel Tokaji asserts: 
        Bossier II  imposed an enormous limitation on the DOJ’s authority to deny  
       preclearance, since the purpose prong had been the most-often used justification  
      for objection before then and showing a retrogressive purpose is difficult.  The  
      only function that the purpose prong serves after Bossier II is to stop the 
      “incompetent retrogressor”—for example, the jurisdiction that intends to make  
       racial minorities worse off, but makes a change that fails to have this intended  
       effect (2001, 8). 
 
 
Post-2000 Census:  Political Gerrymandering 
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 The Shaw, Miller, and Bossier I and II decisions set the stage for the section 5 
“preclearance” litigation following the 2000 census. This round of redistricting, unlike 
the previous round, was more partisan in nature. Many of the new districts in the South 
were created along partisan lines.
92
  Partisan and race are tangled together in the region. 
Many southern states, during the mid-to-late 1990s, saw a surge in the number of 
Republican candidates being elected to political offices.  Following the 2000 census, 
African American and white Democrats in many southern states joined forces to curb the 
Republican growth.  One such way was to create “safe Democratic districts” (Pitts 2008, 
939-940).   These districts were created to preserve as much of the Democratic legislative 
power as possible (ibid, 939). As a result of these districts, the courts were faced with 
more partisan gerrymandering litigation instead of racial gerrymandering litigation; one, 
such case was Georgia v. Ashcroft, which entailed a racial issue with a partisan 
implications. 
Georgia v. Ashcroft 
 Georgia v. Ashcroft, like the Bossier II decision, dramatically redefined and 
further weakened section 5 of the VRA.  It also limited the Department of Justice’s 
preclearance power.  
 Following the 2000 census, redistricting disputes erupted in Georgia once more.  
In 2001, the state enacted a new redistricting plan for the state’s senate, which reduced 
the African American percentage in many of the majority-minority districts drawn in 
1997 and allegedly created a number of African American “influence districts.” 
Georgia’s redistricting plan contained 56 districts.  In all, the legislature drew 13 districts 
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with an African American voting-age population above 50 percent, thirteen additional 
districts with an African American voting-age percentage between 30 percent and 50 
percent, and four other districts with an African American voting-age percentage between 
25 percent and 30 percent (Georgia v. Ashcroft 2003, 439). The asserted goal of the plan 
was to maintain the number of majority-African American districts and also increase the 
number of Democratic Senate seats (ibid, 440).
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The Attorney General, focusing on Districts Two, Twelve, and Twenty-Six, the 
boundaries of which were altered, denied preclearance because these districts unlawfully 
reduced African American voters’ ability to elect representatives of their choice (id, 440).  
In these three districts, in which the percentage of registered voters was above 50 percent 
before the change, the percentage of registered African American voters was reduced to 
just under 50 percent (id, 440).  The African American voting-age population dropped in 
District Two from 60.58 percent to 50.31 percent; it dropped from 55.43 percent to 50.66 
percent in District Twelve and from 62.45 percent to 50.80 percent in District Twenty-
Six.   
Georgia sought preclearance for the plan in the federal District Court for the 
District of Columbia.  It attempted to prove that its Senate’s plan was not retrogressive 
either in intent or effect (Georgia v. Ashcroft 2002, 36).  Georgia submitted evidence 
documenting each district’s total population, total African American population, African 
American voting-age population, percentage of registered African American voters, and 
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This plan was supported by both African Americans and white Democrats. Forty-three of the 45 African 
Americans in Georgia’s General Assembly supported and voted for the plan (ibid, 439).  Senator Charles Walker, 
the majority leader of the Senate when the plan was adopted by the legislature, stated “we [African-Americans] 
have a better chance to participate in the political process under the Democratic majority than we would have 
under a Republican majority” (Doc. No. 148. Pl. Exh.20, 19).No Republicans in either House voted for the plan 
(Georgia v. Ashcroft2003, 439). 
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overall percentage of Democratic votes in senate elections.  The state also submitted 
testimony from several individuals that participated in enacting the Senate’s plan into law 
(id, 36).   
The federal District Court denied preclearance to Georgia’s Senate plan (id, 97).  
The court held that the three districts in question were retrogressive because they 
provided less opportunity than in the existing plan for African Americans to elect 
representatives of their choice (ibid, 93-94).  The court further held that the reduction in 
African American voting-age population would “diminish [their] voting strength in these 
districts” and that Georgia had “failed to present any evidence” that the retrogression in 
those three districts “will be offset by gains in other districts” (id, 88).  
 The retrogression standard was redefined again by Ashcroft. According to the new 
retrogression standard, a districting plan should be upheld if it replaces majority-minority 
districts with influence districts, so long as the jurisdiction can show that it is in the best 
interest of the minority community (ibid, 493). In other words, even if the effect is an 
overall reduction in the election of representatives of choice by African American voters, 
the Court will not find retrogression if the jurisdiction can show that there is an increase 
in the “number of representatives sympathetic to the interest of minority voters” (id, 483). 
This standard is based on increasing the number of so-called minority influence 
districts.
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 The new section 5’s non-retrogression standard was to be judged by the 
ambiguous “totality of circumstance” standard. The focus on minority influence districts 
reduces the likelihood of African Americans electing representatives of their choice. One 
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 O’Connor defined influence districts as districts in which “minority voters may not be able to elect a 
candidate of choice but can play a substantial, if not decisive, role in the electoral process” (Georgia v. 
Ashcroft 2003, 482).  
80 
 
could argue that this decision has dramatically weakened the protection of minority 
voting rights under section 5. The Court argued that majority-African American districts 
could be replaced with so-called influence or coalition districts (id, 483).  Following this 
decision, many southern states have replaced several of their majority-African American 
districts with so-called influence districts (i.e., Louisiana, Georgia, North Carolina, 
Texas). 
Restoring Section 5 of the VRA: Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments 
Act of 2006 
 
     Section 5 of the VRA was scheduled to expire on August 6, 2007 unless it was 
reauthorized.  On July 27, 2006, the Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, Coretta Scott King 
Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006 (VRARA) was 
reauthorized for another 25 years.  The VRARA in effect overturned the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in Reno v. Bossier II and Georgia v. Ashcroft.  As mentioned previously, these 
two decisions weakened section 5 of the VRA.  In Bossier II, the Court redefined the 
purpose prong of section 5, which replaced the standard set three decades ago in Beer.  
The Court held that section 5 “prevents nothing but backsliding” that makes minority 
voters worse off than they were before the voting change under the statute’s language 
(Reno v. Bossier II 2000, 335-36).  The Bossier II’s decision substantially limited the 
Department of Justice’s power to object to voting changes with a discriminatory purpose.  
The new Section 5 the VRARA addressed Bossier II in three ways.   First, it replaced 
“does not have the purpose and will not have the effect” with “neither has the purpose nor 
will have the effect.”95  Second, Congress clarified that a section 5 objection could be 
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VRARA, Pub L. No. 109-246 Section 5, 120 Stat. 580-81 (2006).VRARA also added several subsections to 
section 5.  Subsection (b) provides that any voting change “that has the purpose or will have the effect of 
diminishing the ability of any citizens…on account of race or color, or in contravention of…section 4(f)(2) to 
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made based upon discriminatory purpose, effect, or both.  Finally, it restored the purpose 
prong to its original standard set in Beer. 
 As discussed previously, the Supreme Court in Georgia v. Ashcroft adopted the 
totality of the circumstances standard to determine discriminatory effect that did not rest 
on just the ability of African Americans being able to elect representatives of their 
choice.  The Court also indicated that no discriminatory effect was present if African 
American voters could influence election results even if their preferred representatives of 
choice were defeated.  The VRARA restored the Beer test for discriminatory effect by 
adding subsection (d) to section 5, clarifying that the purpose of section 5 “is to protect 
the ability of [African American] citizens to elect their preferred candidates of choice” 
(H.R. Rep. 109-478, 70). 
 
Conclusion 
 The VRA was originally created to end the constant struggles that African 
Americans in the South faced when they tried to participate in the political arena (i.e., 
voting and running for political office). They were faced with a number of devices and 
strategies that prohibited them from participating.  The passage of the VRA largely 
eliminated these barriers and provided African Americans with a political voice.  The 
focus then turned to fighting vote dilution with the help of sections 2 and 5.These two 
sections helped to create a number of new majority-African American districts so that 
African Americans could elect representatives of their choice.  These districts increased 
the number of African Americans elected to political office in the South. The number of 
                                                                                                                                                 
elect their preferred candidates of choice denies or abridges the right to vote within the meaning of subsection (a) 
of this section.”  It also added a subsection (c) clarifying that the term “purpose” includes “any discriminatory 
purpose” (ibid). 
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African Americans serving in both the U.S. House and in southern states’ legislative 
districts has increased. However, despite the creation of these districts, African 
Americans are still underrepresented in these legislative bodies. 
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Chapter 4: The Alternative Hypothesis: The Rise of the Republican Party 
  
 The Democratic Party had dominated southern politics for many years.  By the 
1960s, however, Democrats started losing white voter support in the region because of 
the National Democratic Party's active role in the Civil Rights Movement.  This opened 
the door for the GOP. Initially, Republican growth in the region was most visible at the 
federal level as support for Republican presidential candidates increased.  Republican 
victories below the presidential level however were slower as Democrats maintained their 
edge in all state and local offices (Lublin 2004, 46).   
 This section examines an alternative explanation for the growth of Republican 
membership in southern state legislatures other than the perverse effect thesis.  The 
alternative explanation argues that more southern whites are voting for Republican 
candidates regardless of whether or not they are in districts adjacent to majority-African 
American districts. This section is divided into three parts.  The first provides a brief 
historical overview of the structure of southern state legislatures.  The second examines 
the growth of the Republican Party in the lower legislative chambers of southern states.  
The relationship between race and party identification will be examined in the last. 
Historical Overview of the Structure of Southern State Legislatures 
 Southern state legislatures differ from their counterparts in other regions 
(Kapeluck et al., 2006, 270).  From the end of Reconstruction until the mid 1960s, 
southern state legislatures were one-party institutions dominated by the Democratic 
Party.  It has been expressed that the overriding purpose of the one-party system in the 
South was the preservation of white supremacy (Lamis 1999, 3; Willingham 1985, 3).  
As Alexander Lamis states, “if whites divided their votes between two political parties, 
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blacks would hold the balance of power and could bargain for an end to racial 
segregation and discrimination” (1999, 3).  African Americans and Republicans were 
virtually ignored by southern state legislators during this period, which left these groups 
operating behind the scenes.  Lublin jokingly suggests that, during this time, 
“…Republican state legislative caucuses could literally meet in the back seat of a taxicab 
in most southern states” (2004, 47).  Prior to 1966, Republicans held under 10 percent of 
the region’s lower legislative chamber seats, as reported in Table 4.1.96  It was much later 
before this figure (10 percent) was exceeded in Alabama, Arkansas, Louisiana, and 
Mississippi.  
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  The table reveals that the percentages of Republicans in North Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia was 
greater than 10 percent prior to 1966.  Lublin states these three southern states “contain sections of 
Appalachia that resisted secession and remained pro-Union during the Civil War, despite suffering greatly 
for their views” (2004, 47).  They remained loyal to the Republican Party because there were few African 
Americans in the region (ibid, 47).  The lack of African Americans, as stated by Lublin, “made it easier for 
mountain regions to resist pressure to join the Democrats in order to protect white supremacy…” (id, 47).       
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Table 4.1:  Percentage of Seats in the Lower Chambers of Southern State Legislatures Held by Republicans, 1954 to 1986 
 
  
1954 
 
1956 
 
1958 
 
1960 
 
1962 
 
1964 
 
1966 
 
1968 
 
1970 
 
1972 
 
1974 
 
1976 
 
1978 
 
1980 
 
1982 
 
1984 
 
1986 
 
Alabama 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 2 2 0 2 4 4 8 12 15 
Arkansas 2 2 0 0 1 1 2 4 2 1 2 4 6 7 7 9 9 
Florida 6 6 3 3 5 9 22 35 32 35 28 28 26 33 30 36 38 
Georgia 2 2 2 0 1 3 11 13 11 16 13 13 11 13 13 14 15 
Louisiana 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 1 4 4 4 9 10 11 13 14 
Mississippi 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 4 4 4 9 3 4 5 7 
N. Carolina 8 8 3 2 18 12 22 24 20 29 8 5 12 20 15 32 20 
S. Carolina 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 4 9 17 14 10 13 14 16 22 26 
Tennessee 18 19 17 15 21 24 39 50 43 49 35 32 38 39 38 37 38 
Texas 0 0 0 0 5 1 2 5 7 11 11 13 15 23 24 35 37 
Virginia 7 6 5 8 11 11 11 15 24 20 17 21 25 33 34 33 35 
 
Average % of 
Southern 
Republicans by 
years 
 
4 
 
4 
 
3 
 
3 
 
6 
 
6 
 
12 
 
14 
 
14 
 
17 
 
13 
 
13 
 
15 
 
18 
 
18 
 
23 
 
23 
 
Note: Entries are the percentages of seats held by Republicans in the lower chamber of southern state legislatures. 
 
Sources:  Data gathered from David Lublin, The Republican South: Democratization and Partisan Change (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004). 
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 Southern state legislatures, following World War II, were largely characterized by 
scholars as weak, corrupt, and inefficient institutions because of their one-party nature.  
Studies of legislatures during this era focused on the region’s one party domination.  In 
1948, H. C. Nixon stated that “the typical southern legislature…provides little voice for 
Republicans, inadequate representation for all urban people [due to malapportionment], 
and no direct and little indirect participation for Negroes….” (1948, 412).  During this era 
only white Democrats were legislators.  Nixon described the typical southern legislature 
as “a body of Democratic, small town or rural white men, a majority of whom represent a 
minority of the white population of the state, not to mention the restricted suffrage by 
which the members were chosen in a party primary” (ibid, 412).   
 In 1964, Malcolm Jewell examined eight southern legislatures as one-party 
institutions and made several predictions about changes in those bodies.
97
  His 
speculation was that based on the rising number of white southerners identifying with the 
Republican Party, changes would come in the power structure of most southern 
legislatures.  He believed that these changes would make these institution “…more 
representative, and that would increase the degree of competition in legislative elections, 
and the degree of conflict in legislative sessions” (1964, 177).  By the mid to late 1960s, 
the changes that Jewell predicted became evident.  The one-party-dominated institutions, 
along with white supremacy, started to crumble after the events of the 1960s.  The 
Republican Party and African Americans began making significant gains in many 
southern state legislatures in the subsequent decades.    
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 The eight southern states that Jewell examined were Arkansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia. 
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 Three years later Jewell published another study that focused on the new 
Republican competition in the region (Jewell, 1967).  Examining the same eight states, 
his analysis revealed that two-party competition in urban areas had increased.  His studies 
changed how scholars viewed southern state legislatures at that time.  Today, most of the 
literature that examines southern states’ legislatures focuses on the now present two-party 
competition, and the increased presence of the Republicans and African Americans in 
these institutions (see Grau 1981; Hamm et al. 1983; Black and Black 1987, 1992, and 
2002). 
The Rise of Republicans in Southern States’ Lower Legislative Chambers 
 The Republican Party made significant gains in southern states’ lower legislative 
chambers from 1964 to 1976, as revealed in Table 4.1.  However, these gains were not 
uniformly distributed across the region.  For instance, Republicans held almost no seats 
in the lower chambers in Alabama, Arkansas, Louisiana, and Mississippi. The party made 
progress, however, in the remaining seven southern states (Lublin 2004, 48).  After the 
1972 elections, Republicans occupied around one-third of Florida’s and North Carolina’s 
lower legislative seats, and one-half of those in Tennessee (ibid, 48-49). Lublin states that 
in Georgia, Texas, and Virginia Republicans won at least 9 percent of the lower chamber 
seats in 1972 (id, 49).    
 The Republican growth in southern states’ lower legislative chambers was stunted 
in 1972 by the Watergate scandal.  Most of the scholarly literature on the effects of the 
scandal focused primarily on the national level because the Republican Party lost the 
presidency in 1976 (Lublin 2004, 50).  As shown in Table 4.1, Republicans lost lower 
legislative seats in several states.  In 1972, Republicans in Florida held 35 percent of its 
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lower legislative seats, but after the Watergate investigation, they lost 80 percent of them.  
Republicans serving in North Carolina’s lower legislative chamber lost 28 percent of 
their seats in 1976.
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 The Watergate scandal briefly revitalized the southern Democratic Party, which 
managed to recapture many of their lower legislative seats that had been lost to the 
Republicans.  However, by 1984, Republicans had made a strong comeback, regaining 
most of their seats held prior to the scandal. For instance, South Carolina's Republicans 
regained 73 percent of their lower legislative seats from 1982. 
 From 1986 to 1992, Republicans continued winning lower chamber seats in the 
South (Gaddie and Hoffman 2001, 30). The biggest Republican gains in the southern 
states’ lower legislative chambers occurred in 1994 (Lublin 2004, 51).  Lublin states, "the 
GOP garnered nearly 6 percent more of the region's [lower chamber] seats…" (ibid, 51). 
As revealed in Table 4.2, the GOP made significant gains in eight states (Alabama, 
Arkansas, Florida, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia).  
They held 35 percent of the total seats in the region in 1994.  
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 Several southern states were not negatively affected by the scandal.  For instance, in Texas the percent of 
Republicans who held lower chamber seats after the scandal remained constant at 11 percent.  
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Table 4.2: Percentage of Seats in the Lower Chambers of Southern State Legislatures 
Held by Republicans, 1988 to 2006 
 
 
Note: Entries are the percentages of seats held by Republicans in the lower chambers of southern state 
legislatures. 
 
Sources: Data for 1992-2002 were gathered from Lublin, The Republican South: Democratization and 
Partisan Change (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), data for 2004 and 2006 were collected 
at the National Conference of State Legislature website (see 
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/legismgt/statevote2002.htm; 
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/legismgt/statevote2004.htm; and 
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/legismgt/statevote2006.htm.  
  
  
1988 
 
1990 
 
1992 
 
1994 
 
1996 
 
1998 
 
2000 
 
2002 
 
2004 
 
 
2006 
Alabama 16 21 22 28 28 34 35 40 40 41 
Arkansas 11 9 10 12 14 24 30 30 28 25 
Florida 39 38 41 48 50 61 64 68 70 66 
Georgia 20 14 29 36 41 43 41 41 55 59 
Louisiana 16 16 15 15 26 26 31 34 35 39 
Mississippi 7 16 20 20 30 30 27 31 39 39 
N. Carolina 38 33 35 56 51 45 48 51 48 43 
S. Carolina 30 33 40 48 52 55 56 59 60 59 
Tennessee 40 43 36 40 38 40 41 45 54 46 
Texas 38 37 38 41 45 48 48 59 58 54 
Virginia 39 39 41 46 46 50 52 65 58 57 
 
Average % of Southern 
Republicans by year 
 
27 
 
 
27 
 
30 
 
35 
 
38 
 
41 
 
43 
 
48 
 
50 
 
48 
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 Republicans continued winning lower legislative seats after the 1994 election, as 
revealed in Table 4.2.  Lublin listed several reasons why the Republican Party made these 
gains following the 1994 elections (2004, 51).  First, deep disappointment in President 
Clinton made many southern whites turn their backs on the Democratic Party.  Second, 
Republicans made gains in rural areas in the South that once seemed more resistant to 
Republican efforts to convert them (ibid, 51).  And third, Lublin argued, consistently with 
the perverse effects thesis, that racial redistricting contributed to the increase of 
Republicans in southern states' lower legislative chambers (id, 51).  
 The Republican Party, following the post-2000 elections, continued gaining lower 
chamber seats but these victories were still not uniform.  After the 2000 election, they 
held 43 percent of the region's total lower chamber seats, and had a majority of seats in 
Florida, South Carolina, and Virginia with 64, 56, and 52 percent respectively.  In 2002, 
Republicans held 31 to 40 percent of the lower legislative seats in Alabama, Louisiana, 
and Mississippi (Lublin 2004, 52).   
 After the 2002 elections, the GOP had a majority of the seats in the lower 
legislative chambers of Florida, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia (see 
Table 4.2).  They held 48 percent of the total lower chamber seats in the region.  By 
2004, Republicans had majorities in Georgia and Tennessee, as well, but lost their 
majority in North Carolina.  Overall, they held 50 percent of all the lower legislative seats 
in the region.  In 2006, they experienced a two percentage point decrease overall and lost 
control of one lower legislative chamber, that in Tennessee. 
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 This Republican growth produced two-party competition in the region's lower 
legislative chambers.  A number of scholars argued this was due to a partisan realignment 
in the South, based on the increased number of white Republican voters in the region (see 
Black and Black 2004, 25-27, 36, 39, 211-224; Hood et al., 2004, 69; Knuckey 2005, 6).   
Partisan Change in the South 
 
When examining partisan change in the South, scholars often start with V. O. 
Key’s theory of critical elections.  Critical elections, according to Key, are “sharp 
alterations of the pre-existing cleavage within the electorate,” after which the new 
patterns of voting will “persist for several succeeding elections” (1955, 4).  Critical 
elections are discrete events that lead to a realignment.  Key refined his theory in 1959, 
when he introduced the term secular realignment.  Secular realignment in party 
attachments, according to Key, is “a movement of the members of a population category 
from party to party that extends over several presidential elections and appears to be 
independent of the peculiar factors influencing the vote at individual elections” (1959, 
199).  Secular realignment is a change in the dominant party of a region due to the 
partisanship of the citizens changing over time (ibid, 199). 
 The literature following Key’s studies built on his theory of secular realignment.  
One such study is Gerald Pomper’s classification of presidential elections from 1832 to 
1960.
99
  He found that regional changes in the southern electorate occur gradually over 
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 Pomper's study builds on the three categories of elections used by Campbell et al., in The American 
Voter.  These three categories are Maintaining, Deviating, and Realigning.  In a maintaining election, the 
majority party wins the election (Pomper 1967, 536).  Pomper states that in a deviating election, “the 
minority party wins a short-lived tenure as the majority because of temporary factors, such as a popular 
candidate” (ibid, 536). In a realigning election, the basis of voter cleavage is transformed (id, 536).  Pomper 
argues that a fourth category should be included when classifying presidential elections—Converting.  A 
converting election occurs when the “majority party retains its position, but there is considerable change in 
the voter base” (Pomper 1959, 538). 
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time.  He further found evidence of a critical election and concluded that a critical 
election is followed by a steady assimilation of another party within the electorate (1967, 
560-61).  He suggested that this is what happened in the southern region.  Jonathan 
Knuckey (1999) updated Pomper’s study, expanding the timeframe to 1996.  He argued 
that the 1960, 1964, and 1968 presidential elections were critical elections that 
contributed to the partisan change in the South (1999, 648-651). 
 In a recent study of partisan change in the South, Lublin argued that the evolution 
of southern politics must be seen as part of a process of democratization of the region's 
politics (2004, 14).  He did not, per se, agree with the realignment or a secular 
realignment argument used to explain the partisan change in the region.  He suggested 
that the Democrat’s pro-civil rights agenda during the 1960s transformed southern 
politics.  This created a "new breed of politicians" who posed new issues and took a 
different political stance as the opposing party (id, 14-15).   
“Top-Down and Bottom-Up Realignment” Theories  
Scholars have questioned why the Republican success in southern states’ 
legislative elections has consistently lagged behind that in gubernatorial or congressional 
elections.  When addressing this question, scholars have examined the top-down and 
bottom-up realignment theories.  They disagree, however, as to which type of 
realignment occurred. The top-down realignment theory argues that only after 
Republicans achieve success at the top of the ticket can they begin to make gains in less 
prestigious offices (Lublin 2004, 61). Joseph Aistrup (1996) and Charles Bullock (1988) 
argue that the South has undergone a “top-down" realignment.  This theory contradicts 
the traditional hypothesis about party change, in which success at the local level precedes 
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gains in elections for higher offices (Lublin 2004, 61).  Candidates who have previously 
won a lower level office are usually stronger candidates for higher office because these 
candidates have name recognition and campaign experience (ibid, 61).    
 Explanations for the top-down realignment theory vary widely (Lublin 2004, 61).  
Bullock argued that the Republicans have had greater success in finding viable candidates 
for senatorial or gubernatorial contests than for state legislative seats or local government 
seats (1988, 56).   Aistrup argued that the “absence of the local Republican organizations 
prevented the GOP from capitalizing on support for GOP presidential nominees” (1996, 
77-89).  Several scholars have speculated the size of the jurisdiction explains why 
Republican candidates fare better in elections for higher offices (Bullock 1988, 556; 
Aistrup 1996, 22; Lublin 2004, 61).  For instance, more populated jurisdictions, 
according to Lublin, are “likely divided over more issues and more diverse than smaller, 
more homogeneous constituencies.  Greater diversity and less unanimity of opinion may 
provide greater opportunities for a new, rising political party” (Lublin 2004, 61). 
Lublin noted that “other scholars argue that local Democrats find it easier to 
distance themselves from the regionally unpopular policies of national Democrats the 
more removed they are from federal office” (2004, 61).  For instance, Earl Black and 
Merle Black (2002, 152-167) and James Glaser (1996, 80-121, 127-41) argued that state 
legislative Democratic candidates could campaign as conservatives so they fare better in 
electoral contests than Democrats campaigning in congressional or presidential elections.  
Southern Democratic congressional candidates found it harder to convince southern 
voters that they are more conservative than Democrats from other regions (Lublin 2004, 
61).   
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 Lublin examined both the top-down and bottom-up theories and found support for 
both.  He stated that one “should not assume that the partisan change was a completely 
top-down process with Republican success at the presidential level trickling down to the 
local level” (2004, 64).  He stated:  
Republican victories at the local level may have helped produce greater  
gains at the state and national level even if Republicans achieved majority  
status at the national level first.  Victories for local offices also provided a  
pool of more experienced candidates, which facilitated greater, less temporary 
Republican gains than were possible with the earlier shallow pool of GOP  
talent.  If a party fails to recruit good candidates, its chances of winning and 
then holding on to office decrease markedly (2004, 64-65). 
 
Southern White Party Identification 
 This study's attention now turns to what might have triggered the partisan change 
among southern whites.  Figure 4.1 show the distribution of partisan identifications of 
southern whites from 1952 through 2000.  It reveals that southern whites are now more 
likely to identify with the Republican Party than the Democratic Party and that this 
change occurred in the 1990s.  Jonathan Knuckey noted that by 2000 only one-in-three 
southern whites held a Democratic identification (2005, 6).   
There is a debate among scholars as to what caused the transformation of southern 
white voting behavior.  This literature contains a number of different results and 
conclusions.  M. V. Hood et al., state, "given the sheer weight of the printed volumes of 
research on this topic, our understanding of this dramatic political transformation is 
surprisingly limited" (2004, 69-70). They further argued that this body of literature is 
"still somewhat disjointed,” and that the “wide array of methodological approaches, units 
of analyses, explanatory variables, and timeframes characteristic of this literature have 
hindered the development of a coherent explanation of Republican growth in the region" 
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(ibid, 70).  Virtually all of the literature on this topic has been limited to studying voting 
in presidential and congressional elections (Sundquist 1983; Black and Black 1987; 
Phillips 1970; Bass and DeVries 1976; Carmines and Stimson 1989). Scholars have 
suggested that racial, economic, and/or social issues have caused this shift in partisanship 
in the South.   
Figure 4.1:  Party Identifications of Southern Whites, 1952-2000 
 
Note: Democratic and Republican identifiers include strong, weak and independent-leaning partisans. 
 
Source: Jonathan Knuckey (2005); American National Election Studies, 1952-2000. 
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 In the South, racial attitudes and partisanship are intermingled together.  The 
literature on this fascinating relationship can be traced back to Key’s 1949 study of 
southern politics.  Key argued that race was the underlying element in southern politics 
(1949, 5).  In accordance with Key, Hood et al., stated that in the South “white 
conservatism was directly related to the size of the Black population" (2004, 75).  As 
proximity to African Americans increased, the racial threat perceived by whites 
increased.  This is referred to as the "Black-Belt hypothesis," which was coined by Key 
(1949, 5-6).
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 As Knuckey stated, scholars have been interested in the “importance of race and 
racial attitudes on the political behavior of southern whites, particularly its role in driving 
the partisan change among southern whites” (2005, 7).  Many scholars, when analyzing 
southern whites’ voting behavior, argued that racial issues played the central role in 
reshaping their partisan preference.  In Politics and Society in the South (1987), The Vital 
South (1992), and The Rise of Southern Republicans (2002), Black and Black argued that 
race gradually eroded the basis of support for Democratic presidential candidates in the 
South.  They concluded Republicans’ manipulation of racial issues was critical in 
weakening the Democratic hold in the region.   
Edward Carmines and James Stimson argued that race was the sole reason for the 
restructuring of whites’ political ideology (1989, 138-158).101  They argued that race and 
racial attitudes are tightly linked to partisanship and political ideology (ibid, 185).  They 
stated that: 
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 It is also called the “threat hypothesis” or the “group threat hypothesis.” 
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 Carmines and Stimson examined the whole country and not just the southern region.  They found that 
these changes are also present in the region.   
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race with its deep symbolic meaning in American political history has 
touched a raw nerve in the body politic.  It has also been an issue on which 
the parties have taken relatively clear and distinct stands…Moreover, the  
issue has a long political life cycle; it has been a recurring theme in American  
politics since the nation’s founding (ibid, 14). 
 
They found that the 1964 election was the decisive turning point that started the 
transformation in the restructuring of whites’ political ideology and partisanship (id, 150, 
168).
102
  Most southern whites, prior to this election, were more likely to identify with the 
Democratic Party.
103
 
Not all scholars believed that race or racial attitudes changed southern whites’ 
voting behavior.  These scholars suggested that other factors have influenced their vote.  
For instance, Alan Abramowitz, using Carmines’ and Stimson’s study as a model, 
concluded that social welfare and national security played a much larger role in 
influencing whites’ voting behavior than did race (1994, 9-11, 22).  He concluded that 
racial attitudes were unrelated to party identification among either younger or older 
whites even by the end of the 1980s (ibid, 20).  
Greg Adams has argued that abortion played a major role in reshaping southern 
whites' political behavior in the 1980s and 1990s (1997, 718, 721, 735).  Lublin noted 
that Republicans had become more likely to identify with the pro-life position, and 
Democrats with the pro-choice position (2004, 175).  Lublin stated, "southern 
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 The 1964 presidential election featured a southern Democratic presidential candidate, Lyndon Johnson 
and a Republican from Arizona, Barry Goldwater.  Running on a states’ rights platform, Goldwater won 
five Deep southern states with 87 percent of the vote in Mississippi, 70 percent in Alabama, 59 percent in 
South Carolina, 57 percent in Louisiana, and 54 percent in Georgia (Carmines and Stimson 1989, 45).  No 
Republican presidential candidates had carried these states since Reconstruction (ibid). 
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 The Democratic Party, from Reconstruction until the 1964 presidential election, was associated with 
racial conservatism.  Since this significant election, the Republican Party is now associated with this 
ideology. 
98 
 
Republicans have gained more support as pro-lifers entering the electorate identify with 
the GOP" (ibid, 175). 
 Jeffery Stonecash argued that economic issues have reshaped southern whites’ 
voting behavior (2000, 64-68).  He stated that the differences in economic issues relates 
more strongly to voting behavior in the South than in the 1960s (ibid, 64-68).  Similar to 
Stonecash, Richard Nadeau and Harold Stanley argued that high-income, native southern 
whites became more likely to support the Republicans by the 1970s, indicating that the 
class cleavage characteristic of the New Deal alignment had finally arrived in the South 
(1993, 900, 907, 915).  
Unlike Stonecash or Nadeau and Stanley, Hood et al., found little evidence that 
economic change in the South is an explanation for the Republican growth.  Instead, they 
suggest that the theory of relative advantage contributed to the Republican growth.  They 
argue, "the size of the Republican Party in the South grew [from 1960 to 2000] because 
the benefits of voting and identification with the Republican Party for conservative 
whites, compared to the benefits of Democratic affiliation, increased" (2004, 72).  This 
theory is based on societal cleavages.
104
They argued that social cleavages can lead to 
certain advantages for a specific party, relative to another party or parties (ibid, 72).  
They noted that citizens identify with political parties and vote for candidates for a 
variety of reasons (id, 72).  Two factors, according to the authors, are: "(a) the relative 
competitiveness of the party in a wide variety of political arenas and (b) the relative 
                                                 
104Seymour Lipset’sand  SteinRokkan’s (1967) study provided a useful framework for discussing social 
cleavages that relates to the relative advantage theory.  Hood et al., stated, that Lipset’s and Rokkan’s 
framework is “especially relevant  to the idea that various cleavage structures can lead to certain 
advantages for a specific party relative to another party or parties” (2004, 72).  Hood et al., stated that the 
idea of relative advantage includes more than demographic foundation of partisan changes (ibid, 72). 
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consistency of each party's political objectives with a citizen's own political objectives" 
(id, 73).  As noted earlier, the relative advantage of the Republican Party increased over 
time, although the extent of it varied across the South. 
Hood et al.’s study included several variables that scholars have argued 
contributed to the growth of the Republican Party.  The variables were divided into three 
categories: political, economic, and demographic.
105
  The authors found:  
…there is no doubt that regional in-migration and economic transformation were  
ongoing phenomena during the period of time under study, these factors, along with  
other demographic variables such as Black context and Evangelicalism, do not appear  
to have had a consistent impact on the growth of Southern Republicanism.  We find no  
reason to believe, then, that economic or demographic change alone, however profound,  
would have broken the long-held constant in Southern politics of one-party Democratic 
dominance absent political changes (2004, 90). 
 
Their conclusion contrasts sharply with the body of literature that examines partisan 
change in the South. 
 Lublin (2004) examined the factors that many scholars have argued contributed 
to partisan change in the South.  Using American National Election Study (NES) data 
from 1980 to 2000 and aggregate data from local and state legislative elections, he found 
that race did destroy the old southern political system, but it did not assure that racial 
issues would assume center stage in the new system (2004, 214).  He suggested that race 
continues to play a role, but it is not as salient as before (ibid, 181-182, 215).  As African 
Americans became more politically involved, Republicans found it harder to win 
elections.  He found that racial issues became salient in the 1980s as the "…elected 
officials of the two parties began to disagree more noticeably on racial issues" (id, 215).   
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 Hood et al., stated, the “variables designed to tap political concerns include Black electoral strength, % 
Black [calculated at the state level as the number of registered voters], substate party competition, and two 
sets of variables designed to represent the effects of presidential campaigns” (2004, 80).  Two variables 
were used to measure whether the economic factors contributed to the Republican growth in the South.  
They are the per capita income of each southern state and the percentage of the workforce employed in the 
agricultural sector.  For the operationalization of these variables, see Hood et al., 80-85. 
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As the old segregationist Democrats retired, a new breed of southern Democrats 
replaced them (id, 215).  These new Democrats were often elected with the support of 
biracial coalitions.  Lublin argued that these coalitions produced the shift in southern 
whites’ voting behavior because they “now had a new reason to discriminate between the 
two parties, and many more white southerners chose to vote Republican…" (id, 215).  
Lublin also found evidence that economic change promoted Republican growth in the 
wake of the Civil Rights Movement (id, 192, 214).  He further found that, more recently, 
social issues (i.e., abortion, death penalty, morality issues, and the Religious Right) have 
arisen as a new source of division between the parties.   
Knuckey (2005) examined racial resentment and the changing voting behavior of 
southern whites.  He disagreed with Lublin who found that social class and economic 
issues had influenced white voting behavior.  He examined how racial resentment 
affected party identification among southern whites.
106
 Using NES data from 1986 
through 2000, he found that racial resentment was not a significant predictor of 
partisanship prior to 1994; however, in 1994 and 2000, racial resentment had a large and 
significant effect on partisanship.  In 1994, as noted earlier, the southern Republican 
Party made significant gains in congressional and in state legislative elections.  
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 Racial resentment replaced the concept of “symbolic racism.”  Kinder and Sears used symbolic racism 
to explain the effect of white racial attitudes on vote choice in the Los Angeles mayoral election of 1969 
(1981).  They argued that the term racial resentment captures the underlying concept better than symbolic 
racism (1996, 106, 108-109).  Racial resentment posits that white racial attitudes are no longer shaped by 
old-fashioned “biological racism,” but instead has become more subtle or covert in nature.  Sears describes 
it as a mixture of “some anti-black feeling with the finest and proudest of traditional American values, 
particularly individualism” (1998, 54).  Kinder and Sears suggested that the central concept of racial 
resentment is an anti-black prejudice that view blacks as being at the bottom of the socio-economic ladder, 
not as a result of born abilities, but rather as a result of not meeting the values embodied by the “Protestant 
work-ethic” or self-reliance, hard work, obedience and discipline (1981, 416).  Knuckey stated that 
meaning and measurement of racial resentment has proved to be controversial; specifically, “questions 
have been raised over its validity in terms of whether it is actually a manifestation of racism and instead 
simply the product of more general conservative values” (2005, 9).  However, he argued that racial 
resentment has been proven to be a powerful explanatory variable for a variety of political attitudes and 
behaviors.  
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In a more recent study, Nicholas Valentino and David Sears (2007) examined the 
regional political realignment that occurred among whites over the past four decades.  
They hypothesized that the South’s shift to the Republican Party has been driven by 
“racial conservatism in addition to a harmonizing of partisanship with general ideological 
conservatism” (2007, 672).  Using data from the General Social Survey (GSS) and NES 
from the 1970s through 2000, they found whites that reside in the South continue to 
display more racial antagonism and ideological conservatism than non-Southern whites.  
These results are similar to Knuckey’s conclusions. These findings suggest that race and 
racial attitudes continue to shape southern whites' voting behavior. 
Out- Migration and In-Migration in the Southern Region 
 The southern region has experienced a population shift, which also has 
contributed to the Republican Party growth.  During the 1900s the African American 
population, according to the 1900 census, was 38 percent.  By 1990 it decreased by 19 
percent (1900 and 1990 U.S. Censuses).  Between 1900 and 1920 approximately 700, 
000 African Americans left the South for Northeast and Midwest cities (Scher 1997, 28).  
Scher (1997) states “between 1920 and 1940 about 1 million [African Americans] left the 
South; from 1940-1960, some 2.5 million left; and from 1960 to 1980 about 1.5 million 
left (28).  Out-migration of African Americans was not uniform across the South. The 
Deep South states were most affected (Calef and Nelson 1956; Hamilton 1964; Long and 
Hansen1975; U.S. Census).  Hood et al. argue that the decline of the African American 
population, particularly during the decades of the 50s, 60s and 70s, weakened the 
Democratic Party (2004, 77).
107
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 As noted in chapter 1, African Americans are more likely to identify with the Democratic Party.   
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While African Americans were moving out of the region, non-southern whites 
started migrating to the region.  This migration became noticeable during the 1940s.  
Many whites came to the region for military training for World War II.
108
  After the War 
many of them returned to the southern region with their families because of the economic 
opportunities in the region, which was moving away from an agriculture system to a 
more industrialized system.  
Scholars have suggested that whites from other regions who relocated into the 
southern region have also contributed to the growth in the Republican Party (Scher 1997; 
Stanley and Castle 1988; Black and Black 1987; Stanley 1988; Lamis 1988).  Scher 
argued that “the most important factor contributing to the growth of the Republican 
success in the South has been in-migration since World War II” (1997, 143-4). When 
non-southern whites moved into the region many brought their “… Republican attitudes 
and loyalties with them” (ibid, 144).  Scher suggests that this group formed the core of 
the modern Republican Party (id, 144). 
Other scholars have found that in-migration is important, but not the most 
important reason as argued by Scher (Black and Black 1992; Miller and Shanks 1996; 
Petrocik 1987; Stanley 1988).  John Petrocik, in his 1987 study, examined “the 
partisanship of three different groups of southern whites--migrants to the region, native 
residents of the border southern states, and native residents of the ten states of the Deep 
South for the 1950s, the 1960s, the 1970s, 1980, and 1984” (1987, 359).   He found that 
the partisan realignment was the most important reason for the Republican growth in the 
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 Bartley stated that, “the South was the great training ground for the nation’s military forces” (1997, 11).  
After the War, non-southern whites returned the South and they worked for the military. The military in 
1940s accounted for 25 percent of salaries and wages in the region (ibid, 11).   
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South. Similar to Petrocik’s study, Stanley examined three groups: native African 
Americans and whites and white migrants (1988, 67).  He found that “in-migration made 
little difference to the growth in independence but without the migrants Republican 
identification would have been three to four points lower and Democratic identification 
higher by the same margin over the 1956 to 1984 period” (1988, 71).  Native southern 
whites played the greatest role in the Republican growth, according to Stanley (1988, 71). 
In a more recent study, Hood et al. also examined if in-migration played a 
significant role in the growth of the Republican Party.  The scholars utilized a pooled 
time series model to examine “…various temporal and cross-sectional forces that might 
have shaped the growth of the GOP in the South” (2004, 79).109  The scholars did not find 
evidence that in-migrant had any direct influences on the Republican growth in the South.  
Looking at the southern states they found that in-migrant “…does appear to affect state-
level Republican growth during the 1960s and 1970s but apparently not later” (2004, 89).  
Social Interaction Theory 
 After the Civil Rights Movement whites and African Americans started 
interacting more throughout the country but especially in the southern region.  This 
interaction has produced positive changes in the relationship between these groups.  As a 
result of this interaction a new theory has been adopted by scholars called social 
interaction theory.  According to social interaction theory, the “degree of spatial 
concentration of blacks may determine the amount of racial interaction that whites have 
with black individuals” (emphasis in original) (Liu 2001, 603). The highest level of 
African Americans living within a residential area produces greater opportunities for 
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 In-migrant was measured as the “proportion of a state’s population that is composed of white residents 
born outside the southern region” (Hood et al., 2004, 82). 
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whites living in the same area to interact with African Americans (Langton and 
Raporport 1975 as cited in Liu 2001, 603).   Thomas Carsey states that, as this type of 
interaction increases, “the probability that those [white] individuals will adopt political 
attitudes and behaviors similar to those [African Americans] with whom they interact 
increases (1995, 223).
110
  They have linked the social interaction theory to white 
crossover voting (see DeLorenzo, Kohfeld, and Stein, 1997, 120-33; Carsey, 1995, 225-
228; Lui, 2001, 608-614).  Scholars have found support for this theory. Carsey’s 1995 
study of the 1989 New York mayoral election also found support for the social 
interaction theory.  The 1989 election was between an African American (David Dinkins) 
and a white Republican (Richard Giuliani). Using exit poll data Carsey found when the 
African American densities in the precinct increased the probability of a white person 
voting for Dinkins increased (1995, 225).   In 2001, Baodong Liu also found support of 
the social interaction theory.  He examined 29 biracial elections between 1977 and 1998 
in New Orleans.  He found when the African American densities increased the 
probability of white citizens voting for the African American mayoral candidate 
increased (2001, 612). 
Conclusion 
Southern white party identification has changed over the years.  As stated earlier, 
there is a disagreement among scholars as to why there has been a change or what caused 
it to occur.  Several scholars have argued that race and racial attitudes produced the 
changes.  Race played and will continue to play an important role in this region.  
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 The social interaction theory is opposite of the black belt hypothesis.  The black belt hypothesis predicts 
a negative relationship between whites and African Americans, whereas the social interaction theory 
predicts a positive relationship.   
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Knuckey concluded his 2005 study with this statement: “racial attitudes have been woven 
into the partisan fabric that now characterizes the New South’s party system” (2005, 23).   
Race and partisanship are still linked.  As noted previously, southern African 
Americans are more likely to belong to the Democratic Party and whites are more likely 
to belong to the Republican Party.  It might be that this growth in the Republican 
attachment of southern whites has been the primary reason for the gains in U.S. House 
seats for the party in the 1990s, and in state legislative seats in the South.
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CHAPTER 5:  METHODOLOGY SECTION AND SAMPLE 
 
The perverse effects thesis has been heavily examined in the context of the United 
States House of Representatives. As mentioned in Chapter 2, research designs used to 
analyze this thesis have varied “from a ‘common head count,’ which requires authors to 
‘dirty their hands’ with the particular details of the different election contests, to more 
sophisticated statistical analyses in which numerous U.S. House elections serve as the 
units of analysis and patterns across these elections are examined” (Engstrom 2006, 100).  
This chapter identifies the research design utilized to test for the presence of perverse 
effects and for the alternative explanation for the Republican growth in these chambers 
that more southern whites were voting for Republican candidates more frequently across 
the districts in these states.  It also identifies the sample of states selected for analysis, 
and why they are selected. 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
Empirically Testing the Perverse Effects Thesis 
 As noted in Chapter 2 statistical models have been employed in the study of the 
perverse effects thesis, but these models do not provide a direct test of that thesis because 
they do not entail an adjacency requirement.  This requirement is critical to the thesis.  It 
is the districts adjacent to new majority-African American districts that are “bleached” as 
a result of those districts. A proper test of the thesis is therefore one that limits the 
perverse effects to those adjacent districts. 
 This study therefore will employ a straightforward count of Republican gains in 
adjacent districts as was done in the studies of U.S. House districts by Lublin and Voss 
(2000a) and Beachler (1998). 
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 In order to assess perverse effects, district maps from 1988 to 2004 will be 
examined.
111
  First, all of the new majority-African American districts created in the 
respective redistricting plans will be identified. These are districts in which African 
Americans constitute over 50 percent of the voting age population based on the census 
figures closest to the year they were adopted.  After the majority-African American 
districts are identified, the districts adjacent to these districts will be identified.  Once 
those adjacent districts are identified, then it will be determined whether the relative 
presence of African Americans in them has been reduced. If that has occurred, and more 
Republicans have been elected in the adjacent districts than previously, then the number 
of such Republican gains will be counted as evidence of perverse effects.  Gains 
occurring in districts not adjacent to the new majority-African American districts will be 
considered gains attributable to growth in Republican voting strength.  This will allow 
Republican gains to be disaggregated into those attributable to “bleaching” and those 
attributable to increases in Republican electoral support.   
The racial makeup of each district will be gathered by contacting each state for 
this information.  Election results for each state will also be collected from the states.  
State Selection 
 
The states selected for this analysis are Deep South states, all of which are fully 
covered by Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.
112
  These states have been selected for the 
study because they have a larger African American population compared to the other 
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 The district boundaries might have changed several times from 1988 to 2004; therefore, all redistricting 
arrangement during this period will be examined.  
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 The Deep South consists of five states: Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina.  
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southern states, known as Rim states.
113
  Key argued that this region was the backbone of 
the South, because it shaped and influenced white southerners’ political behavior and 
maintained white supremacy.  He argued the larger the African American population, in 
an area, the greater the fear and anxiety among southern whites. This fear is visible in 
whites’ voting behavior.  For instance, scholars have found that in districts with a larger 
(40 percent or greater) African American population whites are more likely to vote for 
Republican candidates than in districts with a smaller African American population (see 
Glaser 1998, 31-39; Giles and Hertz 1994, 317; Black and Black 2002, 368; Shafer and 
Johnston 2001, 189; McKee 2010, 190). 
The specific Deep South states selected for analysis were chosen because the 
maps of districting plans and demographic data for districts necessary to test the perverse 
effects thesis are available through the states.  These states are Alabama, Louisiana, and 
Mississippi.  The data for Georgia and South Carolina are theoretically available through 
the Voting Rights Section of the United States Department of Justice (DOJ), but a request 
for this information has not produced a response.
114
 
According to the 1990 census, the African American voting-age populations in 
Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi were 23, 28, and 32 percent respectively (see Table 
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 The Rim states consist of Arkansas, Florida, North Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. According 
to the1990 and 2000 U.S. censuses, the African American voting-age populations in the Deep South states 
was 17 percent in 1990 and 21 percent in 2000 as opposed to 10 percent and 11 percent in the Rim States 
(see table 5.1). 
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 In August of 2010, a request was submitted to the DOJ requesting districting maps and demographic 
data for the five Deep South states.  In a reply to the requested material, the DOJ stated that in the previous 
six months they have received a high volume of requests from citizens throughout the country requesting 
districting maps/plans and other material from prior censuses.  Due to this high number of requests, it was 
estimated that it could be a year to receive the requested material.  It was further explained that the DOJ is 
preparing for another round of redistricting with the release of the 2010 census which would take priority 
over the requests. The redistricting centers for both Georgia and South Carolina were contacted for the 
redistricting maps.  However, the 1990s districting maps for these states are not available. 
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5.1).  Following that census, Alabama and Louisiana each created seven new majority-
African American districts for their lower legislative chambers, and Mississippi created 
four (see Table 1.2).
115
  The creation of these districts helped to increase the number of 
African Americans elected to these positions (see Table 1.3).  In 1990, African 
Americans held 14, 16, and 17 percent of the seats in Louisiana’s, Mississippi’s, and 
Alabama’s lower chambers respectively, and by 2006, African Americans in both 
Louisiana and Mississippi held 29 percent of them, and in Alabama they held 26 percent 
of them (see Table 1.3). As the percentage of African Americans increased in these lower 
chambers, so did the percentage of Republicans in the legislative chambers.  In Alabama, 
Republicans held 21 percent of the lower chamber seats in 1990, and increased to 41 
percent by 2006 (see Table 1.4).  In 1990, Republicans held 16 percent of both 
Louisiana’s and Mississippi’s lower chamber seats, and sixteen years later, they held 39 
percent in both (see Table 1.4).  This study will assess the extent to which these gains are 
attributable to “bleaching” due to new majority African American districts, or attributable 
to increases in Republican electoral strength in other areas of these states.  
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 Georgia ranks first in the creation of new majority-African American lower chamber districts; it created 
nine.  Alabama and Louisiana, as noted above, both created seven of these districts and Mississippi four 
following the 1990 census.  Virginia created three, Texas two, and Tennessee one after the 1900 census.  
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Table 5.1.  Percentages of the Total African American and African American Voting-Age  
Populations in the South 
 1990 Census 2000 Census 
 African 
American 
percentage 
Total 
Population 
African 
American 
Percentage 
VAP 
African 
American 
percentage 
Total 
Population 
African 
American 
percentage 
VAP 
Deep South 
Alabama 25 23 26 24 
Georgia 27 25 29 27 
Louisiana 31 28 32 30 
Mississippi 36 32 36 33 
South 
Carolina 
30 27 30 27 
     
Rim States 
Arkansas 16 14 16 14 
Florida 14 11 15 13 
North 
Carolina 
22 20 22 20 
Tennessee 16 14 16 15 
Texas 12 11 12 11 
Virginia 19 18 20 18 
Source: 1990 and 2000 Censuses of Population 
 
 
  
111 
 
A Brief Overview of the 1990 and 2000 Round of Redistricting in Alabama, 
Mississippi, and Louisiana 
 
Alabama 
1990 Round of Redistricting 
 Alabama’s 1901 Constitution requires the legislature to reapportion itself every 
ten years.  This process is controlled by the Permanent Joint Legislative Committee on 
Reapportionment (herein the Reapportionment Committee).
116
  Following the 1980 
census, the Reapportionment Committee passed its redistricting plan (Act No. 81-1049) 
on October 26, 1981. It was rejected by the U.S. Attorney General because it violated 
Section 5 of VRA.  Nine months later the committee created and adopted a new plan (Act 
No. 82-626). This plan was litigated; the plaintiffs argued that the plan diluted African 
American voting strength.  The Attorney General declared the plan invalid because it also 
violated Section 5 of the VRA. The Attorney General found no “unfavorable impact on 
black voters in sixty of sixty-seven counties” (quoted in Burton v. Hobbie, 561 F. Supp. 
1029, 1033).  Alabama needed to adopt a plan that would be precleared by the Justice 
Department because elections were near.  Feeling this constraint, “the Court ordered the 
implementation, on an interim basis, of Act No. 82-629 as modified with respect to 
House Districts 32, 36, and 44 in the Jefferson county” (ibid, 1033).117  Once more the 
Attorney General did not preclear the plan.  On February 17, 1983 Alabama’s General 
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 The Reapportionment Committee includes 22 members which includes “one member of the House of 
Representatives from each congressional district, four members of the House of Representatives at-large to 
be appointed by the Speaker of the House and one member of the Senate from each congressional district, 
four members of the Senate at-large, to be appointed by the Lieutenant Governor” 
(http://www.legislature.state.al.us/reapportionment/reap.html). The committee was created in 1972 in 
response to the court order in Sims v. Amos (336 F. Supp. 924, 1972). 
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 Elections were held using this plan but legislators elected “only served one year of the normal four-year 
term” (Burton v Hobbie, 561 F. Supp. 1029, 1033).  
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Assembly passed Act No. 83-154, and it was precleared by the Department of Justice. 
This plan was used until after the 1990 census. 
 Following the 1990 census, Alabama was unable to pass any redistricting plan; 
consequently, Act. No 83-154 was used until a new plan was passed.  On May 12, 1993, 
an Alabama Circuit Court in Sinkfield v. Camp, CV-93-689, ordered Alabama’s 
legislature to create a redistricting plan that could be used for the 1994 elections.  The 
plan, known as the “Reed-Buskey” plan, created eight new majority-African American 
House districts and three new majority-African American Senate districts.
118
 This plan 
was used to maximize the number of majority-minority districts in Alabama (Rice v. 
Sinkfield, 732 So.2d 993). Alabama’s House of Representatives approved the plan, but 
the Senate did not.  The plan was precleared by the Justice Department and was later 
challenged in both state and federal courts.  White citizens living adjacent to the new 
majority-African American districts argued that the Reed-Buskey Plan was a racial 
gerrymander that violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
(Rice v. Sinkfield, 732 So.2d 993).  A District Court held that the Reed-Buskey plan was a 
product of racial gerrymandering (Sinkfield v. Kelly 2000, 96 F. Supp. 2d 1301, 1302).  
On direct appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, the Court agreed with the lower courts that 
the state’s redistricting plan was unconstitutional and it violated Shaw v. Reno because 
the state acknowledged the plan was created to increase the number of majority-African 
American districts (Sinkfield v. Kelly 531 U.S. 28, 30).  The Court ruled that Alabama 
needed to redistrict before 2002 using the data from the 2000 census.   
2000 Round of Redistricting 
                                                 
118
 The plan was created by Dr. Joe Reed and Representative Buskey.  
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Alabama’s Democratic Governor Don Siegelman called a Special Legislative 
Session that began June 25, 2001, with the purpose of redistricting the legislature.  Both 
the Senate, Act 2001-727, and House, Act 2001-727, adopted redistricting plans. There 
were “eight majority-African American Senate districts under Act 2001-727 and 27 
majority-African American House Districts under Act 2001-729” (Montiel et al, v. Davis, 
215 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1284).  The Justice Department precleared the Senate’s plan, 
October 15, 2001, and the House’s plan on November 15, 2001.  After receiving 
preclearance the Governor signed into law the Senate’s redistricting plan.  Shortly, this 
plan became law and was challenged by a number of white Alabamians. They argued: 
...the state legislative redistricting plans violate Article IV, Section 2 and the 
 Fourteenth Amendment to United States Constitution in that (1) the  
disproportionate sizes of the districts and regional discrimination found  in the 
State legislative redistricting plans violate the constitutional principle of “one person, 
one vote,”119 and (2) the state legislative redistricting plans constitute illegal partisan 
gerrymandering.  Plaintiffs further seek declaratory judgment that the state legislative 
redistricting plans unconstitutionally impinge upon their freedom of association rights, 
guaranteed by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, in that the plans  
penalize Republican voters and Representatives solely because of their party affiliation 
and political beliefs (Gustafson et al., v. Johns, 434 F. Supp. 2d 1246, 2006,  1246). 
 
The Court ruled in favor of the defendant. They issued res judicata and dismissed the 
case.  
 Mississippi 
1990 Round of Redistricting 
                                                 
119
 In Reynolds v. Sims (1964), the U.S. Supreme Courts argued that electoral districts must roughly be the 
same in population.  The plaintiffs in Gustafson et al., v. Johns showed that Alabama’s 2000 redistricting 
plan violated the “one person, one vote” standard. They argued that many of the House and Senate districts 
were not equal.  Of the 35 Senate districts, 18 districts were overpopulated, 9 had a deviation of 4.0% or 
greater, and 17 of the districts were under populated, and 7 had population deviation in excess of -4.0 % 
(Gustafson et al. v. Johns 2006, 1258).  “Of the 105 House districts, 52 districts are overpopulated; of those 
52, nine have a relative overall population deviation of +4.0%. Fifty-three of the 105 districts are 
underpopulated, with 19 districts having a relative population in excess of -4.0%” (ibid, 1258). 
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Redistricting in Mississippi is controlled by a standing joint legislative 
committee.
120
  Following the 1990 census, the standing joint legislative committee 
created a districting plan that was denied preclearance  on June 24, 1991.
121
  The plan 
was objected to, because the Attorney General felt that “black citizens did not have an 
equal opportunity to elect candidates of their choice to either the Mississippi House or 
Senate” (Watkins v. Mabus 771 F. Supp. 789, 792).  Since the Mississippi’s 1991 
districting plan was rejected, the 1982 districting plan had to continue to be used.
122
  
African American Mississippians argued that the 1982 districting plan violated the one-
person, one-vote requirement.
123
   
In its 1992 session, the standing joint legislative committee passed a new electoral 
plan for the House of Representatives (House), Miss. J.R. 1, and Senate, Miss. J.R. No. 
204 (Watkins et al., v. Fordice 791 F. Supp. 649, 647).  Both the House and Senate plans 
                                                 
120
 The committee consists of ten Senators and ten House members, two from each congressional district, to 
be appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and two from Congressional districts to be 
appointed by the Lieutenant Governor. The governor can veto the plan 
(http://www.msjrc.state.ms.us/MSJRC_committee_membership.html ). 
 
121
 The Mississippi Legislature was majority Democratic and the Governor, Kirk Fordice, identified with 
the Republican Party. 
 
122
 The 1982 districting plan became effective on November 22, 1982. Under this plan, there were 122 
House and 52 Senate districts.  
 
123
 According to Watkins et al., v Mabus: 
 
…based upon the number of persons now residing in the 1982 plan districts, the existing  
districting scheme (the 1982) for the House has a total population deviation from the norm 
of 110.124%, with district 58 being overpopulated by 55.81% and district 51 being 
underpopulated by 54.43%.  Likewise, the Senate now has a total population percentage 
variation from the norm of 42.31%, with district 30 being overpopulated by 24.92% and 
district 22 being underpopulated by 17.39% (771 F. Supp. 789, 791).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
115 
 
were precleared by the United States Attorney General.  A total of 37 majority-African 
American House districts were created under the plan.  The 1992 legislative elections 
were held under this districting plan.   
2000 Round of Redistricting 
Following the 2000 census, Democrats in Mississippi were the dominant party in 
the Legislature.  Mississippi’s House of Representatives and Senate both created 
redistricting plans and submitted them to the U.S. Attorney General.  The plans received 
preclearance and it was effective.  Thirty-nine majority-African American House districts 
were created.  This plan was not faced with any challenges. 
Louisiana 
1990 Round of Redistricting 
Redistricting in Louisiana is controlled by the state legislature but the Governor 
has the power to veto any proposed plans for both the House and the Senate (Louisiana 
Constitution, Article III, Section 6).  The Louisiana House of Representatives has the 
responsibility of developing a redistricting plan.
124
 During the 1990s, Democrats 
controlled the House of Representatives  and the Senate.  Charles (Buddy) Roemer, a 
Republican, was the governor during the 1990 redistricting process. The governor called 
an Extraordinary Session for the purpose of creating a new redistricting plan for the 
House of Representative on April 8, 1991 (The Louisiana House of Representatives v 
Ashcroft, Civil Action No., 12).   A plan was adopted by the legislature on April 14, 
1991, Act 1, during the Second Extraordinary Session, and was submitted to the U.S. 
Attorney General.  On July 15, 1991 the Attorney General rejected the plan because the 
                                                 
124
 http://house.louisiana.gov/H_Redistricting2011/default_FAQs.htm 
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state failed to create “additional districts in five areas of the State that would have 
provided to African American persons a reasonable opportunity to elect candidates of 
choice” (The Louisiana House of Representatives v. Ashcroft).125  A Third Extraordinary 
Session was called by the Governor on July 28
th.   Based on the Attorney General’s 
objection to Act I, the Legislature created four new majority-African American House 
districts (House Districts 4, 11, 21, and 72).  This plan created a total of twenty-three 
majority African American House Districts.  This plan received preclearance by the 
Justice Department and it became effective.  
2000 Round of Redistricting 
Following the 2000 census, the Louisiana House and Senate were controlled by 
the Democratic Party and the Governor was a Republican. In a Second Extraordinary 
Session House Bill 1 was adopted on October 12, 2001, and four days later Governor 
Mike Foster signed the bill into law. This plan included 26 African American House 
districts.   The plan was denied preclearance by the Attorney General’s office because it 
violated Section 5 of the VRA.  The legislature challenged the Attorney General’s 
decision.  The state argued that the benchmark for determining retrogression should be 
measured by either the 1982 plan or the first 1991 plan.  The legislature did not consider 
the 1991 House plan that received preclearance as the benchmark plan because they 
argued that it violated Shaw v. Reno. In 1991, the legislature had created four new 
majority-African American districts after the Attorney General denied preclearance.  The 
1982 House plan had included 26 majority-African American House districts following 
the 1980 census. The legislature challenged the Attorney General’s objection.  “The suit 
                                                 
125
 Retrogression was not the basis of the Attorney General’s objection.  As discussed in Chapter 3, the  
Attorney General can only interpose and objection on only on retrogression grounds (See Reno v. Bossier 
Parish School Board, 520 U.S. 471, 1997).  
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was settled in district court and a new plan was created and it included 12 majority-
minority districts and one majority district.”126   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
126
 http://www.senate.leg.state.mn.us/departments/scr/redist/redsum2000/redsum2000.htm 
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CHAPTER 6:  THE PERVERSE PARTISAN EFFECT THESIS V. A 
REPUBLICAN REALIGNMENT  
 
 The number of Republicans elected in the lower chambers of the Alabama, 
Louisiana, and Mississippi legislatures has increased, as seen in Table 1.4.  Scholars have 
identified two possible explanations for the rise of the Republican Party in the South. The 
first justification was first used after the 1990 census, when a number of “new” majority-
African American districts were created. These new districts were created by “pulling” 
many African Americans from surrounding districts into a single district, leaving the 
adjacent districts with a higher percentage of whites. These adjacent districts are often 
referred to as “bleached” districts. The whiter a district, other things being equal, the 
greater the chance that a Republican candidate will be elected in it (Swain 1995, 229; 
Cameron, Epstein and O’Halloran 1996, 805).  This process is called the “perverse 
partisan effect thesis.” This thesis has been widely studied by scholars (see Hill 1994, 
391; McKee 2002, 133; Bullock 1995b, 35; Lublin 1997, 111; Lublin and Voss 2000a, 
431; Lublin and Beachler 1995, 76; Grofman and Handley 1988, 56-67; Swain 1995, 
227; Hill and Rae 2000, 16). 
Literature that has examined the perverse partisan effect thesis at the 
congressional level found little support for this thesis, as discussed extensively in Chapter 
2. There is an alternative hypothesis scholars have offered about the number of 
southerners voting for GOP candidates in the South. This hypothesis argues that a 
realignment has led to more southerners voting for Republican candidates (see Chapter 
4).  When examining the rise of the Republican Party, scholars have mostly focused on 
the national level. This study is seeking to answer what extent this growth led to 
Republicans winning more seats verses the new majority-African American districts 
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causing them?  Both the perverse partisan effect and the realignment hypothesis will be 
tested.  This study will also deviate from the prior studies by focusing on Alabama, 
Louisiana, and Mississippi’s House of Representatives rather than the U.S. House of 
Representatives. It will assess the extent to which these gains are attributable to the new 
majority African American districts rather than to the realignment that occurred in these 
states.  It will examine data from the post- 1980, 1990, 2000 rounds of redistricting. Most 
studies have examined the perverse partisan effect thesis following the post-1990 round 
of redistricting, with a focuses on the 1992 and 1994 elections. 
Often when the perverse effect thesis is tested, scholars test it with statistical 
models. When using this approach, scholars ignored the adjacency requirement, as noted 
in Chapter 2. This study will analyze legislative maps from Alabama’s, Louisiana’s, and 
Mississippi’s Houses.  This is achieved by a straightforward count of the Republican 
gains in adjacent or bleached districts. First the majority-African American districts are 
identified and then the adjacent districts are identified.  The adjacent districts are crucial 
to the thesis. This approach will help to determine how many Republican seats were 
gained due to the creation of the majority-African American districts.  This study is 
focused on the number of Republican gains, not the Democratic losses like most of the 
prior studies that addressed this thesis. Richard Engstrom (2006: 100) argued that when 
testing this thesis, most scholars usually address the wrong question. Scholars have 
sought to answer this question: How much better could the Democrats have done if the 
states had not felt compelled to adopt new majority districts?  He states the appropriate 
question is: How many of the Republican gains and Democratic losses are attributable to 
the new majority-African American districts (ibid, 100)? 
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The Results 
Alabama 
 
1980s 
 
 Three House maps for the state of Alabama were analyzed, 1983, 1993, and 2001. 
Alabama’s House has 105 seats during the period of the study.  Following the 1980 round 
of redistricting, Democrats controlled the legislature. Seventeen majority-African 
American districts in population were adopted by the Alabama legislature
127
 (see Table 
A.1 in the appendix for the districts demographics).   The seventeen majority-African 
American districts were identified on the House map (see Figure A.6).
128
  Eight of these 
districts are located near each other in the mid-eastern border of the State, Districts 59, 
60, 54, 53, 52, 56, 57, 58.
129
 District 19 is located at the Northern region of the state. 
Districts 82, 68, and 69 are located mid to the bottom –eastern border of the State.  
Districts 98 and 103 are located in the bottom-western border of the State. 
Table A.2, in the appendix, shows the adjacent districts to the majority-African 
American districts. As seen in the Table A.2, there are five Republican districts that are 
adjacent to the majority-African American districts.
130
   District 15, a Republican district, 
is adjacent to Districts 52 and 56.  District 55 is another Republican district which is 
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 The Permanent Joint Legislative Committee on Reapportionment is the committee that develops 
electoral maps for the state. The committee consists of 11 members that are appointed by the lieutenant 
governor from the Senate and 11 members that are appointed by the Speaker of the House from the House. 
After the committee creates an electoral plan, both the House and the Senate must agree on the plan.  
Finally, the governor must sign the plan into effect.  
 
128
 The 1983 House map and demographic of the state were obtained from the state.  The map that was sent 
was obtained from The Birmingham News.  The quality of the map is not the best. Three of the majority-
African American districts were not found on the map, Districts 77, 78, and 99; therefore, they are excluded 
from the study.  This is the only map that was available at the time of this study.  
 
129
 These districts resemble an egg.  
 
130
 Republican districts in this study are district that elected a Republican candidate in the 1983 election.  
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located in the middle of the eight majority-African American districts.
131
  Republican 
District 76 is in the middle of the two majority-African American districts, 54 and 82.  
Republican District 74 is adjacent to majority-African American Districts 68.  Republican 
District100 is also adjacent to a majority-African American district, 98. 
1990s 
 
Following the 1990 census, the number of majority-African American districts in 
voting age population increased in Alabama to 26. The total number of Republican 
Districts also increased to 36.  Figure A.7 shows the 1993 Alabama House District maps 
and Table A.3 shows the demographics of these districts. It identifies the majority-
African American districts and the adjacent bleached districts. The results from the map 
provide more evidence to support the perverse effect thesis.  A number of the majority-
African American districts are found near the mid-southern part of the state and they run 
from the eastern to the western borders of the state.
132
   District 19 is located at the 
northern part of the state near Madison County.  Districts 52-60 and 32 are near each 
other and they are near Shelby County, as seen in Figure A.7.
133
   Districts 97-99 and 103 
are located at the Southern part of the state.  
 Figure A.7 also shows that there are more Republican districts adjacent to the 
majority-African American districts, as seen in Table A.4, compared to the number of 
Republican districts in the 1983 House map after the 1983 elections. Thirteen Republican 
Districts are adjacent to majority-African American Districts 32 and 52-60. These 13 
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 District 55 resembles the yolk of the egg.  
 
132
 These districts resemble a wall.  
 
133
 Districts 52- 60 are analyzed together because the districts are so small that it is hard to identify each 
district separately.  
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Republican Districts are 15, 33, 35, 36, 40, 41, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, and 49.  Republican 
Districts 73 and 74 are adjacent to majority-African American Districts 76, 78, and 77.  
Republican District 88 was adjacent to majority-African American Districts, 78, 69, and 
77.  Republican District 89 is adjacent to majority-African American Districts 76 and 82.  
The four majority-African American Districts, 97, 98, 99, and 103, that were created at 
the Southern border of the state were surrounded by three Republican Districts, 102, 104, 
and 105.
134
   
2001 
Following the release of the 2000 census data, Alabama’s legislature and the 
governor
135
 kept the same number of majority-African American district in voting age as 
in the prior redistricting cycle (see Figure A.8 and Table A.5).  Twenty-eight Republican 
districts were adjacent to majority-African American districts after the 2002 election. The 
number of Republican districts based on the 2002 election, that were adjacent to the 
majority-African American districts were 24.
136
  Republican District 62 is adjacent to 
majority-African American Districts 72, 71, and 70; Republican District 79 is adjacent to 
majority-African American Districts 82 and 83; and Republican District 96 is adjacent to 
majority-African American Districts 98 and 97.  These districts following the post-round 
of redistricing1990 elections were Democratic and, after the past-2000 census, these two 
districts became Republican after the 2002 election. The results for this round of 
redistricting further support the perverse partisan effect thesis.  
                                                 
134
 It looks like the three Republican Districts were hugging the majority-African American Districts.  
 
135
 The governor signed the law into effect.  
 
136
 Following the 1983 elections, they were 5 bleached districts adjacent from the majority-African 
American districts. 
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Table 6.1 summarizes the Republican gains made in Alabama’s House following 
the 1980, 1990, and 2000 rounds of redistricting.  After the 1980 round of redistricting, 
seventeen majority-African American districts were created and Alabama citizens elected 
twenty-two Republicans in the first elections after redistricting.  Only five of the 
Republican districts are adjacent to the 17 majority-African American districts. 
Seventeen of the Republican seats are attributed to the realignment. The results show 
minimal support for the perverse effect thesis. It appears as if the realignment had a major 
impact after the 1980 census.   
After the 1990 and 2000 rounds of redistricting, the total number of Republican 
districts increased to 36 in 1994 and 43 in 2002. The numbers of majority-African 
American districts increased, as well as the number of bleached districts.  Republicans 
gained sixty-seven percent in 1994, and sixty-five percent in 2002 of the House seats due 
to redistricting.  Republicans gained more seats due to the creation of the majority-
African American districts.  Republicans also made gains due to the realignment but the 
impact was not as great as the gains due to the creation of the majority-African American 
districts. 
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Louisiana 
1988-1992  
 
Following the release of the 1980 census, the Louisiana legislature
137
 adopted a 
state House electoral map that included sixteen majority-African American districts in 
population (see Table A.7 and Figure A.9).
138
  Table A.7 shows the demographics of the 
majority-African American districts.
139
  Fourteen of the sixteen majority-African 
American districts have a total African American population of 70 percent or greater (see 
Districts 2, 3, 10, 17, 34, 61, 63, 67, 91, 93, 96, 97, 99, and 101, see Table 6.8).
140
 Seven 
                                                 
137
 Louisiana legislature has full authority to create all electoral maps and the Governor can veto the plans 
for any reason. Democrats controlled the Legislature following the 1980 round of redistricting. 
 
138
 Districts 2, 3, 61, and 67; and Districts 91, 93, 95 96, 97, 99, and 101 are lumped together because these 
districts were hard to identify them separately, as seen in Figure A.7.   
 
139
 Only the districts total African American and whites total population were available at the time of this 
study.   
    
140
 District’s 95 total African American population was 65.4 percent and District 58’s total African 
American population was 52.8 percent following the 1980 census.  
 
Table 6.1: Total Republican Gains in Adjacent Districts and Total Gains Due the  
Realignment in Alabama 
  
Years 
 
Categories 
1983 1994 2002 
No. of African American Districts 17 26 
 
26 
Total No. of Republican Districts 22 
 
36 43 
No. of Adjacent Districts 5 24 
 
28 
Percent of Republican Districts  Adjacent to the 
Majority-African American Districts 
23% 67% 65% 
No. of Districts Due to Realignment 17 12 
 
15 
Percent of  Republican Districts Due to the 
Realignment  
77% 33% 35% 
125 
 
of the sixteen majority-African American districts were located in Orleans and Jefferson 
Parishes (see Districts 91, 93, 95, 96, 97, 99 and 101).  Districts 61, 63, 67, and 58 were 
located in East Baton Rouge and Ascension Parishes.  Two majority-African American 
districts were located near the Shreveport area, Districts 2 and 3.  District 17, a majority-
African American district was located between Ouachita and Webster Parishes.   
Table A.8 displays the demographics of the districts that were adjacent to the 
majority-African American districts.  Districts 5 and 6 were Republican districts that 
were adjacent to majority-African American Districts 2 and 3.  The percentage of whites’ 
total population in District 5 was 96.4 percent and 84.5 percent in District 6.  District 35, 
located in Calcasieu Parish, was a Republican District that was adjacent to the majority-
African American District 34.
141
 Republican District 70 was located in East Baton Rouge 
Parish and it was surrounded by three majority-African American Districts, 61, 63, and 
67.  Republican Districts 98, 94, 90, and 89 are adjacent to majority-African American 
Districts 91, 93, 95, 96, 99, and 101.
142
  
A total of seventeen Republicans were elected to Louisiana’s House during the 
1988- 1992 period.  Eight of these Republican districts are adjacent to the sixteen 
majority-African American districts. Forty-seven percent of the Republican seats gained 
are due to the majority-African American districts (see Table 6.2). This provides support 
for the perverse effect thesis; however, the results also show somewhat more support of 
the alternative explanation.  Nine Republican House seats were gained due to the 
                                                 
141
 Republican District 35 total white population is 95 percent. 
 
142
 As seen in Figure 6.4, majority-African American Districts 91, 93, 95, 96, 99, and 101 and Republicans 
Districts 89, 90, and 98 are lumped together in the map. This was the only map available at the time of the 
study.  There are no Republican Districts that are adjacent to the majority-African American Districts 10 
and 17. 
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realignment that occurred in the region. Fifty-three percent of the Republican districts 
gained in this period were due to the realignment. 
Table 6.2: Total Republican Gains, Total Gains in the Adjacent Districts and Total Gains Due To 
Realignment in Louisiana 
 Years 
Categories 1988-1992 1992-1996 2000-2004 2004-2008 
No. of African American Districts 16 23 27 27 
Total No. of Republican Districts 17 24 32 40 
No. of Adjacent Districts 8 13 24 28 
Percent of Republican Districts 
Adjacent to the Majority-African 
American Districts 
47% 54% 75% 70% 
No. of Districts Due to Realignment 9 11 8 12 
Percent of Republican Districts Due to 
the Realignment 
53% 46% 25% 30% 
Source: The data were collected from Louisiana’s House of Representatives.  
1992-1996 
 Seven more majority-African American districts in population were created 
following the release of the 1990 census (see Table A.9).
143
   District 4, a majority-
African American district in population was created near between Caddo and Bossier 
Parishes (see Figure A.10).   The area included three majority-African American districts, 
following the 1990 round of redistricting.  District 11, found in Claiborne Parish, became 
a majority-African American district with an African American total population of 58.9 
percent.  District 21 was a new majority-African American district that is located on the 
eastern border of the state, which runs through four parishes; starting in East Carroll 
Parish and ending in Concordia Parish (see Figure 6.5).  District 72, located on “top of 
                                                 
143
 Louisiana Legislature including the Governor approved a House electoral plan that created 23 majority-
African American districts following the release of the 1990 census data.  
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the boot,” runs from West Feliciana to Saint Helena Parishes. There were new majority-
African American Districts located in St. Landry (District 40), Lafayette (District 44), 
and Rapides Parishes (District 26). Two more majority-African American Districts were 
added to Orleans (District 100) and Jefferson Parishes (District 87).  
The number of Republican districts adjacent to the majority-African American 
districts also increased, further providing evidence to support the perverse partisan effect 
thesis (see Table A.10).  Four Republican Districts (1, 5, 6, and 8) were adjacent to the 
majority-African American Districts 2, 3, and 4.
144
  Districts 5, 6, and 8 were all at least 
ninety percent white (see Table A.10), and all three elected Republican candidates in the 
1991 elections.  District 27, with a population that was 91.4 percent white, also elected a 
Republican in 1991; it was adjacent to majority-African American District 26 in Rapides 
Parish.  The populations of Republican Districts 35 and 36 were 93.4 percent white and 
95 percent white, respectively.
145
 These two districts were adjacent to majority-African 
American District 34.  Republican District 62 was adjacent to majority-African American 
District 72.  District 66 which was located in the Baton Rouge area was a Republican 
District that was adjacent to District 61 a majority-African American District.  
Republican District 70 was adjacent to majority-African American District 58. Three 
Republican Districts, 85, 94, and 98, were created adjacent to majority –African 
American districts in Orleans and Jefferson Parishes.
146
  
                                                 
144
 Districts 2, 3, and 4, as seen in Figure 6.5, were lumped together making it hard to identify their specific 
location.  
  
145
 Republican District 35 was located in between Jefferson Davis and Calcasieu Parishes, and Republican 
District 36 was located in Cameron Parish.   
146
  Republican District 85 was adjacent to majority-African American Districts, 87and 93; Republican 
District 94 was adjacent to majority-African American Districts 97 and 96; majority-African American 
Districts, 97 and 101 were adjacent to Republican District 98. These Republican Districts and majority-
African American districts were located in Orleans and Jefferson Parishes.  
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 Republicans gained thirteen of Louisiana’s House seats due to racial redistricting, 
as seen in Table 6.2. These districts were adjacent to the twenty-three majority-African 
American districts that were adopted after the release of the 1990 census data.  
Louisianans elected a total of twenty-four Republicans to House districts.  Fifty-four 
percent of the Republican seats were attributed to the majority-African American districts 
through 1992 -1996.  Eleven, or forty-six percent, of these Republican seats were due to 
the realignment that occurred in the region.  
2000-2004 
All of the majority-African American districts that were created following the 
1990 census survived the post-2000 round of redistricting, but four more were added after 
this round of reapportionment; see Table A.11 and Figure A.11.
147
  Majority-African 
American District 17 which was located between Ouachita and Richland Parishes was 
created.  The remaining three majority-African American districts in population that were 
created are located in Orleans and Jefferson Parishes, 91, 98, and 102.  District 98 was a 
Republican District after the 1990 round of redistricting, but following the release of the 
2000 census data, this District became a majority-African American district.   
 The number of Republican districts that were adjacent to the majority-African 
American districts increased after the 2000 round of redistricting. A majority of the 
Republican districts that were adjacent to the majority-African American districts 
following the 1990s round of redistricting remained the same (see Table A.12).   
Following the redistricting in the 1990s, no Republican districts were adjacent to 
majority-African American Districts 40 and 44; these two Districts are located in St. 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
147
 A total of 27 majority-African American districts in population were created post-2000 round of 
redistricting.  The shape of the majority-African American districts changed.  
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Landry and Lafayette Parishes.  But after the 2000 round of redistricting, Republican 
Districts were adjacent to these districts. Republican District 41, located in Acadia Parish, 
was adjacent to majority-African American District 40.
148
  Republican District 43, which 
was 91.6 percent white, was adjacent to majority-African American District 44.  District 
74, a Republican District, runs from Tangipahoa to St. Tammy Parishes and it was 
adjacent to majority-African American District 72.  Two new Republican Districts, 66 
and 62, were created in the Baton Rouge area. Republican District 66 was adjacent to two 
majority-African American Districts, 29 and 61; and Republican District 62 was adjacent 
to Districts 72 and 63, two majority-African American districts.  As seen in Table A.12, 
five more House Districts, 82, 81, 94, 85, and 86, elected Republican candidates in the 
1999 election.
149
 
A total of thirty-two Republicans were elected to Louisiana’s House seats in the 
1999 elections (see Table 6.2).  Out of those thirty-two Republican seats gained, twenty-
four (or seventy-five percent) of these districts were adjacent to the twenty-seven, 
majority-African American districts.  Eight, or twenty-five percent, of the Republican 
seats are attributed to realignment. The results illustrate that the creation of the twenty 
seven majority-African American districts had a great impact on increasing the number of 
Republican- held seats in the legislature.  
2004-2008 
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 The total percentage of whites in District 41 was 80.6 percent. 
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 Republican Districts 82 and 81 were adjacent to majority-African American District 95; Republican 
District 94 was adjacent to four majority-African American Districts, 93, 96, 97, and 98; Republican 
District 86 was adjacent to majority-African American District 102, and Republican District 85 was 
adjacent to three majority-African American Districts 87, 93, 102.  
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 In the 2003 House elections, a total of forty Republicans were elected. The 
number of bleached districts increased from twenty-four, following the 1999 elections, to 
twenty-eight districts after the 2003 elections. Tables A.13 and A.14 and Figure A.12 
show the majority-African American districts and the adjacent districts following the 
2003 elections.
150
  Following these elections, seven new bleached Republican Districts, 
31, 59, 104, 68, 65, 64, and 66, surrounded several majority African American districts. 
Republican candidates gained seven seats, 62, 64, 65, 66, 69 68, 70, in the 2003 election 
in West and East Baton Rouge Parishes.
151
  Republican District 31, located outside of 
Lafayette Parish was adjacent to District 44 a majority-African American district.  Five 
new Republican candidates were elected in five districts in East and West Baton Rouge 
Parishes after the 2003 elections. Republican District 59 was adjacent to District 58 a 
majority-African American district. Republican District 104, located in Orleans Parish 
was adjacent to District 102 a majority-African American district.
152
   
 Table 6.2 summarizes the results for the Republican gains in Louisiana’s House 
from 1988- 2008. According to the results, the creation of the majority-African American 
districts has had the greatest impact on Louisiana citizens electing Republican candidates.  
As the number of majority-African American districts increased, so did the number of 
bleached districts. 
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 After the 2001 elections, Districts 27 (Rapides Parish), District 41 (Acadia Parish), and District 77 (near 
Tangipahoa and St. Tammany Parishes) elected Republican candidates, but following the 2003 elections, 
these Districts elected Democratic candidates.  
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 See Table 6.16 for the list of majority-African American districts that are adjacent to the seven 
Republican Districts in West and East Baton Rouge Parishes.  
152
A total of 40 Republican House seats were gained after the 2003 elections. Seventy percent of the 
Republicans’ gains are due to the creation of 27 majority-African American districts. Ten, or 30 percent, of 
the Republican districts are due to the realignment.    
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 There is also significant evidence demonstrating that the realignment had a 
positive effect for Republicans in Louisiana.  Not all of the Republican gains were due to 
the majority-African American districts, as seen in Table 6.2.   Table 6.2 shows that 
white Louisiana citizens are voting more for Republican candidates. It provides evidence 
that the realignment has arrived in the Louisiana House.  Lublin (2004) stated that the 
effect of the realignment at the state level for Southern states was delayed compared to 
the gains at the national level (46).  By 2004, Republicans gained thirty percent of the 
House seats because of the realignment. More citizens are voting for Republican 
candidates.     
Mississippi 
1992 
 Mississippi is the last state analyzed in this study. Following the release of the 
1990 census data, thirty-seven majority African American districts were created.
153
  This 
is the most majority-African American districts created in any of the states analyzed. 
Most of the majority-African American districts run along the western and eastern 
borders of the states (see Figure A.13).  As seen in Table A.15, thirty-four of the districts 
have a 60 percent or larger African American voting age population.  As seen in Figure 
A.13, most of the majority-African American districts were found along the western 
borders of the state.  District 5, which contains part of Benton and Marshall Counties, 
was the only majority-African American district located at the northern portion of the 
State.  Four majority-African American districts were located in the interior of the State 
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 The 1980 House map and data were unavailable at the time of the study.  Mississippi legislatures are 
charged with creating electoral maps, but the governor has the ability to veto plans.  There are a total of 122 
House seats in the state of Mississippi.  
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(see Districts 27, 32, 47, 91, as seen in Figure 6.8).  District 119, which was located in 
Harrison County, was the only majority-African American district located at the Southern 
border of the state. This District was next to the Gulf of Mexico. Several of the House 
Districts created were very bizarre in shape. For instance, District 32, which runs between 
Tallahatchie and Grenada Counties, looks like a snake.
154
 District 55 looks as if it has 
“rabbit ears.” This district was located in Warren County, which was in the western 
border of the State.  District 91 is another bizarre looking majority-African American 
district.  It appears as if someone has carved a “capital J” out of the district.155   
 Table A.16 shows the districts adjacent to the majority-African American 
districts.   As revealed in this table, there are not many Republican districts that are 
adjacent to the majority-African American districts.  There were thirteen Republicans 
elected to House seats in the 1993 elections that are adjacent to the majority-African 
American districts, 58, 59, 40, 52, 54, 73, 64, 84, 77, 101,102, 104, and 120.
156
  
Republican District 58 was adjacent to several majority-African American Districts, 57, 
27, and 72.  Republican District 52 was adjacent to three majority-African American 
Districts, 50, 51, and 55.  Republican District 77, located in Simpson County, was 
adjacent to majority-African American District 91.  Two majority-African American 
Districts 41 and 38 were adjacent to Republican District 40.  Republican District 54 was 
adjacent to majority-African American Districts, 55 and 85.  Republican District 64 was 
adjacent to majority-African American Districts 63 and 72.   
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 The district is very narrow and has several curves like a snake. 
 
155
 Other districts beside the majority-African American Districts are bizarre shaped as well. For instance, 
District 56, which is located near the western border of the State, looks like a “goat with two horns.”  
 
156
 The African American voting age population is less than 20 percent in these 14 Republican Districts. 
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Looking at Table A.16 and Figure A.13, it does not show much support for the 
perverse effect thesis. But once you consider that only twenty-three Republicans were 
elected following the 1990s round of redistricting, see Table 6.3, sixty-one percent of the 
Republican Districts are adjacent to the majority-African American district.  The creation 
of majority-African American districts had a greater impact than did realignment. 
Table. 6. 3: Total Republican Gains, Total Gains in the Adjacent Districts and Total 
Gains due to the Realignment in Mississippi 
 
 Years 
 
Categories 
1993 2003 
No. of African American Districts 
 
37 39 
Total No. of Republican Districts 
 
22 46 
No. of Adjacent Districts 
 
13 28 
Percent of  Republican Districts  Adjacent to the Majority-
African American Districts 
 
59% 70% 
No. of Districts Due to Realignment 
 
9 18 
Percent of  Republican Districts Due to the 
Realignment  
41% 39% 
Source: This data were collected from Mississippi’s House of Representatives. 
 
 
2003 
 Following the release of 2000 census data, the Mississippi legislature adopted a 
House plan that included thirty-nine majority-African American districts. Table A.17 
shows the total populations of the districts and the African American voting age 
population.  Districts 66 and 71 which are located near Madison County became 
majority-African American districts after this round of redistricting.  As seen in Figure 
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A.14, the majority-African American districts are roughly in the same position as they 
were following the 1990 round of redistricting.
157
   
Table A.18 shows the districts that are adjacent to the thirty-nine majority-African 
American districts created after the 2000 census.
158
  The number of Republican districts 
that were adjacent to the majority-African American districts increased to 28, as seen in 
Table 6.21 and Figure A.14.
159
  Republican District 46 was adjacent to the majority-
African American Districts 32.  Three majority-African American Districts, 51, 55, and 
85, were adjacent to Republican District 54.  Republican District 62, located near Copiah 
County, was adjacent to two majority-African American Districts 91 and 76.  Majority-
African American District 110 was adjacent to Republican District 109.  
 Republicans gained a total of 46 lower legislative seats in Mississippi after the 
2003 elections, as seen in Table 6.3.  Sixty-one percent of the Republican Districts are 
adjacent to the majority-African American districts. The result shows support for both the 
perverse effect thesis and the alternative hypothesis.  
After the 1990 and 2000 censuses, the Mississippi legislature created thirty-seven 
and thirty-nine majority-African American districts, respectively.  Table 6.3 summarizes 
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 There are several districts that are bizarre shaped. For instance, District 51 is spread out across four 
counties: Issaquena, Yazoo, Humphreys, and Sharkey.  District 48, like 51, is located in several different 
counties: Humphreys, Holmes, Carroll, Montgomery, Attala, and Choctaw.  
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 Many of the Republican districts that are adjacent to the majority-African American districts are bizarre 
shaped.  It appears as if these bizarre districts were drawn to increase the number of white voters who 
identify with the Republican Party.  For instance, District 37 which is located in the upper eastern border 
wraps itself around District 38.  District 37 is narrow.  Another bizarre shaped district is 54, which is 
located on the western border of the state.  This district runs along several counties picking up white 
conservative voters.  This district is adjacent to Districts 51, 55, 85 and 63.  District 97, another bizarre 
shaped Republican District is adjacent to District 96, 85, 94, and 91. District 97 is located in the lower 
western border of the state that runs across several counties.  It resembles a snake.  
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 Majority African American Districts 65, 66, and 70 were excluded from the study because their districts 
were too small to identify.  
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the results of the Republican gains due to the majority-African American districts or the 
alternative explanation (the realignment) in Mississippi.  Mississippians elected a total of 
twenty-two Republican candidates in 1992, which was the first House election after the 
census.  Fifty nine percent of these twenty-two House districts were bleached districts.  
Therefore, Republicans gained nine Republican seats due to racial redistricting.   After 
the 2000 round of redistricting, the Republicans gained 28, or sixty-one percent, of the 
seats due to the majority-African American districts. However, the effects of the 
realignment should not be dismissed in Mississippi. Mississippi Republicans gained 9 
and 18 House seats after both rounds of redistricting.   
Conclusion 
What has increased the number of Republican state legislative seats in the 
Southern region? Most studies that have addressed this question have focused on the 
growth at the national level. This study has deviated from the path that has been well 
traveled; instead, it focuses on Alabama’s, Louisiana’s, and Mississippi’s state legislative 
House Districts from 1988 to 2004.  Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi were analyzed 
because they are part of the Deep South and they are protected by Section 5 of the Voting 
Right Acts.   In Louisiana, Alabama, and Mississippi after the 1990 and 2000 round of 
redistricting, Republicans gained more seats due to the creation of the majority-African 
American districts.  These results contradict much of the literature on the perverse effect 
thesis. Most scholars have found only marginal support of the perverse effect thesis.  
However, most scholars when examining this thesis focus on the wrong research 
question, and they abandon the adjacent requirement. The prior studies, as discussed in 
chapter 2, found that only about six Republican gains were due to racial redistricting. 
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This study found that most of the Republican gains in Louisiana, Mississippi, and 
Alabama House seats were due to the creation of the majority-African American districts 
and it finds support of the perverse partisan effect thesis. Sixty-one percent of all of the 
Republican seats gained in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama were attributed to the 
increased number of majority-African American districts (see Table 6.4).
160
 
Table 6.4: Total Republican Gains, Total Gains due in the Adjacent Districts and Total Gains Due to 
the Realignment 
States Years Total Republican 
Gains 
Total Gains due in 
the Adjacent 
Districts 
Total Gains in 
Other Districts 
Alabama 1983 22 5 17 
 1993 36 24 12 
 2001 43 28 15 
     
Louisiana 1988-1992 17 8 9 
 1992-1996 24 13 11 
 2000-2004 32 24 8 
 2004-2008 40 28 12 
     
Mississippi 1992 22 13 9 
 2003 46 28 18 
     
Total  282 171 (61%) 111(39%) 
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 As seen in Table 6.22, Republicans gained a total of 281 seats in the three states; 175 of these districts 
were gains due to the majority-African American Districts that were created.  Thirty-eight percent of the 
Republican gains, as seen in Table 6.22, were seats that the Republican gained because of the effect of the 
realignment that has occurred in the South.  
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 The increase in the number of majority-African American districts had a major 
impact in these three states. These results support, V.O. Key’s (1949) “black belt” 
hypothesis.  This hypothesis, as discussed in chapter 4, argues that a large African 
American presence produces greater fear among whites (1949, 5-6).  M.V. Hood et al., 
states that in the South “white conservatism was directly related to the size of the Black 
population” (2004, 75).  The greatest impact of these districts was after the 2000 
elections, as seen in Tables 6.5, 6.10, and 6.19.   The increase in the number of majority-
minority districts mandated by the VRA led to more bleached districts being created, 
where white voters living adjacent to those majority-minority districts tend to vote 
conservatively. These districts increased the number of Republicans being elected to 
House seats in Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana. When there was not an urgent need 
to increase the number of majority-African American districts, the Republican gains were 
mostly attributed to the realignment that occurred in the South, as seen in Tables 6.5 and 
6.12.
161
  These results also demonstrate that racism and racially polarized voting are still 
issues in the region.     
The results also lend some support to the alternative hypothesis. The alternative 
hypothesis argues that the Republican gains are due to the realignment that occurred in 
the South. The effects of the realignment should not be dismissed.  Not all of the 
Republican gains were due to racial redistricting.   The realignment has helped 
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 As discussed in Chapter 3, there were several reasons why these districts increased. One reason, as 
discussed in Chapter 3, was the perceived mandate that stated “if you can, you must” create majority-
African American districts.  Once these majority-African American districts were created and they received 
preclearance from the Attorney General, states could not easily destroy these districts because it would 
violate “the retrogression standard” of Section 5 of the Voting Right Acts. Once the state’s redistricting 
plan has been approved the number of African American districts cannot be reduced in the next round of 
reappointment.  
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Republicans win seats, as Lublin has argued.  Chapter 7 will provide a brief summary of 
this study, and the implications for future research.  
 
  
 
139 
 
Chapter 7:  THE CONCLUSION 
 
Following the 1990 census of population, state and local governments across the 
United States engaged in an atypical round of gerrymandering. It was atypical because, 
unlike previous rounds, new majority-African American and Hispanic districts were 
created, as mandated by Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. These districts allowed these 
groups to elect representatives of their choice. As a result, the number of African 
Americans elected into political positions increased, as seen in Table 1.3. These districts 
were created by “pulling” many African Americans from surrounding districts into a 
single district, leaving the adjacent districts with a higher percentage of whites. These 
adjacent districts are called “bleached” districts.  The whiter a district, other things being 
equal, the greater the chance that a Republican candidate will be elected in it (Swain 
1995, 229; Cameron, Epstein and O’Halloran 1996, 805; Lublin 1997, 99).  The 
hypothesized linkage that more majority-African American districts result in more 
Republicans being elected is known as the “perverse effects thesis.” 
  This thesis has been widely acclaimed, but it is contested.  Richard Engstrom 
examines the empirical evidence for the “perverse effects” thesis and maintains that the 
creation of the twelve new majority-African American U.S. House districts in the South 
following the 1990 census did not benefit the Republicans as conventionally argued.  
Other studies of these districts found that the benefit to Republicans was not nearly as 
great as many have claimed, or as consequential, as the perverse effects thesis would 
suggest.  Empirical research has found that only about six U.S. House seats gained by 
Republicans following the 1992 and 1994 elections were attributable to the new majority-
African American districts.  Kevin Hill states, “not all Republican gains in the South 
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were related to redistricting” (1995, 400 emphasis in original).  Chapter 2 summarizes all 
of the studies that examined the perverse effect thesis.  These studies have found minimal 
support.   
There is an alternative approach that scholars have used to explain the growth of 
the Republican Party in the South.  Scholars have argued that a partisan realignment that 
occurred in the South is a major reason for the growth of the Republican Party after the 
1992 and 1994 elections (see McKee 2000, 137; Hill and Rae 2000, 18; Rae 2001, 136). 
This realignment resulted from changes in the party preference of many white voters. 
Many white voter switched their preference to the Republican Party.  
This study deviates from the prior studies that examine the perverse effect thesis. 
This study sought to determine how many of the Republican gains in southern lower 
chambers are attributable to the new majority-African American districts in these 
chambers from 1988 to 2004. It examines both the perverse effect thesis and the 
alternative hypothesis. Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi were used in this study. 
These states were used because they are part of the Deep South and they are protected by 
Section 5 of the Voting Right Acts. Deep Southern states have a larger African American 
population compared to the Rim South states.  V.O. Key argues that the larger the 
African American presence in an area, the greater the fear and anxiety among Southern 
whites. This fear is visible in southern whites’ voting behavior, manifested as greater 
support for the Republican Party. 
In addition, this study did not perform a statistical model; instead, it employed a 
hand-count.  Generally when scholars examine the perverse effect thesis, they abandon 
the adjacent requirement.  The adjacent requirement is a key element to the thesis.  This 
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study does not ignore the adjacent requirement.  Scholars have sought to answer this 
question: How much better could the Democrats have done if the states had not felt 
compelled to adopt new majority-minority districts (Engstrom 2006, 100)?  Engstrom 
states the appropriate question is: How many of the Republican gains are attributable to 
the new majority-African American districts (ibid, 100)? This study focuses on the 
Republican gains, not the Democratic losses.  
This study found evidence to support the perverse effect thesis.  Table 6.22 shows 
that the creation of the majority-African American districts helped increase the number of 
Republican state legislative seats in the Deep South state legislatures.  After the 1990 and 
2000s censuses, Republicans made significant gains in districts adjacent to the newly 
created majority-African American districts.  According to Table 6.22, 61 percent of the 
Republicans’ gains, from the data obtained for this study, were in districts adjacent to 
majority-African American districts.  The creation of these districts has had a major 
impact on the elections of Republican candidates. These results contradict prior studies 
on this thesis.  Most scholars that have examined the perverse effect thesis only found 
minimal support (Hill 1994, 399-400; Hill and Rae 2000, 18-19; McKee 2002, 131). This 
dissertation provides some support for the perverse effect thesis by showing that the 
creation of majority-minority districts and the resulting concentration of white 
conservatives in adjacent districts account for about 61 percent of the Republican gains in 
the lower legislative chambers in the Deep South states of Alabama, Louisiana and 
Mississippi.  
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This study also found some support for the alternative explanation.  A 
realignment has occurred in the South.   It is well stated in the Southern politics literature 
that increasing numbers of white southerners identify with the Republican Party in the 
last few decades.  This is due to the realignment that has occurred.  This study found that 
the effects of realignment were greater when there were minimal numbers of majority-
African American districts, as seen in Tables 6.2 and 6.9.   
Future Studies 
The results of this study are only the beginning to determining the effects of 
Republican realignment and of racial redistricting in increasing the number of 
Republicans elected to southern state legislatures. Future studies should include all of the 
southern states.  It is possible that all of the Deep Southern states, not just those studied 
here, will provide evidence that the creation of majority-African American districts 
increased the number of bleached districts.  It is likely that the creation of majority-
African American districts will have a greater impact on the Republican gains in the 
Deep South than in the Rim South states, where Republican gains will be due more often 
to partisan realignment.  This is based on V.O. Key’s black belt hypothesis.  The Rim 
South states did not create as many majority-African American districts in their lower 
chambers, as seen in Tables 1.2 and 1.3.  Also the time frame of the study should be 
expanded from 1980 to the present, as an expanded time frame will tell a more complete 
story of the Republican legislative gains in the South.  Future research should also 
attempt to access whether any of the Republican gains in adjacent districts could be 
attributed to Republican partisan attachments among whites increasing in these areas, as 
much as or more than the bleaching of these districts. Further analysis of the adjacent 
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bleached districts will examine factors explaining why some have elected Republicans 
while others have elected Democratic candidates. Also, further analysis will examine 
particular districts and their changes in demographics and voting behavior after 
redistricting.   
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APPENDIX A: FIGURES 
 
Figure A.1: North Carolina Congressional District 12: “The  I-85.” Source: 
Election Data Service Inc. 
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Figure A.2: Louisiana Congressional District 4: “The Mark of Zorro.” Source: Election 
Data Service Inc.  
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Figure A.3:  Georgia Congressional District 11. Source: Election Data Service Inc.  
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Figure A.4: Texas Congressional Districts 30 and 29. Texas Congressional District 18: 
“Four Spiders Having an Orgy.”  Source: Election Data Service Inc. 
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Figure A.5: Florida Congressional District 3. Source: Election Data Service Inc. 
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Majority-African American Districts 
 
 
 
 
Republican Districts  
 
 
Figure A.6: Alabama’s 1983 House Map 
Note: Republican Districts are 51, 55, 76, 15, 74, and 100.   Districts 77, 78, and 99 were not were not found 
on the map. 
 
Source: This map was collected from the Alabama’s House of Representative. It was obtained from The 
Birmingham News. 
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Figure A.7: Alabama’s 1993 House Map 
Majority-African Districts  
 
Republican Districts 
 
 
Sources: This map was obtained from Alabama’s State Legislature. 
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Figure A.8: Alabama’s 2001 House Map 
Majority-African Districts  
 
Republican Districts  
 
 
 
 
Sources: This map was obtained from Alabama’s State Legislature. 
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Figure A.9: Louisiana’s 1988-1992 House Map 
Districts 2-3 are Majority-African American Districts; Districts 5-6 
are Republican Districts 
Districts 61, 63, and 67 
are majority-African 
American Districts and 
District 70 is a 
Republican District 
Districts 91, 93, 95, 96, 
97, 99, and 101 are 
majority-African 
American Districts and 
Districts 89, 90, and 98 
are Republican districts 
Majority-African 
American Districts 
 
 
Republican Districts 
 
 
 
Sources: This map was collected from Louisiana Legislature, 1988-1992: Grass Root 
Guide. 
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Sources: This map was collected from Louisiana Legislature, 1992-1996: Grass Root 
Guide. 
Majority-African 
American Districts 
 
 
Republican Districts 
 
 
 
Figure A.10: Louisiana’s 1992-1996 House Map 
Districts 2-4 are Majority-African Districts; 
Districts 5-6 are Republican Districts 
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Figure A.10: continued: Louisiana’s 1992-1996 House Districts Map- Baton 
Rouge Metro 
  
Majority-African 
American Districts 
 
 
Republican Districts 
 
 
 
Sources: This map was collected from Louisiana Legislature, 1992-1996: Grass Root Guide. 
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Majority-African American 
Districts 
 
 
Republican Districts 
 
 
 
Figure A.10: continued: Louisiana’s 1992-1996 House Districts Map- New 
Orleans Metro 
  
Sources: This map was collected from Louisiana Legislature, 1992-1996: Grass Root Guide. 
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Figure A.11: Louisiana’s 2000-2004 House Districts Map 
 
Majority-African American 
Districts 
 
 
Republican Districts 
 
 
 
Sources: This map was collected from Louisiana Legislature, 2000-2004: Grass Root Guide. 
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Figure A.11 continued: Louisiana’s 2000-2004 House Districts Map-Baton Rouge Metro 
 
Majority-African American 
Districts 
 
 
Republican Districts 
 
 
 
Sources: This map was collected from Louisiana Legislature, 2000-2004: Grass Root Guide. 
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Figure A.11 continued: Louisiana’s 2000-2004 House Districts Map- New Orleans Metro 
 
Majority-African American 
Districts 
 
 
Republican Districts 
 
 
 
Sources: This map was collected from Louisiana Legislature, 2000-2004: Grass Root Guide. 
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Figure A.12: Louisiana’s 2004-2008 House Districts Map 
 
Majority-African American 
Districts 
 
 
Republican Districts 
 
 
 
Sources: This map was collected from Louisiana Legislature, 2004-2008: Grass Root Guide. 
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Figure A.  
 
 
  
Figure A.12 continued: Louisiana’s 2004-2008 House Districts Map- Baton Rouge Metro 
 
Majority-African American 
Districts 
 
 
Republican Districts 
 
 
 
Sources: This map was collected from Louisiana Legislature, 2004-2008: Grass Root Guide. 
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Figure A.12 continued: Louisiana’s 2004-2008 House Districts Map- New Orleans Metro 
 
Majority-African American 
Districts 
 
 
Republican Districts 
 
 
 
Sources: This map was collected from Louisiana Legislature, 2004-2008: Grass Root Guide. 
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Figure A.13: Mississippi’s 1992 House District Map 
 
Majority-African American 
Districts 
 
 
Republican Districts 
 
 
 
Source: The map was collected from Mississippi’s Department of Archive and History. 
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Figure A.14. Mississippi’s 2001 House District Map 
Note: This is map is not shaded like the other maps because of the map quality. 
 
Source: This map was obtained Mississippi’s Standing Joint Reappointment Committee website 
(http://www.msjrc.state.ms.us/ms_house.html). 
MAAD= Majority African 
American Districts 
 
R= Republican Districts 
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Appendix B: Tables 
 
Table A.1: Alabama’s 1983 Majority-African American House 
Districts Demographics 
 
 
District Total AA population Total Black Population 
Percentage 
19 20,039 56.92 
52 26,845 71.90 
53 25,188 67.35 
54 27,211 74.04 
56 23,826 64.97 
57 24,389 65.21 
58 18,118 51.31 
59 26,914 73.93 
60 26,363 70.85 
68 24,579 67.80 
69 27,577 71.51 
77 28,997 81.83 
78 29,724 84.12 
82 29,739 79.46 
98 26,790 72.77 
99 34,725 93.59 
103 23,911 67.43 
Source: This data were collected from Alabama’s House of Representatives. The 
voting age population was not available at the time of this study. 
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Table A.2: The Adjacent Districts from the Majority African American Districts, the 
Demographics, and the Party of the Candidates Elected in 1983 to the Adjacent Districts in 
Alabama 
 
 
District Adjacent 
Districts  
Political Party of the 
Districts 
Total African 
American 
Population 
Total African American 
Population Percent 
19 17 Democrat 498 1.29 
 18 Democrat 1,311 3.40 
 22 Democrat 2,897 8.12 
 20 Democrat 1,954 5.51 
     
52 51 Democrat 5,400 14.32 
 55 Republican 2,075 5.66 
 15 Republican 10,888 28.05 
 53 Democrat 25,188 67.35 
     
53 85 Democrat 19,075 49.31 
 86 Democrat 2,419 6.31 
 54 Democrat 27,211 74.04 
 52 Democrat 26,845 71.90 
 51 Democrat 5,400 14.32 
     
54 76 Republican 10,706 29.44 
 62 Democrat 5,801 15.07 
 60 Democrat 26,363 70.85 
 55 Republican 2,075 5.66 
 53 Democrat 25,188 67.35 
 85 Democrat 19,075 49.31 
     
56 52 Democrat 26,845 71.90 
 55 Republican 2,075 5.66 
 15 Republican 10,888 28.05 
 28 Democrat 5,390 15.22 
 27 Democrat 598 1.64 
     
57 58 Democrat 18,118 51.31 
 30 Democrat 616 1.67 
 29 Democrat 7,999 22.41 
 28 Democrat 5,390 15.22 
 55 Republican 2,075 5.66 
     
58 59 Democrat 26,914 73.93 
 60 Democrat 26, 363 70.85 
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Table A.2  continued 
59 57 Democrat 24,389 65.21 
 58 Democrat 18,118 51.31 
 60 Democrat 26,363 70.85 
     
60 54 Democrat 27,211 74.04 
 55 Republican 2,075 5.66 
 62 Democrat 5,801 15.07 
     
68 69 Democrat 27,577 71.51 
 74 Republican 1,747 4.92 
 84 Democrat 17,969 48.91 
 76 Republican 10,706 29.44 
     
69 72 Democrat 6,029 16.33 
 65 Democrat 13,958 36.90 
 68 Democrat 24,579 67.80 
 67 Democrat 25,567 6.70 
     
77     
     
78     
     
82 83 Democrat 11,690 33.04 
 85 Democrat 19,075 49.31 
 76 Republican 10,706 29.44 
 84 Democrat 17,969 48.91 
     
98 97 Democrat 10,697 28.99 
 99 Democrat 34,725 93.59 
 100 Republican 2,863 8.06 
     
99     
 
Note: Districts 77, 78, and 99 were not found on the map; therefore, they are excluded from the study.  
  
Source: This data were collected from Alabama’s House of Representatives.  
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Table  A.3:  Alabama’s 1993  Majority-African American House of Representatives Voting Age 
Population 
 
Districts Whites Voting 
Age population 
Whites Voting 
Age  Percentage 
African Americans 
Voting  Age 
Population 
African Americans  
Voting  Age Percentage  
19 9,835 35.72 17,358 63.04 
32 10,565 39.03 16,357 60.43 
52 10,049 36.49 17,204 62.47 
53 10,694 37.44 17,190 60.19 
54 11,623 40.01 17,253 59.40 
55 11,452 42.91 15,157 56.79 
56 10,591 39.88 15,895 59.85 
57 10,837 40.26 15,985 59.39 
58 10,897 41.99 14,940 57.56 
59 10,327 39.06 16,057 60.73 
60 10,061 37.63 16,613 62.14 
67 10,257 41.07 14,601 58.46 
68 10,301 40.60 15,013 59.17 
69 10,269 42.13 14,074 57.74 
70 12,038 41.25 16,842 57.71 
71 9,716 38.36 15,553 61.41 
72 10,147 39.72 15,345 60.07 
76 9,184 36.37 15,896 62.94 
77 7,966 30.18 18,261 69.19 
78 7,392 30.45 16,659 68.63 
82 6,206 22.41 21,357 77.11 
83 10,977 38.27 17,511 61.05 
97 10,246 39.91 15,232 59.33 
98 9,260 37.75 15,136 61.70 
99 9,629 36.86 16,359 62.62 
103 10,081 40.34 14,705 58.85 
 
Source: This data were collected from Alabama’s House of Representatives. 
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Table A.4: The Adjacent Districts from the Majority African American Districts, the Demographics 
and the Party of the Candidates Elected in 1992 to the Adjacent Districts in Alabama 
 
Majority-
African 
American 
Districts 
Adjacent 
Districts 
Political 
Party of the 
Districts 
Whites 
Voting Age  
Whites 
Voting Age  
Percentage 
African 
Americans 
Voting age 
Population 
African 
Americans  
Voting Age 
Percentage  
19 5 Democrat 26,147 87.75 3,451 11.58 
 6 Democrat 24,729 82.31 4514 1503 
 20 Republican 29,332 91.79 1,841 5.76 
 22 Democrat 25,297 93.78 1,328 4.92 
 21 Democrat 23,794 79.90 5,257 17.6 
 10 Republican 26,434 89.69 1,803 6.12 
       
32 33 Republican 21,307 79.69 5,328 19.93 
 34 Democrat 26,617 90.03 2.679 9.06 
 35 Republican 25,876 91.37 2,270 8.02 
 36 Republican 25,403 87.66 2,873 9.91 
 37 Democrat 23,427 78.25 6,443 21.52 
 39 Democrat 25,954 93.78 1,563 5.65 
       
52-60 15 Republican 28,316 93.25 1,959 6.45 
 40 Republican 25,861 90.42 2,552 8.92 
 41 Republican 24,746 88.82 2,965 10.64 
 43 Republican 25,102 90.50 2,414 8.70 
 44 Republican 25,511 95.78 985 3.70 
 45 Republican 28,330 92.89 1,944 6.37 
 46 Republican 29,302 97.78 346 1.15 
 47 Republican 29,228 95.07 1,098 3.57 
 48 Republican 30,628 95.90 817 2.56 
 49 Republican 24,790 89.57 2,751 9.94 
       
67 72 Democrat 10,147 39,72 15,345 60.07 
 69 Democrat 10,269 42.13 14,074 57.74 
       
68 64 Democrat 21,543 75.05 6,846 23.85 
 65 Democrat 20,941 76.48 5,739 20.96 
 90 Democrat 18,265 69.75 7,863 30.03 
 69 Democrat 10,269 42.13 14,074 57.74 
 72 Democrat 10,147 39.72 15,345 60.07 
       
69 90 Democrat 18.265 69.75 7,863 30.03 
 88 Republican 20,984 81.44 4,599 17.85 
 68 Democrat 10,301 40.60 15,031 59.17 
 67 Democrat 10,257 41.07 14,601 58.46 
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Table A.4 continued 
70 62 Democrat 25,846 88.60 3,119 21.49 
 63 Republican 27,798 85.36 4,043 12.42 
 61 Democrat 22,249 77.95 6,134 21.49 
 72 Democrat 10,147 39.72 15,345 60.07 
 14 Democrat 28,890 95.99 1,114 3.70 
       
72 42 Democrat 26,079 87.50 3,576 12.00 
 40 Republican 25,861 90.42 2,552 8.92 
 62 Democrat 25,846 88.60 3119 10.69 
 71 Democrat 9,716 38.36 15,553 61.41 
 67 Democrat 10,257 41.07 14,601 58,46 
 69 Democrat 10,269 42.13 14,074 57.74 
       
76 78 Democrat 7,392 30.45 16,659 68.63 
 73 Republican 35,611 88.15 4,250 10.52 
 74 Republican 28,598 92.87 1,824 5.92 
 82 Democrat 6,206 22.41 21, 357 77.11 
 83 Democrat 10,977 38.27 17,511 61.05 
 89 Republican 20,513 74.49 6,808 24.72 
 90 Democrat 18,265 69.75 7,863 30.03 
       
77 75 Republican 22,624 78.61 5,708 19.83 
 88 Republican 20,984 81.44 4,599 17.85 
 73 Republican 28,313 89.44 2,956 9.34 
 78 Democrat 7,392 30.45 16,659 68.63 
 74 Republican 28,598 92.87 1,824 5.92 
       
78 90 Democrat 18,265 69.75 7,863 30.03 
 73 Republican 28,313 89.44 2,959 9.34 
 74 Republican 28,598 98.27 1,824 5.92 
 88 Republican 20,984 81.44 4,599 17.85 
 76 Democrat 9,184 36.37 15,896 62.94 
       
82 31 Democrat 21,210 77.11 6,185 22.49 
 81 Democrat 22,100 76.47 6,718 23.25 
 84 Democrat 17296 65.79 8,875 33.76 
 89 Republican 20,513 74.49 6,808 24.72 
 76 Democrat 9,184 36.37 15,896 62.94 
 83 Democrat 10,977 38.27 17,511 61.05 
       
83 84 Democrat 12,296 65.79 8,875 33.76 
 80 Democrat 26,016 86.52 3,806 12.66 
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Table A.4 continued 
 82 Democrat 6,206 22.41 21,357 77.11 
 79 Democrat 29,851 87.79 3,023 8.89 
       
97-99 96 Democrat 23,028 86.02 3,204 11.97 
 102 Republican 25,049 94.62 1,151 4.35 
 104 Republican 26,128 93.22 1,625 5.80 
 105 Republican 22,600 86.37 2,859 10.93 
       
103 104 Republican 26,128 93.22 1,625 5.80 
 105 Republican 22,600 86.37 2,859 10.93 
Note: Districts 52-60 and 97-99 are lumped together because these districts were too small to identify them separately on 
the map.  
 
Source: This data were collected from Alabama’s House of Representatives. 
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Table A.5:  Alabama’s  2001 Majority-African American House of Representatives  
Voting Age Population 
 
District Total VAP % white VAP % African American 
19 32,056 35.80 61.65 
32 31,252 42.51 56.15 
52 31,711 34.28 62.80 
53 33,417 35.66 59.76 
54 31,183 39.25 58.31 
55 29,153 34.96 64.02 
56 30,949 40.24 58.51 
57 30,072 39.75 59.68 
58 29,506 41.45 56.98 
59 29,367 38.84 59.67 
60 31,178 38.26 60.72 
67 29,109 39.70 59.39 
68 28,709 40.65 58.73 
69 28,163 37.66 61.63 
70 33,538 40.38 57.29 
71 28,736 38.93 60.47 
72 29,973 42.65 56.71 
76 28,759 29.36 69.52 
77 30,215 32.62 66.25 
78 29,266 28.96 69.45 
82 34,655 39.54 58.08 
83 28,719 40.06 58.49 
97 30,611 39.05 59.40 
98 29,871 37.52 61.38 
99 30,975 37.17 61.22 
103 28,646 40.80 56.66 
 
Source: This data were collected from Alabama’s House of Representatives. 
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Table A.6:  The Adjacent Districts from the Majority African American Districts, the 
Demographics and the Party of the Candidates Elected in 2002 to the Adjacent Districts 
in Alabama 
 
Districts Adjacent 
Districts 
Political 
Party of the 
Districts 
Total 
Population 
Whites 
Voting Age 
Percentages 
African 
American 
Voting Age 
Percentages 
19 6 Democrat 31,400 68.25 26.83 
 10 Republican 32,647 81.14 12.71 
 20 Republican 32,250 93.34 2.12 
 21 Democrat 32,141 71.96 24.29 
      
32 33 Republican 32,090 77.73 20.94 
 35 Republican 31,655 86.77 11.18 
 36 Republican 32,212 88.84 8.915 
 38 Democrat 32,682 70.70 28.16 
      
52 46 Republican 32,725 92.40 4.52 
 56 Democrat 30,949 40.24 58.51 
 57 Democrat 30,072 39.75 59.68 
 53 Democrat 33,417 35.66 59.76 
 60 Democrat 31,178 38.25 60.72 
 51 Republican 32,624 93.36 5.29 
      
53 55 Democrat 29,153 34.96 64.02 
 60 Democrat 31,178 38.25 60.72 
 58 Democrat 29,506 41.44 56.98 
      
54 59 Democrat 29,367 38.83 59.67 
 58 Democrat 29,506 41.44 56.98 
 45 Republican 31,104 96.36 17.55 
      
55 57 Democrat 30,072 39.75 59.68 
 60 Democrat 31,178 38.25 60.72 
 53 Democrat 33,417 35.66 59.76 
      
56 57 Democrat 30,072 39.75 59.68 
 47 Republican 35,010 87.75 6.15 
 52 Democrat 31,711 34.28 62.80 
      
57 56 Democrat 30,072 39.75 59.68 
 47 Republican 35,010 87.75 6.15 
 55 Democrat 29,153 34.96 64.02 
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Table A.6 continued 
 
58 59 Democrat 29,367 38.83 59.67 
 44 Republican 30,565 87.68 10.65 
 45 Republican 31,104 80.28 17.55 
59 60 Democrat 31,178 38,25 60.72 
 55 Democrat 29,153 34.96 64.02 
 59 Democrat 29,367 38.83 59.67 
 54 Democrat 31,183 39.25 58.31 
      
60 55 Democrat 29,153 34.96 64.02 
 59 Democrat 29,367 38.84 59.68 
 52 Democrat 31,711 34.28 62.80 
      
67 72 Democrat 29,973 42.65 56.71 
 69 Democrat 28,163 37.67 61.63 
 43 Republican 32,490 93.65 3.50 
      
68 65 Democrat 29,405 71.75 24.76 
 64 Democrat 30,443 73.16 23.82 
 90 Democrat 30,199 67.33 31.89 
      
69 90 Democrat 30,199 67.33 31.90 
 67 Democrat 29,109 39.70 59.40 
 68 Republican 28,709 40.64 58.73 
 72 Democrat 29,973 42.65 56.71 
      
70 63 Republican 34,860 78.98 18.22 
 62 Republican 31,961 81.50 16.62 
 61 Democrat 29,947 71.21 27.07 
 71 Democrat 28,736 38.93 60.47 
      
72 49 Republican 29,973 42.65 56.71 
 67 Democrat 29,109 39.70 59.39 
 62 Republican 31,961 81.49 16.62 
 71 Democrat 28,736 38.93 60.47 
 68 Republican 28,709 40.65 58.73 
      
      
76 73 Republican 31,594 71.80 25.04 
 78 Democrat 29,266 28.96 69.45 
 90 Democrat 30,199 67.33 31.89 
 89 Republican 31,475 65.75 31.89 
 75 Republican 32,705 76.47 20.98 
 82 Republican 34,655 39.54 58.08 
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77 74 Republican 31,376 82.77 14.41 
 88 Republican 31,458 83.65 14.27 
 75 Republican 32,705 76.47 20.98 
      
78 69 Democrat 28,163 37.67 61.63 
 76 Democrat 28,758 29.36 69.53 
 73 Republican 31,594 71.80 25.05 
 88 Republican 31,458 83.65 14.27 
      
71 61 Democrat 29,947 71.21 27.07 
 68 Republican 28,709 40.65 58.73 
 72 Democrat 29,973 42.65 56.71 
 70 Democrat 33,538 40.38 57.29 
 62 Republican 31,961 81.49 16.62 
      
82 76 Democrat 28,758 29.36 69.53 
 89 Republican 31,475 65.75 31.12 
 83 Democrat 28,719 40.06 58.50 
 84 Democrat 30,733 48.92 48.96 
 81 Democrat 32,262 75.93 23.16 
 31 Democrat 31,869 75.83 22.37 
 79 Republican 35,594 86.16 10.22 
      
97 96 Republican 32,451 88.34 9.75 
 105 Republican 29,326 86.43 8.13 
 103 Democrat 28,646 40.81 56.66 
 99 Democrat 30,975 37.17 61.22 
 98 Democrat 29,871 37.52 61.38 
      
83 84 Democrat 30,733 48.92 48.96 
 80 Republican 31,936 81.90 16.94 
 79 Republican 35,594 86.16 10.22 
      
98 102 Republican 30,824 84.92 10.98 
 99 Democrat 30,975 37.17 61.22 
 96 Republican 32,451 88.34 9.76 
      
99 100 Republican 30,457 89.30 7.29 
 98 Democrat 29,871 11,208 61.39 
 97 Democrat 30,611 39.06 59.40 
      
103 97 Democrat 30,611 39.06 59.40 
 105 Republican 29,326 86.43 8.13 
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 104 Republican 32,807 87.81 9.62 
 100 Republican 30,457 89.30 7.29 
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Table A.7: Louisiana’s 1988-1992  Majority-African American House of 
Representatives  Districts and the Demographics of Each District 
 
Districts Total Population Total White % Total AA % 
2 15,976 11.1 88.9 
3 13,750 26.0 74.0 
10 21,581 12.2 72.4 
17 15,893 24.1 75.9 
34 19,599 20.4 70.6 
58 24,429 47.2 52.8 
61 14,043 22.1 77.9 
63 16,465 13.8 86.2 
67 12,959 22.7 77.3 
91 17,482 24.0 76.0 
93 13,045 30.2 69.8 
95 15,031 34.6 65.4 
96 17,130 18.4 81.6 
97 16, 106 21.2 78.8 
99 16,221 10.0 90.0 
101 16,539 13.4 86.6 
 
Source: This data were collected from Louisiana’s House of Representatives. 
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Table A.8:  The Adjacent Districts from the Majority African American Districts, the 
Demographics, and the Party of the Candidates Elected in 1987 to the Adjacent Districts in 
Louisiana 
Districts Adjacent 
Districts 
Political 
Party of the 
District 
Total 
Population 
Whites 
Percentage 
in 
Population 
African 
Americans 
Percentage in 
Population 
2-3 2 Democrat 15,976 11.1 88.9 
 3 Democrat 23,750 26.0 74.0 
 4 Democrat 19,937 83.4 16.6 
 5 Republican 25,344 96.4 3.6 
 6 Republican 17,705 84.5 15.5 
 1 Democrat 19,487 81.6 18.4 
 9 Democrat 22,165 83.8 16.2 
 7 Democrat 21,215 75.4 24.6 
      
10 9 Democrat 22,165 83.8 16.2 
 11 Democrat 23,124 65.6 34.4 
 13 Democrat 23,623 77.1 22.9 
      
17 16 Democrat 20,364 85.6 14.4 
 15 Democrat 20,816 91.7 8.3 
 19 Democrat 20,576 60.9 39.1 
 14 Democrat 19,752 78.3 21.7 
      
34 35 Republican 23,846 94.3 5.7 
 36 Democrat 25,081 95.8 4.2 
 37 Democrat 21,990 84.2 15.8 
      
58 60 Democrat 25,847 63.7 36.3 
 59 Democrat 26, 280 92.2 7.8 
 55 Democrat 21,667 87.4 12.6 
 56 Democrat 26,021 69.5 30.5 
 57 Democrat 25,317 70.1 29.9 
 61 Democrat 14,043 22.1 77.9 
      
61,63,67 60 Democrat 25,847 63.7 36.3 
 61 Democrat 14,043 22.1 77.9 
 62 Democrat 21,812 64.5 35.5 
 63 Democrat 16,465 13.8 86.2 
 64 Democrat 21,790 83.8 16.2 
 65 Democrat 20,839 97.0 3.0 
 66 Democrat 16,954 80.9 19.1 
 67 Democrat 12,959 22.7 77.3 
 68 Democrat 23,099 86.1 13.9 
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 69 Democrat 27,386 97.9 2.1 
 70 Republican 28,510 95.5 4.5 
 59 Democrat 26,280 92.2 7.8 
 71 Democrat 25,699 95.3 4.7 
 72 Democrat 26,355 64.3 35.7 
 62 Democrat 21,812 64.5 35.5 
 29 Democrat 23,528 61.6 38.4 
 58 Democrat 24,429 47.2 52.8 
      
91, 93, 95, 96, 97, 
99. 101 
 
89 Republican 19,369 83.7 16.3 
 90 Republican 17,103 53.5 46.5 
 91 Democrat 17,482 24.0 76.0 
 92 Democrat 14,572 77.3 22.7 
 93 Democrat 13,045 30.2 69.8 
 94 Republican 21,192 91.7 8.3 
 95 Democrat 15,031 34.6 65.4 
 96 Democrat 17,130 18.4 81.6 
 97 Democrat 16,106 21.2 78.8 
 98 Republican 22,155 62.8 37.2 
 99 Democrat 16,221 10.0 90.0 
 100 Democrat 20,735 59.2 40.8 
 101 Democrat 16,539 13.4 86.6 
 59 Democrat 26,280 92.2 7.8 
 56 Democrat 26,021 69.5 30.5 
 105 Democrat 22,328 84.0 16.0 
Note: Districts 2-3; 61, 63, and 67; and 91, 93, 95, 96, 97, 99, 101 are lumped together because these districts were too 
small to identify them separately on the map. 
 
Source: This data were collected from Louisiana’s House of Representatives. 
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Table A.9:  Louisiana’s 1992-1996 Majority-African American House of 
Representatives  Districts and the Demographics of each District  
 
 
District Total Pop White % Black % 
2 16,451 22.1 77.4 
3 17,539 36.3 63.2 
4 17,394 41.8 57.7 
11 22,382 46.6 58.9 
21 24,718 46.6 53.3 
26 19,263 40.7 58.7 
29 18,080 41.9 58.0 
34 18,993 7.8 86.2 
40 25,450 44.8 55.0 
44 20,700 42.5 57.3 
58 25,328 35.8 64.2 
61 17,762 39.4 60.4 
63 21,214 23.5 76.4 
67 15,641 35.7 63.6 
72 25,416 43.4 54.4 
87 15,489 35.9 62.3 
93 19,110 28.2 70.0 
95 18,816 27.1 71.6 
96 19,416 11.1 87.9 
97 20,449 20.0 78.8 
99 20,494 7.5 91.8 
100 19,070 36.6 61.5 
101 20,287 18.7 80.3 
 
Source: This data were collected from Louisiana’s House of Representatives. 
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Table. A.10:  The Adjacent Districts from the Majority African American Districts, the 
Demographics, and the Party of the Candidates Elected in 1993 to the Adjacent Districts in Louisiana 
 
 
Districts Adjacent 
Districts 
Political Party of 
the House 
Member 
Total 
Population 
White 
Percentage 
in 
Population 
African American 
Percentage in 
Population 
2-4 1 Republican 20,045 81.9 17.8 
 2 Democrat 16,451 22.1 77.4 
 3 Democrat 17,539 36.6 63.2 
 4 Democrat 17,394 41.8 57.7 
 5 Republican 21,695 94.1 5.1 
 6 Republican 24,593 92.7 6.7 
 7 Democrat 20,555 70.9 26.5 
 8 Republican 16,077 90.2 9.3 
 9 Democrat 18,521 82.6 16.9 
      
11 10 Democrat 22,378 71.2 28.8 
 12 Democrat 22, 382 40.6 58.9 
 13 Democrat 24,200 72.8 27.2 
      
21 28 Democrat 22,981 75.5 24.3 
 20 Democrat 26,913 76.6 21.3 
 22 Democrat 26,076 84.5 15.1 
 19 Democrat 23,099 73.8 26.0 
 14 Democrat 22,733 74.4 25.5 
      
26 27 Republican 20,604 91.4 8.1 
 22 Independent 26,076 84.5 15.1 
 25 Democrat 23,281 85.2 13.7 
 28 Democrat 22,981 75.5 24.3 
      
29 18 Democrat 21,937 72.1 27.8 
 61 Democrat 17,762 39.4 60.4 
 67 Democrat 15,641 35.7 63.6 
      
34 35 Republican 20,094 93.4 6.1 
 36 Republican 23.262 95.0 4.6 
 37 Democrat 23,647 84.8 15.0 
      
40 38 Democrat 26,906 74.8 25.1 
 39 Democrat 22,219 82.5 17.3 
 41 Democrat 23,590 81.0 18.9 
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44 39 Democrat 22,219 82.5 17.3 
 43 Democrat 24,256 93.9 5.8 
 46 Democrat 24,274 66.2 33.6 
      
58 70 Republican 20,635 89.7 9.5 
 59 Democrat 23,677 92.9 6.8 
 57 Democrat 23,967 70.8 28.9 
 55 Democrat 19,170 83.4 16.4 
 56 Democrat 23,715 77.2 22.8 
 60 Democrat 25,392 66.8 33.2 
 105 Democrat 21.913 76.3 19.0 
      
63 29 Democrat 18,080 41.9 58.0 
 28 Democrat 18,080 75.5 24.3 
 64 Democrat 23,562 88.9 11.0 
      
67 29 Democrat 18,080 41.9 58.0 
 61 Democrat 17,762 39.4 60.4 
 68 Democrat 24.691 84.9 14.9 
      
61 29 Democrat 18,080 41.9 58.0 
 67 Democrat 15,641 35.7 63.6 
 68 Democrat 24.691 84.9 14.9 
 66 Republican 20,478 89.1 10.5 
      
72 18 Democrat 21,937 72.1 27.8 
 62 Republican 23,968 75.2 22.8 
      
87 84 Democrat 18,445 88.5 9.7 
 85 Republican 18,238 78.2 20.2 
 89 Democrat 22,340 66.2 32.2 
 91 Democrat 21,712 36.3 62.1 
 93 Democrat 19,110 28.2 70.2 
      
93 91 Democrat 21,712 36.3 62.1 
 85 Republican 18,238 78.2 20.2 
 102 Democrat 19,275 48.5 50.0 
 96 Democrat 19,416 11.1 87.9 
      
95 94 Republican 22,947 89.8 8.9 
 89 Democrat 22,340 66.2 32.2 
 81 Republican 23,390 98.6 .9 
 82 Republican 21,138 91.1 8.2 
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 91 Democrat 21,712 36.3 62.1 
 93 Democrat 19,110 28.2 70.2 
      
96 93 Democrat 19,110 28.2 70.2 
 96 Democrat 19,416 11.1 87.9 
 97 Democrat 20,449 20.0 78.8 
 94 Republican 22,947 89.8 8.9 
 102 Democrat 19,275 48.5 50.0 
      
97 94 Republican 22,947 89.8 8.9 
 98 Republican 24,137 56.1 42.9 
 99 Democrat 19,275 48.5 50.0 
 101 Democrat 20,287 18.7 80.3 
 102 Democrat 19,275 48.5 50.0 
      
99 97 Democrat 20,449 20.0 78.8 
 101 Democrat 20,287 18.7 80.3 
 102 Democrat 19,275 48.5 50.0 
 103 Democrat 20,532 87.1 11.1 
      
100 101 Democrat 20,287 18.7 80.3 
      
101 97 Democrat 20,449 20.0 78.8 
 98 Republican 24,137 56.1 42.9 
 99 Democrat 19,275 48.5 50.0 
 100 Democrat 19,070 36.6 61.5 
 103 Democrat 20,532 87.1 11.1 
Source: This data were collected from Louisiana’s House of Representatives. 
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Table A.11:   Louisiana’s 2000-2004   Majority-African American House of 
Representative  Districts and Demographics of each District 
 
District Districts’ Total 
Population 
White 
Percentage in 
Population 
African 
American 
Percentage in 
Population 
2 17,045 16.8 80.0 
3 19,551 19.2 78.4 
4 19,556 29.7 67.8 
11 21,547 39.2 59.2 
17 20,811 10.6 87.4 
21 25,151 43.9 55.6 
26 17,229 33.8 65.0 
29 19,502 23.5 73.9 
34 22,621 24.0 73.0 
40 25,686 42.8 56.3 
44 22,375 34.9 63.0 
58 25,567 34.3 64.9 
61 20,646 25.1 71.4 
63 28,510 22.7 75.8 
67 15,042 30.7 64.9 
72 26,350 43.2 54.4 
87 19,611 23.5 69.6 
91 20,244 37.7 57.5 
93 18,978 29.5 65.2 
95 19,674 20.6 75.0 
96 19,113 10.6 86.0 
97 21,940 13.3 83.1 
98 24,246 36.9 59.6 
99 20,436 16.1 79.2 
100 21,351 16.1 79.2 
101 19,800 9.0 88.3 
102 24,703 38.0 57.0 
Source: This data were collected from Louisiana’s House of Representatives. 
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Table A.12 : The Adjacent Districts from the Majority African American 
Districts, the Demographics, and the Party of the Candidates Elected in 
1999 to the Adjacent Districts in Louisiana 
 
Districts Adjacent 
Districts 
Political 
Party of 
the 
Districts 
Total 
Population 
Whites 
Percentage 
in 
Population 
African 
American 
Percentage 
in 
Population 
2-4 1 Republican 23,545 77.0 20.9 
 2 Democrat 17,045 16.8 80.0 
 3 Democrat 19,551 19.2 78.4 
 4 Democrat 19,556 29.7 67.8 
 5 Republican 23,480 86.6 10.7 
 6 Republican 25,747 87.8 9.4 
 7 Democrat 24,934 71.4 25.7 
 8 Republican 22,379 82.3 13.6 
      
11 10 Democrat 24,650 69.0 29.7 
 12 Republican 26,499 81.6 16.9 
 13 Democrat 25,562 72.6 26.6 
      
17 15 Republican 27,114 90.9 7.5 
 16 Republican 23,850 88.1 9.8 
 19 Democrat 25,182 70.5 28.8 
      
21 14 Democrat 26,047 70.5 28.5 
 19 Democrat 25,182 70.5 28.8 
 20 Democrat 26,939 77.7 21.9 
 22 Democrat 27,085 84.2 14.8 
 28 Democrat 23,737 89.0 9.3 
 18 Democrat 24,043 73.6 26.0 
      
26 22 Democrat 27,085 84.2 14.8 
 27 Republican 22,684 89.0 9.3 
 25 Democrat 26,016 33.8 65.0 
      
29 68 Democrat 27,780 80.6 16.7 
 18 Democrat 24,043 73.6 26.0 
 67 Democrat 15,042 30.7 64.9 
 64 Republican 27,814 82.3 16.0 
 66 Republican 23,849 86.6 10.5 
      
34 35 Republican 25,930 86.0 11.2 
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 36 Republican 30,507 91.8 6.0 
 37 Democrat 27,084 83.8 14.7 
      
40 39 Democrat 28,819 79.5 18.5 
 38 Democrat 27,712 74.0 25.6 
 41 Republican 25,484 80.6 18.5 
      
44 39 Democrat 28,819 79.5 18.5 
 46 Democrat 28,066 66.7 32.6 
 43 Republican 31,544 91.6 5.6 
 45 Democrat 27,335 90.7 6.0 
      
58 55 Democrat 22,402 96.5 1.8 
 56 Democrat 26,933 76.0 21.6 
 57 Democrat 26,865 64.6 33.3 
 59 Democrat 31,763 90.9 6.6 
 60 Democrat 26,566 65.3 34.5 
 70 Republican 30,304 82.7 12.7 
      
61 29 Democrat 19,502 23.5 73.9 
 65 Republican 23,849 86.6 10.5 
 66 Republican 22,337 75.6 20.5 
 67 Democrat 15,042 30.7 64.9 
 68 Democrat 27,780 80.6 16.7 
      
63 18 Democrat 24,043 73.6 26.0 
 29 Democrat 19,502 23.5 73.9 
 62 Republican 28,510 74.4 22.9 
 64 Republican 27,814 82.3 16.0 
 65 Republican 23,849 86.6 10.5 
      
67 18 Democrat 24,043 73.6 26.0 
 29 Democrat 19,502 23.5 73.9 
 62 Republican 28,510 74.4 22.9 
 64 Republican 27,814 82.3 16.0 
 65 Republican 23,849 86.6 10.5 
      
72 18 Democrat 24,043 73.6 26.0 
 62 Republican 28,510 74.4 22.9 
 74 Republican 32,431 89.9 7.4 
 77 Republican 32,495 84.1 12.2 
      
87 84 Democrat 24,139 79.4 13.9 
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 85 Republican 23,327 67.0 25.5 
 91 Democrat 20,244 37.7 57.5 
 89 Democrat 21,181 62.1 32.9 
 83 Democrat 22,861 61.2 33.3 
 93 Democrat 18,978 29.5 65.2 
      
91 87 Democrat 19,611 23.5 69.6 
 89 Democrat 21,181 62.1 32.9 
 93 Democrat 18,978 29.5 65.2 
 94 Republican 23,642 83.9 10.9 
      
93 85 Republican 23,327 67.0 25.5 
 87 Democrat 19,611 23.5 69.6 
 91 Democrat 20,244 37.7 57.5 
 94 Republican 23,642 83.9 10.9 
 96 Democrat 19,113 10.6 86.0 
 102 Democrat 24,703 38.0 57.0 
      
95 89 Democrat 21,181 62.1 32.9 
 94 Republican 23,642 83.9 10.9 
 81 Republican 24,667 95.1 1.1 
 82 Republican 22,832 86.5 8.5 
      
96 93 Democrat 18,978 29.5 65.2 
 94 Republican 23,642 83.9 10.9 
 97 Democrat 21,940 13.3 83.1 
      
97 94 Republican 23,642 83.9 10.9 
 96 Democrat 19,113 10.6 86.0 
 98 Democrat 24,246 36.9 59.6 
 99 Democrat 20,436 16.1 79.2 
 101 Democrat 19,800 9.0 88.3 
 102 Democrat 24,703 38.0 57.0 
      
98 94 Republican 23,642 83.9 10.9 
 97 Democrat 21,940 13.3 83.1 
 101 Democrat 19,800 9.0 88.3 
      
99 97 Democrat 21,940  13.3 83.1 
 101 Democrat 19,800 9.0 88.3 
 102 Democrat 24,703 38.0 57.0 
 103 Democrat 21,325 81.6 12.2 
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100 101 Democrat 19,800 9.0 88.3 
      
101 97 Democrat 21,940 13.3 83.1 
 98 Democrat 24,246 36.9 59.6 
 99 Democrat 20,436 16.1 79.2 
 100 Democrat 21,351 16.1 79.2 
 103 Democrat 21,325 81.6 12.2 
      
102 85 Republican 23,327 67.0 25.5 
 86 Republican 21,441 64.2 27.1 
 93 Democrat 18,978 29.5 65.2 
 97 Democrat 21,940  13.3 83.1 
 99 Democrat 20,436 16.1 79.2 
Sources: The data were collected from Louisiana’s House of Representatives. 
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Table A.13:  Louisiana’s 2000-2004 Majority-African American House of 
Representative  Districts and Demographics of each District 
 
District Total White  Black 
2 21,668 22.5 74.2 
3 22,317 16.4 80.6 
4 24,592 34.2 62.7 
11 22,631 39.3 58.6 
17 24,897 11.3 85.8 
21 27,574 43.8 55.5 
26 24,377 40.1 60.5 
29 23,281 19.5 77.0 
34 28,639 28.4 68.4 
40 26,414 41.2 57.2 
44 24,636 33.3 63.5 
58 28,028 34.2 64.7 
61 24,137 26.7 69.2 
63 25,101 24.9 73.0 
67 19,756 30.0 65.8 
72 28,017 42.4 54.7 
87 22,961 21.1 71.1 
91 24,372 36.2 59.5 
93 24,711 36.0 56.9 
95 25,745 37.5 55.4 
96 25,314 18.0 77.3 
97 26,115 18.6 77.1 
98 24,597 35.9 57.1 
99 25,262 6.1 90.7 
100 23,805 12.1 83.8 
101 23,338 11.3 85.5 
102 23,467 29.2 64.5 
 
Source: This data were collected from Louisiana’s House of Representatives. 
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Table A.14:  The Adjacent Districts from the Majority African American Districts, the 
Demographics and the Party of  the Candidates Elected in 2003 to the Adjacent 
Districts in Louisiana 
 
District Adjacent 
Districts 
Political 
Party of the 
Districts 
Total 
population 
White 
Percentage 
in 
Population 
African 
American 
Percentage 
in 
Population 
      
2 4 Democrat 24,59.76  43.2 62.7 
 3 Democrat 22,317 16.4 80.6 
 8 Republican 26,378 83.3 12.3 
 6 Republican 28,161 86.5 9.7 
      
3 1 Republican 25,148 77.0 20.1 
 2 Democrat 21,668  22.5 74.2 
 4 Democrat 24,59.76  43.2 62 
 5 Republican 26,064 84.4 12.1 
 6 Republican 28,161 86.5 9.7 
      
4 1 Republican 25,148 77.0 20.1 
 2 Democrat 21,668  22.5 74.2 
 3 Democrat 22,317 16.4 80.6 
 5 Republican 26,064 84.4 12.1 
 8 Republican 26,378 83.3 12.3 
      
11 10 Democrat 26,417 69.1 29.6 
 12 Republican 29,640 79.0 20.7 
 13 Democrat 26,728 74.8 23.9 
      
17 15 Republican 28,592 88.6 8.2 
 16 Republican 26,213 85.0 12.2 
 19 Democrat 25,468 69.5 29.4 
      
21 18 Democrat 24,517 66.5 32.6 
 19 Democrat 25,468 69.5 29.4 
 20 Democrat 28,783 74.6 24.9 
 28 Democrat 25,310 72.9 26.1 
      
26 25 Democrat 26,619 81.6 15.5 
 27 Democrat 28,627 90.7 6.9 
      
29 61 Democrat 24,137 26.7 69.2 
 63 Democrat 25,101 24.9 73.0 
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 65 Republican 26,038 87.2 9.6 
 66 Republican 25,333 78.9 16.5 
 67 Democrat 19,756 30.0 65.8 
      
34 35 Republican 27,836 87.5 9.4 
 36 Republican 29,991 91.2 5.5 
 37 Democrat 27,992 82.4 15.7 
      
40 38 Democrat 28,700 72.4 27.0 
 39 Democrat 28,654 75.7 21.5 
 41 Democrat 26,598 79.4 19.4 
 46 Democrat 29,973 66.5 31.5 
      
44 31 Republican 28,466 90.2 6.6 
 39 Democrat 28,654 75.7 21.5 
 43 Republican 27,916 87.5 8.3 
 45 Democrat 27,239 88.2 7.8 
 49 Democrat 27,645 76.0 21.9 
      
58 55 Democrat 26,401 81.4 16.8 
 56 Democrat 27,476 69.1 27.8 
 57 Democrat 28,061 60.0 37.3 
 59 Republican 27,776 87.7 8.6 
 60 Democrat 28,461 62.6 36.9 
 88 Republican 29,294 92.9 4.7 
      
61 29 Democrat 23,281 19.5 77.0 
 66 Republican 25,333 78.9 16.5 
 67 Democrat 19,756 30.0 65.8 
 68 Republican 25,974 74.6 21.5 
 69 Republican 25,847 89.7 6.4 
      
63 29 Democrat 23,281 19.5 77.0 
 62 Republican 29,090 70.6 26.6 
 64 Republican 27,513 85.6 12.1 
 65 Republican 26,038 87.2 9.6 
      
67 29 Democrat 23,281 19.5 77.0 
 61 Democrat 24,137 26.7 69.2 
 68 Republican 25,974 74.6 21.5 
 70 Republican 27,776 80.9 13.7 
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72 18 Democrat 24,517 66.5 32.6 
 62 Republican 29,090 70.6 26.6 
 74 Republican 29,721 87.7 9.2 
      
87 84 Democrat 24,793 78.9 13.5 
 85 Republican 25,847 61.3 29.7 
 91 Democrat 24,372 36.2 59.5 
 98 Democrat 24,597 35.9 57.1 
      
91 87 Democrat 22,961 21.1 71.1 
 93 Democrat 24,711 36.0 56.9 
 98 Republican 24,597 35.9 57.1 
      
93 85 Republican 25,847 61.3 29.7 
 91 Democrat 24,372 36.2 59.5 
 94 Republican 28,423 82.6 10.9 
 95 Democrat 25,745 37.5 55.4 
 96 Democrat 25,314 18.0 77.3 
 98 Democrat 24,597 35.9 57.1 
 99 Democrat 25,262 6.1 90.7 
 102 Democrat 23,467 29.2 64.5 
      
95 94 Republican 28,423 82.6 10.9 
 81 Republican 30,166 92.1 2.1 
 82 Republican 25,814 84.2 9.3 
 83 Democrat 24,243 58.5 35.1 
 98 Democrat 24,597 35.9 57.1 
 93 Democrat 24,711 36.0 56.9 
      
96 94 Republican 28,423 82.6 10.9 
 93 Democrat 24,711 36.0 56.9 
 97 Democrat 26,115 18.6 77.1 
 102 Democrat 23,467 29.2 64.5 
      
97 94 Republican 28,423 82.6 10.9 
 96 Democrat 25,314 18.0 77.3 
 99 Democrat 25,262 6.1 90.7 
 101 Democrat 23,338 11.3 85.5 
      
98 91 Democrat 24,372 36.2 59.5 
 93 Democrat 24,711 36.0 56.9 
 95 Democrat 25,745 37.5 55.4 
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99 102 Democrat 23,467 29.2 64.5 
 101 Democrat 23,338 11.3 85.5 
 97 Democrat 26,115 18.6 77.1 
 104 Republican 25,697 90.0 6.9 
      
100 101 Democrat 23,338 11.3 85.5 
      
101 100 Democrat 23,805 12.1 83.8 
 97 Democrat 26,115 18.6 77.1 
 99 Democrat 25,262 6.1 90.7 
      
102 85 Republican 25,847 61.3 29.7 
 86 Republican 23,237 62.1 28.8 
 93 Democrat 24,711 36.0 56.9 
 96 Democrat 25,314 18.0 77.3 
 97 Democrat 26,115 18.6 77.1 
 104 Republican 25,697 90.0 6.9 
 
Source: This data were collected from Louisiana’s House of Representatives. 
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Table A.15: Mississippi’s Majority-African American House of Representatives 
Districts and the Demographics for each District for 1993 
Districts Total 
Population 
Percent 
African 
American 
Number 
African 
American 18 
+ 
Percent 
African 
American 18 
+ 
5 20,124 65.60 8,441 61.80 
9 20,385 71.90 8,709 66.38 
11 20,104 56.43 6,824 50.91 
26 22,123 73.93 9,749 69.00 
27 22,124 73.79 10,063 69.40 
29 21,960 78.20 10,107 72.87 
30 20,058 66.18 8,470 60.97 
31 20,181 72.60 8,619 67.03 
32 21,532 80.43 10,933 76.87 
36 20,928 64.76 8,378 60.16 
38 20,115 66.25 8,281 60.30 
41 20,075 66.90 8,580 61.97 
42 20,105 67.98 8,523 63.14 
47 21,180 70.87 9,193 65.68 
49 22,060 74.42 9,947 69.10 
50 21,752 71.06 9,199 65.75 
51 20,849 71.14 8,676 65.70 
55 20,540 67.95 8,676 62.13 
57 21,989 73.54 9,841 68.48 
63 20,099 69.43 8,923 66.30 
65 20,200 76.54 10,683 71.84 
67 22,004 70.99 10,369 66.60 
68 20,404 71.34 8,435 63.58 
69 21,554 71.40 11,089 69.29 
70 21,290 76.19 11,349 71.44 
72 20,430 73.51 9,020 68.69 
76 21,221 68.42 9,351 64.33 
80 21,346 71.16 9,510 65.45 
82 21,003 72.20 9,654 66.25 
85 20,994 71.16 10,055 68.59 
91 20,511 55.04 6,991 50.12 
94 20,511 69.36 9,134 66.24 
96 20,072 64.31 8,353 60.55 
98 20,516 65.71 8,395 61.31 
103 20,452 72.27 9,239 66.06 
110 21,022 68.36 9,032 62.93 
119 20,059 63.73 8,076 59.06 
Source: This data were collected from Mississippi’s House of Representatives. 
 
210 
 
Table A.16:  The Adjacent Districts from the Majority African American 
Districts, the Demographics, and the Party of the Candidate Elected in 1993 to 
the Adjacent Districts in Mississippi 
 
Districts Adjacent 
Districts 
 
Political 
Party in the 
Districts 
Total 
Population 
Percent 
African 
American 
Number 
African 
American 
18 + 
Percent 
African 
American 
18 + 
5 4 Democrat 21,144 15.82 2,149 13.86 
 10 Democrat 20,488 29.22 3,820 25.63 
 13 Democrat 21,267 27.52 3,759 24.67 
 14 Democrat 22,085 14.55 2,107 12.97 
       
9 6 Democrat 20,295 22.06 3,005 20.20 
 8 Democrat 21,432 34.61 4,653 30.71 
 11 Democrat 20,104 56.43 6,824 50.91 
 26 Democrat 22,123 73.93 9,749 69.00 
 25 Democrat 22,075 13.96 1,851 12.17 
 30 Democrat 30,058 66.18 8,470 60.97 
       
11 8 Democrat 21,432 34.61 4,653 30.71 
 9 Democrat 20,385 71.90 8,709 66.38 
 10 Democrat 20,488 29.22 3,820 25.63 
 30 Democrat 30,058 66.18 8,470 60.97 
 33 Democrat 20,184 43.30 5,505 38.55 
       
26 6 Democrat 20,295 22.06 3,005 20.20 
 9 Democrat 20,385 71.90 8,709 66.38 
 25 Democrat 22,075 13.96 1,851 12.17 
 29 Democrat 21,960 78.20 10,107 72.87 
 30 Democrat 30,058 66.18 8,470 60.97 
       
27 48 Democrat 20,265 50.03 6,216 44.19 
 46 Democrat 21,151 35.69 4,907 31.75 
 45 Democrat 21,668 27.09 3,803 24.46 
 58 Republican 22,107 8.06 1,319 7.88 
 59 Republican 22,067 6.86 989 6.29 
 57 Democrat 21,989 73.54 9,841 68.48 
 47 Democrat 21,180 70.87 9,193 65.68 
 56 Democrat 21,938 34.50 4,981 31.80 
       
29 25 Democrat 22,075 13.96 1,851 12.17 
 26 Democrat 22,123 73.93 9,749 69.00 
 30 Democrat 30,058 66.18 8,470 60.97 
 31 Democrat 20,181 72.60 8,619 67.03 
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 28 Democrat 21,696 41.98 5,446 35.96 
 50 Democrat 21,752 71.06 9,199 65.75 
       
30 26 Democrat 22,123 73.93 9,749 69.00 
 9 Democrat 20,385 71.90 8,709 66.38 
 11 Democrat 20,104 56.43 6,824 50.91 
 33 Democrat 20,184 43.30 5,505 38.55 
 32 Democrat 21,532 80.43 10,933 76.87 
 34 Democrat 20,159 36.31 4,385 30.97 
 31 Democrat 20,181 72.60 8,619 67.03 
 28 Democrat 21,696 41.98 5,556 35.96 
 29 Democrat 21,960 78.20 10,107 72.87 
       
31 52 Democrat 22,068 23.69 3,148 20.43 
 28 Democrat 21,696 41.98 5,556 35.96 
 29 Democrat 21,960 78.20 10,107 72.87 
 30 Democrat 30,058 66.18 8,470 60.97 
 34 Democrat 20,159 36.31 4,385 30.97 
 51 Democrat 20,849 71.14 8,676 65.70 
       
32 24 Democrat 20,732 36.86 4,981 33.47 
 30 Democrat 30,058 66.18 8,470 60.97 
 34 Democrat 20,159 36.31 4,385 30.97 
36 20 Democrat 20,087 16.36 2,169 14.70 
 21 Democrat 21,394 18.37 2,556 16.03 
 22 Democrat 20,070 38.67 4,809 34.40 
 41 Democrat 20,075 66.90 8,580 61.97 
 37 Democrat 21,949 19.23 2,997 16.72 
 35 Democrat 21,805 27.01 3,638 23.17 
 46 Democrat 21,151 35.69 4,907 31.75 
 38 Democrat 20,115 66.35 8,281 60.30 
       
38 35 Democrat 21,805 27.01 3,638 23.17 
 36 Democrat 20,928 64.76 8,378 60.16 
 37 Democrat 21,949 19.23 2,997 16.72 
 40 Republican 20,075 66.90 8,580 16.13 
 41 Democrat 20,075 66.90 8,580 61.97 
       
41 20 Democrat 20,087 16.36 2,169 14.70 
 36 Democrat 20,928 64.76 8,378 60.16 
 38 Democrat 20,115 66.35 8,281 60.30 
 39 Democrat 20,102 19.27 2,483 16.91 
 40 Republican 20,075 66.90 8,580 16.13 
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42 37 Democrat 21,949 19.23 2,997 16.72 
 38 Democrat 20,115 66.35 8,281 60.30 
 43 Democrat 20,726 40.20 5,178 35.32 
 44 Democrat 21,578 19.05 2,622 17.25 
 78 Democrat 21,453 26.34 3,627 23.51 
 81 Independent 22,132 21.37 2,975 18.75 
       
47 27 Democrat 22,124 73.79 10,063 69.40 
 48 Democrat 20,265 50.03 6,216 44.19 
 51 Democrat 20,849 71.14 8,676 65.70 
 56 Democrat 21,938  34.50 4,981 31.80 
       
49       
       
50 28 Democrat 21,696 41.98 5,446 35.96 
 29 Democrat 21,960 78.20 10,107 72.87 
 52 Republican 22,068 23.69 3,148 20.43 
       
51 52 Republican 22,068 23.69 3,148 20.43 
 31 Democrat 20,181 72.60 8,619 67.03 
 34 Democrat 20,159 36.31 4,385 30.97 
 48 Democrat 20,265 50.03 6,216 44.19 
 47 Democrat 21,989 73.54 9,841 68.48 
 56 Democrat 21,938 34.50 4,981 31.80 
       
55 52 Republican 22,068 23.69 3,148 20.43 
 54 Republican 22,013 17.66 2,394 15.42 
 56 Democrat 21,938  34.50 4,981 31.80 
 85 Democrat 20,994 71.16 10,055 68.59 
       
57 27 Democrat 22,107 8.06 1,319 7.88 
 56 Democrat 21,938  34.50 4,981 31.80 
 58 Republican 22,107 8.06 1,319 7.88 
       
63 56 Democrat 21,938  34.50 4,981 31.80 
 54 Republican 22,013 17.66 2,394 15.42 
 85 Democrat 20,994 71.16 10,055 68.59 
 73 Republican 20,743  13.11 1,917 17.22 
 72 Democrat 20,430 73.51 9,020 68.69 
 64 Republican 21,073 13.25 1,856 11.67 
       
65-70       
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72 63 Democrat 20,099 69.43 8,923 66.30 
 64 Republican 21,073 13.25 1,856 11.67 
 58 Republican 22,107 8.06 1,319 7.88 
 73 Republican 20,743  13.11 1,917 17.22 
       
76 85 Democrat 20,994 71.16 10,055 68.59 
 92 Democrat     
 53 Democrat 20,102 18.34 2,394 16.57 
 62 Democrat 22,054 18.60 2,581 16.39 
       
80 84 Republican 21,765 19.15 2,630 16.79 
 87 Democrat 21,515 36.96 4,996 32.65 
 89 Democrat 22,040 15.20 2,144 12.88 
 88 Democrat 20,692 9.54 1,212 8.11 
 86 Democrat 22,000 33.35 4,478 29.48 
 81 Independent 22,132 21.37 2,975 18.73 
       
82 81 Independent 22,132 21.37 2,975 18.73 
 83 Democrat 20,313 18.24 2,437 15.85 
       
85 55 Democrat 20,540 67.95 8,910 62.13 
 54 Republican 22,013 17.66 2,394 15.42 
 76 Democrat 21,221 68.42 9,351 64.33 
 94 Democrat 20,083 69.36 9,134 55.24 
 53 Democrat 20,102 18.34 2,394 16.57 
 63 Democrat 20,999 69.43 8,923 66.30 
       
91 77 Republican 21,051 29.28 3,805 25.57 
 62 Democrat 22,054 18.60 2,581 16.39 
 97 Democrat 20,050 21.70 2,848 19.33 
 101 Republican     
 53 Democrat 20,102 18.34 2,394 16.57 
       
94 85 Democrat 20,994 71.16 10,055 68.59 
 95 Democrat 20,372 26.54 3,512 23,56 
 96 Democrat 20,072 64.31 8,353 60.55 
   22,111 11.77 1,571 10.10 
96 85 Democrat 20,994 71.16 10,055 68.59 
 97 Democrat 20,050 21.70 2,848 19.33 
 98 Democrat 20,516 65.71 8,395 61.31 
       
98 96 Democrat 20,072 64.31 8,353 60.55 
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 97 Democrat 20,050 21.70 2,848 19.33 
 99 Democrat 20,042 35.52 4,261 31.05 
       
103 102 Republican 21,713 14.81 2,360 13.17 
 104 Republican 22,145 10.31 1,438 9.11 
       
119 121 Democrat 20,597 10.83 1,412 9.69 
 120 Republican 21,874 11.57 1,745 10.66 
 115 Democrat 21,255 25.93 3,790 23.56 
 117 Democrat 21,259 14.35 1,930 11.99 
       
110       
Note: Districts 49, 65-70 and 110 were too small to identify on the map.  
 
Source: This data were collected from Mississippi’s House of Representatives. 
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Table A.17: Mississippi’s  Majority-African American House of Representatives  Districts and the 
Demographics of each District for 2003 
 
Districts Total Population Percent African 
American 
Number African 
American 18 + 
Percent African 
American 18 + 
5 22,505 64.42 10,014 62.03 
9 20,814 72.26 9,553 67.30 
11 21,608 59.35 8,053 54.39 
26 21,258 79.15 10,339 74.96 
27 24,218 70.41 11,265 65.66 
29 21,538 79.25 10,983 75.11 
30 20,522 73.06 10,517 69.39 
31 20,453 75.63 9,878 71.66 
32 21,004 86.74 11,812 83.68 
36 20,861 67.01 9,110 62.91 
38 22,776 65.17 9,770 60.25 
41 19,967 66.09 8,800 62.76 
42 19,818 69.55 9,342 65.97 
47 21,055 73.04 9,923 68.60 
49 18,894 83.13 10,054 79.48 
50 19,558 79.99 9,860 75.36 
51 19,313 74.57 9,064 70.41 
55 19,021 71.81 9,122 67.94 
57 25,564 70.24 11,436 65.57 
63 20,692 63.07 8,774 60.34 
65 17,807 82.32 10,562 79.10 
66 22,781 54.76 8,482 49.86 
67 19,339 82.20 10,623 78.44 
68 20,778 88.97 11,217 85.30 
69 17,106 83.91 9,973 81.23 
70 16,890 76.00 9,276 71.83 
71 20,392 62.21 7,689 55.01 
72 20,059 87.83 11,324 84.67 
76 21,835 68.50 10,172 64.89 
80 20,968 73.72 10,040 69.07 
82 19,043 80.00 9,846 74.65 
85 22,874 74.19 12,025 72.15 
91 21,905 56.51 8,140 52.70 
94 19,029 74.39 9,551 71.04 
96 20,293 65.16 9,198 62.09 
98 21,537 65.48 9,321 61.69 
103 19,334 75.84 9,539 70.03 
110 18,965 72.83 9,458 68.58 
119 20,227 65.20 8,779 60.82 
Source: This data were collected from Mississippi’s House of Representatives. 
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Table A. 18: The Adjacent Districts from the Majority African American Districts and 
the Demographics and Party of Candidate elected in 2003 to these Districts 
 
Districts Adjacent 
Districts 
Political 
Party of the 
Districts 
Total 
Population 
Percent 
African 
American 
Number 
African 
American 
18 + 
Percent 
African 
American 
18 + 
5 52 Republican 23,417 34.67 5,126 30.38 
 8 Republican 25,370 31.19 5,404 29.21 
 11 Democrat 21,608 59.35 8,053 54.39 
 13 Democrat 36,740 57.5 19.23 17.99 
       
9 8 Republican 25,370 31.19 5,404 29.21 
 25 Democrat 29,325 17.62 3,237 15.60 
 26 Democrat 21,258 79.15 10,339 74.96 
 11 Democrat 21,608 59.35 8053 54.39 
       
11 5 Democrat 22,505 64.42 10,041 62.03 
 13 Democrat 36,740 19.63 4,758 17.99 
 10 Democrat 25,318 30.19 5,143 27.28 
 26 Democrat 21,258 79.15 10,339 74.96 
 9 Democrat 20,814 72.26 9,553 67.30 
 8 Republican 25,370 31.19 5,404 29.21 
       
26 25 Democrat 29,325 17.62 3,237 15.60 
 9 Democrat 20,814 72.26 9,553 67.30 
 10 Democrat 25,318 30.19 5,143 27.28 
 30 Democrat 20,522 73.06 10,517 69.39 
 11 Democrat 21,608 59.35 8053 54.39 
       
27 56 Republican 26,882 31.86 5,757 29.73 
 47 Democrat 21,055 73.04 9,923 68.60 
 48 Democrat 22,695 50.59 7,524 45.99 
 45 Democrat 27,445 28.87 5,364 27.05 
 58 Republican 11,220 12.42 3,085 12.07 
 57 Democrat 25,564 70.24 11,436 65.57 
       
29 25 Democrat 29,325 17.62 3,237 15.60 
 31 Democrat 20,453 75.63 9,878 71.66 
 28 Democrat 20,617 45.46 6,131 40.53 
 49 Democrat 18,894 83.13 10,054 79.48 
 30 Democrat 20,522 73.06 10,517 69.39 
       
30 31 Democrat 20,453 75.63 9,878 71.66 
 29 Democrat 21, 538 79.25 10,983 75.11 
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 26 Democrat 21,258 79.15 10,339 74.96 
 33 Democrat 22,094 43.71 6,392 39.30 
 24 Democrat 22,748 36.81 5,673 33.83 
 34 Democrat 21,528 45.08 6,497 40.91 
       
31 34 Democrat 21,528 45.08 6,497 40.91 
 28 Democrat 20,617 45.46 6,131 40.53 
       
32 46 Republican 21,600 35.87 5,244 32.54 
 34 Democrat 21,528 45.08 6,497 40.91 
       
36 20 Democrats 21,808 16.73 2,463 15.27 
 37 Republican 24,141 24.91 4,473 22.35 
 22 Democrat 21,541 41.00 5,772 37.55 
 23 Republican 21,692 22.75 3,305 20.34 
       
38 35 Republican 22,741 27.67 4.131 24.69 
 37 Republican 24,141 24.91 4,473 22.35 
 42 Democrat 19,818 69.55 9,342 65.97 
 43 Democrat 21,411 42.03 6,039 38.39 
       
41 37 Republican 24,141 24.91 4,473 22.35 
 39 Democrat 19,823 25.22 3,261 22.22 
       
42 38 Democrat 22,776 65.17 9,770 60.25 
 43 Democrat 21,411 42.03 6,039 38.39 
 44 Democrat 24,410 20.43 3,242 18.34 
 81 Republican 23,882 21.06 3,339 18.84 
       
47 27 Democrat 24,218 70.41 11,265 65.66 
 48 Democrat 22,695 50.59 7,524 45.99 
 51 Democrat 19,313 74.57 9,064 70.41 
 56 Republican 26,882 31.86 5,757 29.73 
       
49 34 Democrat 21,528 45.08 6,497 40.91 
 50 Democrat 19,558 79.99 9,860 75.36 
       
50 34 Democrat 21,528 45.08 6,497 40.91 
 49 Democrat 18,894 83.13 10,054 79.48 
       
51 34 Democrats 21,528 45.08 6,497 40.91 
 47 Democrat 21,055 73.04 9,923 68.60 
 48 Democrat 22,695 50.59 7,524 45.99 
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 54 Republican 24,959 27.20 4,339 24.10 
 56 Republican 26,882 31.86 5,757 29.73 
       
55 54 Republican 24,959 27.20 4,339 24.10 
       
57 27 Democrat 24,218 70.41 11,265 65.66 
 56 Republican 26,882 31.86 5,757 29.73 
 58 Republican 34,537 12.42 3,085 12.07 
       
63 56 Republican 26,882 31.86 5,757 29.73 
 69 Democrat 17,106 83.91 9,973 81.23 
 73 Republican 26,566 6,728 4,699 23.35 
 85 Democrat 22,874 74.19 12,025 72.15 
       
70       
       
71 60 Republican 30,982 31.75 7,208 31.20 
 61 Republican 23,203 11.76 1,759 10.17 
 69 Democrat 17,106 83.91 9,973 81.23 
 73 Republican 26,566 25.33 4,699 23.35 
       
69 63 Democrat 20,692 63.07 8,774 60.34 
 71 Democrat 20,392 62.21 7,689 55.01 
 73 Republican 26,566 25.33 4,699 23.35 
       
68 56 Republican 26,882 31.86 5,757 29.73 
 63 Democrat 20,692 63.07 8,774 60.34 
 67 Democrat 19,339 82.20 10,623 78.44 
 69 Democrat 17,106 83.91 9,973 81.23 
 72 Democrat 20,059 87.83 11,324 84.67 
       
67 72 Democrat 20,059 87.83 11,324 84.67 
       
65-66       
       
72 56 Democrat 26,882 31.86 5,757 29.73 
 67 Democrat 19,339 82.20 10,623 78.44 
       
76 62 Republican 26,442 18.96 3,351 17.40 
 63 Democrat 20,692 63.07 8,774 60.34 
 73 Republican 26,566 25.33 4,699 23.35 
 85 Democrat 22,874 74.19 12,025 72.15 
 92 Democrat 21,842 38.30 5,717 35.46 
219 
 
Table A.18 continued 
 
80 84 Republican 23,876 20.24 3,390 18.97 
 86 Democrat 24,000 35.68 5,418 31.79 
 87 Democrat 22,775 40.40 6,110 36.65 
 89 Democrat 23,760 21.60 3,352 18.45 
       
82 81 Republican 23,882 21.06 3,339 18.84 
 83 Republican 20,627 32.06 4,275 27.42 
       
85 54 Republican 24,959 27.20 4,339 24.10 
 56 Republican 26,882 31.86 5,757 29.73 
 57 Democrat 25,564 70.24 11,436 65.57 
 63 Democrat 20,692 63.07 8,774 60.34 
 76 Democrat 21,835 68.50 10,172 64.89 
 94 Democrat 19,029 74.39 9,551 71.04 
       
91 53 Democrats 22,565 17.90 2,788 16.71 
 62 Republican 26,442 18.96 3,351 17.40 
 77 Republican 24,295 31.34 4,862 27.70 
 90 Democrat 24,254 27.39 4,232 24.01 
 92 Democrat 21,842 38.30 5,717 35.46 
       
94 85 Democrat 22,874 74.19 12,025 72.15 
 97 Republican 21,605 26.12 3,806 23.61 
       
96 97 Republican 21,605 26.12 3,806 23.61 
 98 Democrat 21,537 65.48 9,321 61.69 
       
98 96 Democrat 20,293 65.16 9,198 62.09 
 97 Republican 21,605 26.12 3,806 23.61 
 99 Democrat 20,493 36.39 4,793 32.42 
       
103 90 Democrat 24,254 27.39 4,232 24.01 
 101 Republican 29,379 13.84 2,604 12.25 
 103 Democrat 19,334 75.84 9,539 70.03 
       
110 109 Republican 23,842 6.53 950 5.57 
 111 Republican 21,932 22.54 3,069 19.02 
 112 Republican 29,059 16.68 2,874 14.04 
       
119 95 Republican 20,705 28.81 4,050 25.88 
 117 Republican 23,164 19.29 2,910 16.33 
 120 Republican 23,189 14.28 2,159 12.32 
 118 Republican 25,964 22.98 3,965 20.49 
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 116 Republican 26,378 10.29 1,668 8.69 
 
Note: Districts 65, 66, and 70 on the map were too small to identify.   
 
Source: This data were collected from Mississippi’s House of Representatives. 
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